Should crimes involving racism carry stiffer penalties?
The Economist's take:
THE relationship between justice and race is fraught. On August 11th Robert Buckland, the solicitor-general, was quoted in the Daily Telegraph newspaper as saying that those convicted in Newcastle earlier this month of abusing women and girls, plying them with alcohol and drugs before forcing them to have sex, should face stiffer penalties because the gang of mostly Asian men had targeted white victims. During the trial in Newcastle, the jury heard that one member of the gang had referred to women as “white trash” who were “only good for one thing”. Where evidence of “racial hostility of motivation” is apparent, sentences should be longer, argued Mr Buckland.
The case illustrates the complexity of taking into account the role that racism and other forms of prejudice play in crime. The law in England and Wales does, in fact, allow for harsher penalties if certain types of prejudice are deemed to have been an aggravating factor in a crime. If police and prosecutors can establish that a suspect demonstrated racial or religious hostility while carrying out certain offences—mostly types of assault and criminal damage—or that they were motivated by such prejudice, the person can be charged with “aggravated” versions of those crimes, which carry stiffer sentences.
On this basis, whereas those found guilty of common assault can face up to six months in prison, those convicted of racially aggravated assault can end up inside for two years. Shout a racial slur while inflicting grievous bodily harm and your prison sentence could be seven years; if you merely grunt while pummelling your victim, five years is the maximum. Other forms of bigotry, such as homophobia, can also be taken into account when crooks are sentenced, but judges cannot hand down punishments more severe than the maximum specified for the “basic” version of the offence.
The formal system of aggravated offences sends a strong message denouncing racism, argues Mark Walters, a criminologist at the University of Sussex who specialises in hate crimes. The stigma of being labelled racist is such that he reckons defendants will admit to violence more readily than any kind of racial intolerance.
Others are sceptical. Harry Potter, a barrister at 25 Bedford Row Chambers, argues that it should be left to judges to determine whether these kinds of prejudice have influenced crimes and what, if any, impact that should have on sentences. Juries can be unwilling to convict defendants of the aggravated versions of a crime if they think that the abuse was simply flung in the heat of the moment, rather than representing deep-seated prejudice.
But Mr Walters points out that the option of charging people specifically with racially aggravated crimes ensures that police focus on obtaining the necessary evidence to prove such prejudice. The racist murder in 1993 of Stephen Lawrence, a black teenager, and the ensuing public inquiry, which found that institutional racism in the Metropolitan Police had hampered its investigation of Lawrence’s death, prompted the formalisation of this category of offences.
Some argue that more intelligent sentences would be a better response than merely longer ones. Those found guilty of racially aggravated crimes could undergo education or rehabilitation to correct their prejudice, instead of, or in addition to, serving more time inside.
Many legal systems around the world now classify hate crimes in some form. But according to Mr Walters, since Britain permits the prosecution of offences where racism has merely been demonstrated, rather than demanding proof that it motivated the crime, many more cases go to court. Rooting out such prejudice is harder.
