http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/21/...ulnerable/amp/
DARPA working on creating an electric Navajo.
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http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/21/...ulnerable/amp/
DARPA working on creating an electric Navajo.
We haven't been hacked. We just failed to consider that our new tactical net system was designed solely to work against people in yurts with no jamming or sigint capabilities.
$6 billion dollars? Just stick some backslashes or whatever in. It'll be fine. pfft.
It is interesting how this shows the pendulum might be starting to swing again. For the last 15 (or 25, depending on who's doing the talking) years, we've been hearing about how the military is designed to fight interstate opponents in full-scale warfare, a paradigm for a kind of conflict we just weren't getting involved in and which there was no sign we'd be getting involved in any time in the future. So we have developments like this which are exceedingly useful in the kinds of current conflicts we're fighting but which may be quickly nullified (or even used to hurt us in some ways) against the older traditional kind of conflict-opponent.
I think it's always been a weird mix of weapons systems that are conflict-specific and maintaining the capability to effectively dominate a near-peer opponent. We've seen this in many different contexts - for example, the big shift towards developing MRAPs and IED jamming systems - those vehicles weren't even useful for both Iraq and Afghanistan, and they are of dubious value in fighting a sophisticated opponent... and all of the money spent on jamming systems was eventually a dead end as they rapidly became obsolescent. This is in contrast to the utter failure of Future Combat Systems (an early attempt to develop a heavily networked land force) as being too dependent on sophisticated and expensive technology when the real threats were relatively low tech.Quote:
Originally Posted by LittleFuzzy
There's been similar internal struggles in the air and naval branches as well. The USAF and companion air services theoretically espouse a 'high-low' mix for their aircraft mix: essentially a lot of cheap and versatile aircraft that can get dramatic force multiplication by working with a smaller number of very sophisticated aircraft. The classic example might be with the F-16 on the low end and something like the F-22 on the high end. But there is internal criticism that even the F-16 is far too sophisticated and expensive for the likes of close air support in uncontested environments. And indeed 'cheaper' aircraft (on an operating basis) like the AC-130 gunship and the smaller A-10 Warthog have been used to good effect in a variety of low tech conflicts in recent decades... and even cheaper options like Reapers have been increasingly used in the place of high end multirole fighters - at least when time isn't a factor. There's been a big argument brewing in the USAF over the need for a new light attack plane to further fill in this role. But it's hardly a new phenomenon - F-22 procurement numbers were sharply cut when it became clear that it was ridiculous overkill for the vast majority of applications.
On the naval side, there has been a similar debate going on for some time. The USN tried to develop the so-called 'littoral class ship' for taking some of the strain off of guided missile destroyers that were being used for deployments in which they were ridiculously overpowered. Similarly, there has been discussion of the possibility of using more flexible and smaller ships in lieu of supercarriers for force projection (e.g. the new amphibious assault vessels that are essentially baby carriers). The Seawolf class attack sub was shelved in favor of a cheaper and somewhat simpler Virginia class based on a similar calculation.
All of this really boils down to the US scaling back the high end of its mix following the end of the Cold War. It's not terribly surprising that some more thought is going into strengthening this capability as we see a more assertive Russia and a potential confrontation with China brewing. It's not just communications that's being given a long, hard look, either. US Abrams tanks - long a mildly useless capability since 1991 - have been heavily upgraded in recent years, including the recent procurement of active protection systems to defend against sophisticated ATGMs Russia is turning out nowadays. The new LRSB is being developed to give some level of penetration capability in contested environments. Naval procurement is being rethought given the likely operational tempo moving forward and the substantial growth of regional powers that are at least potentially hostile to US interests.
I guess my real point is that it's not such a clear 'pendulum' so much as it is an ongoing assessment of strategic and tactical needs as constrained by budgetary priorities and with the built-in development lag of major military procurement plans.