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Originally Posted by
Illusions
In what case?
For starters:
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Originally Posted by
Illusions
In order for your belief to be factual, you would have to prove that there is a universal morality outside the scope of human opinion. I can back up my belief simply by polling the existing human population and finding disagreement. :bored:
This is only correct if you presuppose that the standard of evidence you offer--polling the existing human population in search of disagreement--is sufficient proof, which in turn presupposes that morality is not absolute and universal. However, if morality were absolute and universal then it wouldn't matter what the polling results were--a Believer would still be able to say that those who disagree are simply wrong.
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I can use human behavior as proof if its human behavior I'm researching. If for instance you stated that there was a universal icecream flavor preference over other flavors, and that it was chocolate, and I found a sample of people who like strawberry better, then your claim would be wrong. What you are claiming is that there is, because those people who like strawberry better than chocolate are wrong, and that preference for chocolate is woven into the very fabric of the universe.
In addition to begging the question, you're also changing the question. No-one's saying all humans believe the same things, nor are they saying all humans behave in the exact same way. The underlying claim is that there are moral facts/laws that exist and are true irrespective of what humans believe or do. Ie. if someone says "rape is right" we can in theory say "you're wrong".
What Enoch seems to have done is to claim that we can take similarities between societies throughout history as evidence for the existence of universal and absolute moral facts/laws. Fuzzy touches on this by referring to Plato's ideal forms and the shadows on the cave wall. You rightly point out that we can't take our observations of human behaviour and reported human beliefs as proof of universal moral facts or laws--there are other possible explanations eg. that societies with dramatically different moral systems would perhaps simply not be able to exist as societies. I don't know if that's true (I think they may perhaps be able to exist as very crappy societies because you just need to be "good enough" in this world), but I accept your argument in principle. However I don't believe that in itself disproves absolute and universal morals, at least not ones that are just.
It should be said that, while Believers attempt to use observational evidence from time to time, such evidence is not the basis of their beliefs in these matters. If it were, then their beliefs would be entirely contingent and possibly also arbitrary. Instead they usually assert these beliefs as being self-evident, or necessarily apparent as being true to any rational and just person.
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It should be able to, in the same way that someone stating that gravity does not operate via invisible pink unicorns should be able to, unless someone offers either proof or a testable hypothesis that states otherwise.
It should not be able to, esp. not when you pick the wrong predictions/hypotheses and require the wrong tests. Moreover, the notion that science and ethics require different approaches isn't exactly a strange one in either science and ethics. Do you know many scientists who seriously claim that the scientific method can tell us--in principle--what's right or wrong rather than to tell us what is--provisionally--true or false? Who claim that the scientific method can tell us what goals we should seek?
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I understand it, but I don't think Enoch is arguing the same thing as you are. What I think you are arguing is of the most whimsical, child-like level of logic and deduction possible. Maybe we should just all revert to solipsism and be done with it...
*shrugs* You can if you like, but this isn't solipsism. I do however share some of your frustration with these idealistic positions, because I don't think that they're tenable and I don't think they lend themselves well to rational discussions even on their own terms. One of the problems I'm having with the questions in the OP is that I can't see a way for this belief in an absolute universal morality to be tenable on its own terms, at least not the versions I've come across. From what I can tell, the foundations of its principles and of its practice are all problematic.
A solipsist--that fabled and probably non-existant creature--wouldn't be much of a believer in absolute universal morality except in a very limited sense and possibly only if he approached morality as Kant did. Viewed as an extreme skeptic in general (rather than as a non-believer in other minds or in an external reality) the solipsist may perhaps be able to claim, with a straight face, that all claims about/approaches to moral questions are equally valid--but the degree of validity would nevertheless only be "provisional". How do you reconcile that view with telling people that they're absolutely wrong? You don't--you can only tell them (automatons or figments of your imagination) that they're provisionally wrong. It would be just as easy to reconcile solipsism with a belief in a completely relative/subjective/contingent morality.
Solipsism is frustrating, non-rational and unproductive but let's not make it something it's not.
Re. logic and deduction, I don't think your approach here is completely logical, nor do I think you can lay any claim to deduction given that your approach has so far consisted mostly of induction. I would suggest that logical deduction would be a more suitable approach and that logical deduction would not support the position [I'm pretending] Enoch holds [until he corrects me].
Please understand that even if I disagree with your reasoning and with your claims I do not agree with the viewpoint you're attacking. I would however like to be right for the right reasons and I don't think your reasons are the right reasons. At the moment my intuition is that the right reasons would have to have something to do with the incorrectness of the claims and arguments used to justify a belief in a universal and absolute morality, or with that belief's problematic nature.
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As opposed to the mystical pursuit of knowledge? I just waved a napkin around, from the rustling sounds it produced its telling me that you're wrong.
That's absolute nonsense. You can instead accuse the believer in IPGU of being non-rational or non-parsimonious, or even provisionally wrong for reasons x y z for the purposes of mu. Your enemy here isn't mysticism but rather an extreme and rarely-asserted approach to epistemology. It's not used to justify a belief in any particular conception of reality; rather, it's used to justify a general disbelief or to limit all knowledge as being "maybe true" to begin with.
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I can tell you it involves words like "all" and "everything", so all - 1, or everything - 1, is not universal. So for instance you can claim (someone with knowledge of such societies, tell me if I'm wrong) "It is universally held among modern Western societies that murder is amoral." but not "It is universally held among human beings that murder is amoral."
1. Changing the question--no-one has claimed that all humans believe the same things. One person has (I think) claimed that the general agreement between humans that eg. slavery is wrong may be seen as evidence that slavery is wrong, but that same person would (I think) also say that slavery would be wrong even if everyone in society believed it to be right.
2. Let's say I live in Sweden and Sweden has a national law that says "it's a crime to hit people in this country" and then I hit a person in Sweden. Have I committed a crime? By law, I have. I can say that it isn't a crime to hit people, but I would (legally) be wrong. I can say that the hitting-people-law does not apply to me, but I would (legally) be wrong. Inside Sweden that law would be absolute and it would apply to everyone in all of Sweden despite my powerful -1. Extrapolate "Sweden" to "universe".