Agreed, I worry it's laying the "groundwork". Then again, the Soviets told their people crazy false shit for years while they were invading Afghanistan and never used nukes.Quote:
Originally Posted by Flixy
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Agreed, I worry it's laying the "groundwork". Then again, the Soviets told their people crazy false shit for years while they were invading Afghanistan and never used nukes.Quote:
Originally Posted by Flixy
Fair enough, though I don't remember that since that's from before my time. It definitely feels line they're justifying genocide though - then again they have to since that's pretty much what they're doing.
I agree they are laying the ground work to dehumanizing Ukrainians but I get wary of the phrase "genocide". It get thrown around too much.
Sure, but the combination of dehumanizing, promising destruction, committing war crimes like in Bucha and forced deportations into Russia makes it not so farfetched to describe what they're doing in my opinion.Quote:
Originally Posted by Dreadnaught
Time to kick Turkey out of NATO now that we have a good excuse. :up:
You know, Steely, I've been re-reading our discussion from March, and I think it's interesting to evaluate in the light of how the invasion has played out since. First off, I was wrong - clearly the problems facing the Russian military are far more serious than I and others had assessed early on in the invasion - even with ample time to regroup/retrench and focus on the Black Sea and Donbas, their ability to advance against relatively weaker Ukrainian defenses has been lackluster at best, and points to a whole host of issues. They continue to face pretty serious losses as they work to secure their near term objectives. (I should note, however, that blaming this all on Russian leadership and troops may be risky.)
One thing I didn't really bank on was the degree of weaponry that the West was willing to provide to Ukraine, and the speed with which it has been deployed (especially indirect fires) - this has helped to even things out a bit for the current phase of grinding advances/sieges, though Russia still has the advantage. Early on in the war I heard an analyst say something along the lines of 'In a war of attrition between the Russian military industrial complex and the Ukrainian, it's no contest', which continues to be true. But if you pit the manufacturing capabilities of the West - especially the US - against that of Russia, that's a different story entirely. I think we will have to see how long the US/allies are willing to maintain this pace of deliveries - certain munitions and weapons systems are already getting surprising low in Western inventories, and lead times for replacements are long - but Russia is likely to be in much worse shape from this perspective, and will only lose if it comes to a flat out manufacturing effort.
That being said, I think the asymmetry in manpower will start to tell, though still depending heavily on the degree to which Ukraine and Russia are willing/able to mobilize their populations. I see no sign that Russia is planning to back down, but we'll have to see what that translates into in terms of military power.
One thing I said in March that I believe continues to be true: there is no path to military victory for Ukraine, provided we define it as evicting Russian forces from Ukrainian territory. The only solution would be some sort of negotiated settlement and will likely involve the loss of some Ukrainian territory. That being said, the ability of Ukraine to keep its government functioning and inflict a punishing stalemate or war of attrition on Russia is looking much better than it was a few months ago. I wouldn't be shocked if Russia slows its advances and works to consolidate its control once they are done reducing remaining pockets in Donbas. We may be looking at a very long, very ugly war with no clear endgame.
Couple of additional points:
1) Mobilisation doesn't really help Russia, unless they settle down for a real long war - it takes 6 weeks to do basic training, and then approximately 6 months to learn how to do your job to a basic level of competence, so if they started tomorrow it wouldn't have an effect on the battlefield until next February at the earliest. Even then they just have a load of green troops who likely don't want to be there, and this doesn't solve the equipment issue.
2) I don't agree there is no path to military victory for Ukraine, but it's not the most likely outcome. I would agree that a long stalemate is more likely, but there is another path to victory for Ukraine which is some kind of political collapse in Russia leading to withdraw.
Regarding 1), they have conscription right? Isn't most of the population somewhat trained then?
Although I read that officers are suffering badly who probably are not easily replaced
Regarding 2), I think the best thing to hope for now is a stalemate which Russia might not be able to bear - they are losing a lot of equipment, suffering a lot of casualties, and the longer it lasts the bigger the effect sanctions will have. On the other hand, Putin has doubled down on this war, so it's doubtful he'll accept anything that looks like a loss, so I guess a political collapse is the only real way out. I don't really see Ukraine accepting any kind of concession which Russia could claim as a win.
They are. Also, conscripts are considered fit for active duty in combat zones after 4 months of training in Russia (and there are reports of corpses in Ukraine who've had even less). There's the matter of declaring war on Ukraine before they can draft people from general population, though. So far, they've been telling their people that the "special military operation" is going great; admitting that they need more people so badly that a mobilization is required will probably put a dent or two in that fairy tale. And in the one about "liberating Ukrainian civilians from their illegitimate neo-nazi government". And after so many lies will have collapsed, it might not be exactly the best idea to hand out guns to the general population.Quote:
Originally Posted by Flixy
I think they are settling in for a long war. Re: equipment, in the Donbas they've been relying much more on long range indirect fires, of which they have no shortage of equipment or ammunition (as opposed to, say, high end MBTs or aircraft or precision fires, which are certainly in short supply). I imagine they can slug it out with Ukrainian troops in the East/South for a rather long period. And we have yet to see if Ukrainian troops, once appropriately reinforced and provided adequate equipment, will be able to carry out sustained offensive operations to clear the Russians from increasingly entrenched positions.Quote:
Originally Posted by Steely Glint
This approach to warfare boggles my mind, mostly because Western countries have a very low threshold of pain that they're willing to endure to achieve a set of military objectives. We haven't had a real knock-down, drag-out fight against a near-peer competitor in a very long time, where raw industrial output and manpower become key determinants of success. Is Russia prepared to endure this kind of slog? It's unclear. Is Ukraine? Possibly more so (at least vis a vis morale), but their economy is going to be in deep trouble if this isn't resolved quickly, while Russia can limp along (despite sanctions) for much longer. Infusions of cash/aid/military equipment may help tip the balance, though, because keeping Ukraine more or less functional and fed is relatively cheap for the Western world, especially if Western Ukraine can be kept relatively safe.
Re: political collapse, to me it's all Kremlinology. I have very little understanding of the dynamics of power around Putin or the likelihood of such an event. Based on pre-invasion assessments, it sounded like he had a pretty darned strong grip on power. Whether that assessment was accurate, or whether circumstances has changed, is very difficult for me to tell. I certainly wouldn't mind if Putin was pushed out of office, but banking on that seems unwise and a relatively remote possibility atm.
One interesting side effect of this whole thing is that Western militaries are taking a long hard look at their own equipment/ammunition stockpiles and supply chains and starting to think about what an extended high intensity conflict might look like for their own prospects. I think we're going to see a lot more insurance built into the system moving forward.
There have been multiple explosions/fires in the Russian-controlled Crimea lately, somewhat harming the illusion of safety the local residents enjoyed. And now, another incident, even closer to home:
A car bomb has taken out Alexander Dugin's daughter, it is likely that he was the actual target.
His death would have purely symbolic meaning, if any, but still, the message "even Moscow is not really a safe distance away from the front" should be clear.
My guess the attempted Dugin assassination was by a rival nationalist. Ukrainians have much better targets to go after.
Likely, but it doesn't really matter, as far as the safety (or feeling safe, at least) of anyone of any significance in Moscow is concerned.Quote:
Originally Posted by Loki
Two claims have been made so far. FSB claims that it was a hit organized by Ukrainians (probably not true, but that's the accusation they're going with). And Ilya Ponomarev claims that a group "National Republican Army", whose main goal is overthrowing Putin and his regime, is responsible.
First of all, both claims are tied to Russian invasion of Ukraine.
And secondly, it means that either FSB is going to try to pin any high-profile assassination on Ukraine instead of conducting a proper investigation - which means somewhat lowered risk of getting caught for going after one's rivals in Moscow - or that there is an actual partisan group that is willing and able to eliminate those believed to be responsible for initiating the war. Neither sounds comforting for that particular crowd.
Yes, this incentivizes behavior that Putin probably doesn't want to incentivize.
Lots of chatter that Putin might be about to announce full mobilisation, but then
Twitter Link
And then
Twitter Link
Seems to be some weird stuff happening in Russia. Weirder than usual, at any rate.
It all looks excessively weak. But that also makes me feel it's highly unstable and dangerous.
So a partial mobilization. Won't that make their army even less effective, and still have the same problems?
He said "partial mobilization" in his speech, but the documents he signed and the orders he issued said "full mobilization". There's no defined limit to how many people can be drafted. So many people are trying to flee the country that they had to make it illegal for any man aged 18 to 65 to leave Russia without permission from the Ministry of Defense.Quote:
Originally Posted by Flixy
It's going to be a meat grinder. They're sending these people into Ukraine with whatever cold war equipment remnants they can find that they haven't used already, and they're doing it in winter.
Also, more oligarchs have fallen down stairs and out of windows.
I wonder how many of Putin's food testers have died recently.
Apparently the two British guys who were sentenced to death in a show trial are included in a prisoner swap :up:
Perhaps this will finally influence their support for the war.Quote:
Originally Posted by Wraith
Those protests against the draft are starting to get pretty violent and arsony.
Too little too late. Some 300k (initially) of them will soon learn that staying silent up until now has its price, too.Quote:
Originally Posted by Wraith
The "referendums" on joining Russia have started in the occupied regions, and the results will enable Russia to claim that Ukraine is attacking its territory. This will probably result in Russia officially declaring war. And they will need the manpower, so getting sent to die over there ASAP is an increasingly likely future prospect for many russian citizens.
Not a good time to be a Russian squad leader. When everyone behind you would prefer to see you dead than to charge forward, it's not good for your health.
That's what barrier troops are for.
Russia doesn't have enough motivated troops to fight on the front line, let alone to sit in the rear.
Oh, that problem has a simple fix - explain that if the second line doesn't push the first line forward, they themselves become the first line. There's your motivation.
Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines damaged, Swedish seismologists report detecting explosions at the damage sites:
https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2...ream-gas-leaks
Presuming that it was sabotage, I've been trying to figure out who would actually benefit from making such an attack, and other than a nebulous benefit to Ukraine by blocking a future carrot to Europe from Russia, I'm not seeing anything.
Anyone else got a rationale?
I don't. But then again virtually nothing makes sense these days. Still would bet on the Russians being behind this. Nordstream 2 is a write off, number 1 soon will be, but blowing them up at this point in time could have felt like Western Europe is suffering much more than Russia.
P. S. At home it's 18C inside but the boiler stays off. Heating is limited to a single room, while we're up to several layers of clothes. This is a choice totally unrelated to the cost of gas and/or electricity.
False flag plans. Spite. Russia's military doesn't have an abundance of rational actors (they keep falling out of windows) or firm control over their military right now, so you don't really need much deep explanation.Quote:
Originally Posted by LittleFuzzy
But really I'd suspect it was some non-state actor looking to strike at Russia this time.
I mean, fairly clearly it's meant to put additional economic pressure on Europe with gas prices high and winter approaching, and perhaps serve as a warning about Russia's capabilities in that area.
That's what I'd guess.Quote:
Originally Posted by Steely Glint
I mean, there's the Baltic Pipe:
https://bnn-news.com/official-launch...-russia-238919
I can't find a map which shows both route of the Baltic Pipe and the sites of the Nord Stream leaks, or one that shows either with sufficient precision, but to me they do seem to be uncomfortably close to each other.
I'd heard that theory, that it was a botched Russian op looking to hit the Baltic Pipe. It's pretty easy to believe.
That sounds like a new peak of incompetence for Russians, if true. I mean, sure, the pipelines are kinda close to each other, but not that close, surely?
I would expect any means of attack that can reach the Nord Stream pipes near Bornholm, to be capable of hitting the other pipe, too, and with the naval base in Kaliningrad it doesn't seem too difficult to pull off, but for them to mix up the pipes? If that's the way their operations are run, I'd expect the next New Year address to the nation from the Kremlin to be delivered in Ukrainian.
I could see it happening - their C&C is extremely broken right now, and you've seen the cardboard they use as tank armor or the rusty guns they're fighting with, right? So they send a sub or boat out with orders to blow the Baltic pipe, but the ship is a bit off in their heading and there's no pipe to blow at their destination, so they circle around until they spot a pipeline, think "that must be it!" and set to work screwing up yet again. Not saying that's what happened, but it's plausible to me.Quote:
Originally Posted by BalticSailor
The problem with that theory is that both pipe-lines were hit in multiple places.
Multiple places still tracks, because they probably weren't told that there was their own pipeline in the area that they should not be hitting - unlike Western militaries, Russia runs its by micromanagement and not telling anyone more than the bare minimum. Captured Russian soldiers in the early days of the war weren't even aware they were in Ukraine. Hitting both pipelines...it makes it a bit more of a reach, but I could still see them just deciding a pipe's a pipe, and that's what they're here to crack open, so they better get them both to make sure one of them was the right one.
I'm just speculating though, I have nothing to back this up. I'd still favor the non-state actor looking to bloody Russia's nose theory.
Or to cut off any way back for Vladimir. With love from the rabidly anti western lobby.
That would be hilarious. Kinda hard to believe though, since there were two distinct events, 17 hours apart, on Nord 2 and then Nord 1. If they botched the first and then went back to try again and hit their OTHER pipe, that tells me they had internal sabotage on their attempts to sabotage the competing pipe. A bit too implausible.Quote:
Originally Posted by Wraith