Be Thou Friend or Foe?

[Loki]

You can view the page at http://www.theworldforgotten.com/con...-Friend-or-Foe

[agamemnus]

What you consider prudence by the US government could simply be a perceived weak negotiating position. It believes it is in too weak a position to dictate terms to the Pakistani government and therefore doesn't. It believes it is in too weak a position to tell Georgia to stop trading with Iran, and therefore doesn't.

I don't think that the US government does use all available means at its disposal to pressure its "friends" and allies to do what it wants... it could be simply a result of the bureaucratic structure: a government does not always push in the same direction with all of its constituent parts.

[Loki]

What you consider prudence by the US government could simply be a perceived weak negotiating position. It believes it is in too weak a position to dictate terms to the Pakistani government and therefore doesn't. It believes it is in too weak a position to tell Georgia to stop trading with Iran, and therefore doesn't.

I don't think that the US government does use all available means at its disposal to pressure its "friends" and allies to do what it wants... it could be simply a result of the bureaucratic structure: a government does not always push in the same direction with all of its constituent parts.

It's not a matter of having a weak negotiating position. In case of Georgia, we have about as much leverage as it's possible to have over an ally. We don't use it because we know Iran is Georgia's neighbor, and we don't want to create tension between Georgia and Iran, even if we don't like Iran.

[agamemnus]

It's not a matter of having a weak negotiating position. In case of Georgia, we have about as much leverage as it's possible to have over an ally. We don't use it because we know Iran is Georgia's neighbor, and we don't want to create tension between Georgia and Iran, even if we don't like Iran.

A little non-consequential trade between an ally that owes the US everything? Or the enforcement of maximal economic sanctions against an enemy government which in all likelihood will have nuclear weapons, and the ability to deploy them (via bomber), in as little as 1 year? I think this is a no-brainer. If you play for keeps, you better make damn sure you win.

[Nessus]

This line of reasoning has two ramifications: countries that are considered to be enemies are judged to be incapable of reason and therefore should not be negotiated with, and countries thought to be friends are expected to follow in lockstep on every policy regardless of the cost involved. The former topic has been dealt with elsewhere. The latter is the focal point of the present piece.

(By the way, your link to your earlier post is broken, the content.php comes after the .com)

To be fair, I am sometimes frankly baffled by the assumption of logical and rational behaviour as a given in all political leaders, on the global arena or otherwise. I've seen straight-faced suggestions that Nixon tried to convey an image of craziness and instability to make the CCCP think thrice about calling bluffs. It's a well-documented fact from most (if not all) insular and totalitarian societies that the leadership is mired in fantasy and unrealistic ideas about the world, both their own nation and citizens, and their expectations of the behaviour of foreign powers are also divorced from reality. By choice or by inertia of the information-controlling nature of non-liberal gummints, doesn't matter, the end result invariably is that the leaders cannot be expected to behave rationally a majority of the time.

Of course your article goes on about the other extreme, so the relevance of this post is questionable

[Loki]

(By the way, your link to your earlier post is broken, the content.php comes after the .com)

Thanks. I keep on fixing it, and then it screws up again...

To be fair, I am sometimes frankly baffled by the assumption of logical and rational behaviour as a given in all political leaders, on the global arena or otherwise. I've seen straight-faced suggestions that Nixon tried to convey an image of craziness and instability to make the CCCP think thrice about calling bluffs. It's a well-documented fact from most (if not all) insular and totalitarian societies that the leadership is mired in fantasy and unrealistic ideas about the world, both their own nation and citizens, and their expectations of the behaviour of foreign powers are also divorced from reality. By choice or by inertia of the information-controlling nature of non-liberal gummints, doesn't matter, the end result invariably is that the leaders cannot be expected to behave rationally a majority of the time.

I did hear a pretty convincing theory about North Korea acting crazy to get more concessions out of the West. Can't argue with the results there. But you're right, that's hardly something that can be used to explain the behavior of most such states. I think a way to partially resolve the problem is to maintain the rationality assumption, but instead of assuming that states are rational, assume that individuals are rational. Individual rationality need not lead to national rationality. For example, it's in the interest of many dictatorial regimes to suppress a lot of information. By having a monopoly of certain kind of information and by preventing any other actor from accumulating a lot of information, the dictator is able to play domestic actors off each other to stay in power. The side-effect of this kind of a policy is that some information never gets to the top, and dictators have no choice but to not pass some available information to those who might need it. Then you end up in a situation like the one Hussein found himself in. The only way that individual rationality leads to national rationality is if the interests of most key domestic actors are aligned, and that's rarely the case.

[Loki]

And what would happen if Iran started trying to incite violence in Georgia? Or if the Georgian economy collapsed? Hell, we were encouraging trade between Afghanistan and Iran, and that's more than some non-consequential trade.

[LittleFuzzy]

The problem here is differing values of "doesn’t mean we should do nothing to prevent actions that jeopardize key American interests," are quite sufficient to generate the responses you're decrying. ISI has done things like ruin our ops. And it will do so in the future if/when we give them the chance.

[Loki]

The problem here is differing values of "doesn’t mean we should do nothing to prevent actions that jeopardize key American interests," are quite sufficient to generate the responses you're decrying. ISI has done things like ruin our ops. And it will do so in the future if/when we give them the chance.

Not all interests are "key interests", and many are too expensive to pursue anyway. I would favor a simple cost-benefit analysis in each instance. What's the expected benefit of using sticks against an ally: is it likely to work, can we maintain this policy over the long turn, how will this affect our relationships with similar countries? And what's the benefit: does it tangibly improve our position in an area we care about, will it continue to benefit us over the long term?

[agamemnus]

And what would happen if Iran started trying to incite violence in Georgia?

Firstly, Iran would be weakened by more sanctions, so their money flow would be smaller and they would be less effective at inciting violence in general. Also, this means that they would have a smaller ability to incite violence in other areas. Finally, this should be expected as part of the multinational sanctions plan. Again, playing for keeps.

Or if the Georgian economy collapsed? Hell, we were encouraging trade between Afghanistan and Iran, and that's more than some non-consequential trade.

Cover it with American assistance: again, part of the overall plan.

It makes no sense for a government to pull in opposite directions when the intended result, if successful, would have a very big benefit. (ie: dissolution of Iranian regime)

[Loki]

Firstly, Iran would be weakened by more sanctions, so their money flow would be smaller and they would be less effective at inciting violence in general. Also, this means that they would have a smaller ability to incite violence in other areas. Finally, this should be expected as part of the multinational sanctions plan. Again, playing for keeps.

Georgia needs Iran far more than vice versa. Sure, Iran might be slightly less able to cause damage, but it would be far more willing to do all the damage it can. Don't think for a minute that Iran is doing anything near everything they can to cause trouble.

Cover it with American assistance: again, part of the overall plan.

You're going to pay billions to every one of Iran's neighbors?

It makes no sense for a government to pull in opposite directions when the intended result, if successful, would have a very big benefit. (ie: dissolution of Iranian regime)

Does America have one interest?

[agamemnus]

Does America have one interest?

It's a pretty big thing.

Of course, the other part is that it would basically nearly eliminate Saudi Arabia from wasting money on billions (?) in American-made parts and equipment for their military yearly...

[Loki]

It's a pretty big thing.

Of course, the other part is that it would basically nearly eliminate Saudi Arabia from wasting money on billions (?) in American-made parts and equipment for their military yearly...

And you can think of no other interest that would be harmed by using all our capital on this one?

[agamemnus]

I got nothing. Please, share with the class your thoughts about this hypothetical... (actually, which hypothetical are we talking about, now?)