Zionuts

[wiggin]

The flight ban hit on July 22, after the beginning of the ground offensive. I don't think they're connected in the slightest. For that matter, Hamas has had the range to hit the Tel Aviv area for several years now. To be honest, the threat to commercial aviation from Hamas' rockets is minimal, and I think upon consultation with Israeli sources on the threat, the FAA et al agreed and rescinded the closure. A much bigger threat to Ben Gurion would be if they ceded full control of the heights in the West Bank to Palestinians - from there, even a MANPAD can take down an airliner on approach.


Still don't get how you're connecting tunnels with shelling the airport...?

[GGT]

Okay....so if threats to commercial aviation and airports in Israel are "minimal", then why does Israel continue to broaden sanctions, and limit Palestinians from fishing for food on their own borders?

[Flixy]

Because Israel is composed of more than just airports and aviation?

[GGT]

Because Israel is composed of more than just airports and aviation?

And what comprises "Palestine" and/or the Gaza strip?

[Flixy]

And what comprises "Palestine" and/or the Gaza strip?

What, you just asked why Israel is moving against Hamas while air travel is relatively safe - but you are aware that Hamas does more than just threatening airports, right? I think it's fair to say Israel's sanctions are pretty much unrelated to the safety of air travel, and more related to the safety of Israel/Israelis in general, and Hamas' attacks on them. Without judging one way or the other on the conflict, why on earth do you think it has to do with just air travel?

[Loki]

What comprises the price of strawberries in Peru?

[GGT]

What comprises the price of strawberries in Peru?

Trade agreements with political objectives.

I appreciate the ability to buy strawberries year-round and out-of-season. Or fly anywhere we want. But that doesn't make for comprehensive domestic policy.

[Hazir]

Trade agreements with political objectives.

I appreciate the ability to buy strawberries year-round and out-of-season. Or fly anywhere we want. But that doesn't make for comprehensive domestic policy.

You are totally wrong about the strawberries; those you should only buy local and in season. Out of season imported strawberries are always harvested too early in order to make them transportable without too much loss, resulting in produce that looks like strawberries, but tastes like bags of water.

[Loki]

Because everything is related to everything, meaning that everything is equal to everything else.

[wiggin]

Honestly, Minx, posting a bunch of links without your own narrative to tie it together is just a waste of our time; in fact, they largely have nothing to do with internal Israeli politics in driving a Gaza offensive. But here goes:

1. The Salon piece, flawed and absurd as it was, indeed agrees with me on one thing: this conflict has little to do with the episode of the kidnapped/murdered teenagers. The flaw, of course, is in the rest of his analysis; the basic flaw in his argument is that I can guarantee the airstrikes would never have started in earnest (and could easily have been stopped during the first week) had Hamas held its fire. The occasional tit-for-tat that goes on in both Gaza and the West Bank would continue at a low simmer, of course, but we wouldn't be looking at 1500 dead people. He argues for a narrative of Israel choosing this war and dragging Hamas along kicking and screaming; rather, it's the reverse. I agree wholeheartedly that the Israeli government and electorate aren't shying away from a fight, but they had no particular interest in it. Now, of course, the battle has a certain momentum of its own, but in the early stages of this conflict I am confident it could have been stopped by the simple fact of Hamas ceasing hostilities. This is the fundamental flaw in his argumentation re: Israel's choice of this fight.

There was also all sorts of false moral equivalencies, obfuscation of the truth, and poor logic in the rest of the piece, but that's par for the course.

2. The Ynet piece, while factual (inasmuch as the US official's opinion is factual) represents an incorrect analysis. Much more detailed accounts of the failed peace talks suggest that a number of factors were problems, and settlements were only tangentially related to those factors. Two that seemed proximate to the issue was Netanyahu's political troubles in releasing the final tranche of Israeli Arab terrorists (as opposed to Palestinian Arabs who could be readily deported), as well as a reluctance to discuss final borders and maps until security guarantees had been sorted out. The second, as also mentioned in the Ynet piece, is partly related to settlements, but I suspect it had more to do with concerns regarding the Jordan Valley security arrangements. Frankly, I find the entire line of reasoning that settlement expansion is at fault to be disingenuous. Netanyahu, leading a center-right coalition, agreed to an unprecedented (and politically risky) 9 month settlement construction freeze, only to have the PA dawdle on setting up negotiations until the freeze ran out. When they demanded the freeze be reinstated, Netanyahu's response was more or less 'tough luck, you had your chance and wasted it'. To be honest, he's right. And even the US official quoted anonymously in the Ynet piece recognizes that Netanyahu was willing to budge a bit on his negotiating position, but Abbas pretty much never changed his opening offer. It wasn't a terrible offer - though there were a few deal breakers for Israel - but it also was a mockery of 'negotiations'.

That being said, I do think that the more comes out from the failed talks, it seems like they were frustratingly close except for intransigence on both sides along with unrealistic timelines. My big question, though, is whether any agreement negotiated with the PA would be worth the paper it was written on without buy-in from Hamas.

3. I read David Horovitz's analysis of Netanyahu's remarks when they came out. I thought it was interesting, though he may have exaggerated the implications a bit - perhaps Netanyahu, by calling for 'security control' west of the Jordan, was willing to accede to a demilitarized West Bank, rather than one under continual Israeli security control. I think it's no secret that Netanyahu is very concerned about security arrangements in the Jordan Valley (with good reason), but he has shown some flexibility on the rest of the West Bank. That being said, Horovitz may be right in that Netanyahu's vision of a 'Palestinian state' may fall short of a vision of complete sovereignty imagined by others. This may be problematic, agreed - though I think that as a truly peaceful Palestinian state behind defined borders began to blossom in the West Bank (and, hopefully Gaza), Israeli security and political echelons would grow more comfortable with lessening their security arrangements. It would take years - possibly decades - but future politicians might cross a Rubicon that Netanyahu isn't prepared to countenance now.

4. Derfner's piece falls for the same fallacies as others I've seen. He sees Gaza as inextricably linked with the kidnappings, while I see the escalation in Gaza as a byproduct of Hamas' weakness that has little connection. Oh, I have no doubt that Hamas wasn't happy about Israel rounding up a bunch of Hamas leaders in the West Bank, but they generally don't go to war over a few dozen arrests, or a dead teenager. Protests, sporadic gunfire, etc. - sure. But hundred-rocket salvos? No, that's a premeditated, calculated move that wouldn't be done for something so small. In fact, the only proximate cause I can see that might have led to this was the explosion of an attack tunnel in Gaza that killed a large number of Hamas operatives (numbers are still a bit unclear) that happened immediately preceding the start of massive rocket fire. That makes sense; Hamas sensed they were losing their grip on the Gaza Strip from the increased vigilance by Egypt, the unity government hadn't gotten them relief, and then their one strategic trump card - a plan to attack Israel through the network of tunnels - seemed to be under threat. In that context, a war to restore their standing makes perfect sense.

Also, Larry Derfner is well known for writing inflammatory and somewhat hyperbolic columns - in fact, he got fired from JPost for posting a blog piece on his own website seeming to justify terrorism. Derfner's position in this piece certainly heaps a lot of blame on Netanyahu - and I don't disagree that Netanyahu could have handled aspects of the Palestinian situation better during his current tenure as PM - but he's going to extremes specifically to elicit a reaction. That's how he works; it's fine, if you understand what he's doing, but you shouldn't take his position at face value.



There, I've addressed my thoughts to each link. Do you have some thoughts, or an overarching discussion that ties it all together? You say you want us to 'discuss' your various ideas, then barely do any discussing of your own. I'd value a thoughtful exchange, especially on how to best move forward from our current mess.

[GGT]

wiggin, what about the blockades? It's not just a tit-for-tat fight between Israel and Hamas....when Palestinians are caught in the middle. If borders are closed and water, food and medicine can't get in -- along with concrete or building supplies (to prevent building tunnels?) -- that doesn't just starve Hamas but innocent civilians.

Q: Aren't the blockades creating another generation of desperate, angry Palestinians who might "support" any group that uses violence to get the world's attention (including other terrorists)?

Q: Can the PA really operate like an official/legitimate government if Palestine doesn't have "real" sovereign nation status?


edit: I'm going to limit my posts to one thread for simplicity's sake, but I did read your replies in the other threads. I do think Palestinian statehood would make a difference. Not just for clearer borders and airspace, but also international funding, negotiations, and expecting an elected PA like a legitimate - and accountable - democracy.

The problem with Israel not wanting to recognize Palestinian statehood....is that it creates a power void that groups like Hamas use (over an official government). From my pov this is similar to what's happening in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Niger etc. and "The War on Terrorism". Weak and/or corrupt governments are easier for separatists, extremists, militant jihadists, even terrorist groups to 'infiltrate'. Even in democratic, sovereign nations.

[wiggin]

wiggin, what about the blockades? It's not just a tit-for-tat fight between Israel and Hamas....when Palestinians are caught in the middle. If borders are closed and water, food and medicine can't get in -- along with concrete or building supplies (to prevent building tunnels?) -- that doesn't just starve Hamas but innocent civilians.

Q: Aren't the blockades creating another generation of desperate, angry Palestinians who might "support" any group that uses violence to get the world's attention (including other terrorists)?

Blockades always hurt a civilian population. It's obviously necessary to ensure that the civilian population isn't starved into submission (and plenty food, water, medical supplies, etc. are allowed into the Strip), but a legal blockade has no requirements to make life comfortable for civilians if there's a reasonable justification for the blockade (which, in the case of Hamas, there most certainly is).

As for creating another generation of violent Palestinians, that was already going to happen. Those UNRWA schools everyone is so worried about are sites of vicious, racist indoctrination where terrorism and 'martyrdom' are praised and all Jews (not just Israelis) are vilified. The ongoing conflict obviously doesn't make things better, but I think the security concerns outweigh the reality that these kids are going to hate Jews irrespective of Israel's actions.

Q: Can the PA really operate like an official/legitimate government if Palestine doesn't have "real" sovereign nation status?


edit: I'm going to limit my posts to one thread for simplicity's sake, but I did read your replies in the other threads. I do think Palestinian statehood would make a difference. Not just for clearer borders and airspace, but also international funding, negotiations, and expecting an elected PA like a legitimate - and accountable - democracy.

The problem with Israel not wanting to recognize Palestinian statehood....is that it creates a power void that groups like Hamas use (over an official government). From my pov this is similar to what's happening in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Niger etc. and "The War on Terrorism". Weak and/or corrupt governments are easier for separatists, extremists, militant jihadists, even terrorist groups to 'infiltrate'. Even in democratic, sovereign nations.

Uhm, there IS an official government; the PA is the civil service of said government, and the PLC and PA president are its government. There is a de facto state running in Gaza and Areas A/B of the West Bank, even if both Hamas and Fatah have ignored democratic norms in their administration thereof, that doesn't mean they don't run things.

De jure, recognized sovereignty won't really change anything absent a real peace agreement: the Palestinians are recipients of record amounts of international aid and are effectively recognized as a state for all intents and purposes.

[GGT]

Blockades always hurt a civilian population. It's obviously necessary to ensure that the civilian population isn't starved into submission (and plenty food, water, medical supplies, etc. are allowed into the Strip), but a legal blockade has no requirements to make life comfortable for civilians if there's a reasonable justification for the blockade (which, in the case of Hamas, there most certainly is).

Palestinians are being starved into submission, though. Can you see how they fault Israel (and the US by proxy)? Egypt used to be seen as a sympathetic neighbor until the whole Muslim Brotherhood dynamic changed.

As for creating another generation of violent Palestinians, that was already going to happen. Those UNRWA schools everyone is so worried about are sites of vicious, racist indoctrination where terrorism and 'martyrdom' are praised and all Jews (not just Israelis) are vilified. The ongoing conflict obviously doesn't make things better, but I think the security concerns outweigh the reality that these kids are going to hate Jews irrespective of Israel's actions.

I disagree. It wasn't a foregone conclusion that all Palestinian children would grow up to be racist, anti-semitic, violent martyrs. But bombing or blockading civilians into submission is certainly no way to win hearts and minds.

Uhm, there IS an official government; the PA is the civil service of said government, and the PLC and PA president are its government. There is a de facto state running in Gaza and Areas A/B of the West Bank, even if both Hamas and Fatah have ignored democratic norms in their administration thereof, that doesn't mean they don't run things.

De jure, recognized sovereignty won't really change anything absent a real peace agreement: the Palestinians are recipients of record amounts of international aid and are effectively recognized as a state for all intents and purposes.

Doesn't Israel have a duty to deal with the official PA government, even if that means Hamas or Fatah is in the mix? Seems like a convenient excuse to say they won't negotiate with "terrorists", knowing full well that terrorist groups have influence over so many things....even from places like Syria or Qatar that's been connected to weapons financing.

And it's disingenuous to compare the "record amounts of international aid" for Palestinians with what's been allotted to Israel. Millions don't compare to Billions.

A single state solution wouldn't be any easier, but I can understand why some people want that: it would mean all sides treating every civilian equally.

[Aimless]

Let's face it, there are some actions Israel is just not willing to take and apparently has never been willing to take under appropriate circumstances. Little things like giving back land, allowing the existence of a sovereign state etc. And then later it can dishonestly point back towards a long line of failures that have partly stemmed from them letting up on one thing while keeping at other sorts of douchebaggery in place and say, "Look! We did everything we could! We did it the wrong way and at the wrong time, but we did it!"

I mean, if I were an Israeli, I'd want to keep the Palestinians thoroughly oppressed, too. They're all evil bastards that want to kill all Jews. I wouldn't necessarily hate them back, because I'd prefer to spend my energy on travelling, eating good food, hanging out at cafés, enjoying sitcoms, discussing philosophy etc, but I'd be annoyed. But look at it from the other side: what Israeli would be satisfied with Israel not being a sovereign state? It would be intolerable.

[Aimless]

But if you ARE okay with not being a sovereign state, let us know so that we can take some land from you and build some hot exotic settlements on Sweden's behalf.

[wiggin]

Let's face it, there are some actions Israel is just not willing to take and apparently has never been willing to take under appropriate circumstances. Little things like giving back land, allowing the existence of a sovereign state etc. And then later it can dishonestly point back towards a long line of failures that have partly stemmed from them letting up on one thing while keeping at other sorts of douchebaggery in place and say, "Look! We did everything we could! We did it the wrong way and at the wrong time, but we did it!"

Israel isn't willing to give back land under any circumstances? So... when they forcibly evacuated their citizens from the Sinai desert and handed it to Egypt in exchange for peace, they weren't giving up land? When they evicted 8,000+ settlers in Gaza and a few thousand more in the West Bank, they weren't willing to give up land? When they handed over civil and security control of Gaza, Jericho, and Area A to the PA they weren't willing to give up land? You're reading a narrative from a playbook that doesn't jive with reality.

As for sovereignty, I think Israel is reasonable in allowing the de facto trappings of a state without recognizing its de jure reality. For one, recognition needs to be mutual (pretty much the entire Muslim world outside of Egypt and Jordan continue to refuse to do this). For another, it's an important lever in negotiations - if Israel recognizes an ill-defined Palestinian state, the Palestinians will have that much less incentive to come to the table to fully normalize relations. Lastly, in the absence of fixed borders in the WB for said state, it's dangerous and difficult to provide such recognition.

With significant help from the EU, US, and Israel, the Palestinians have built the rudiments of state machinery - reasonably well trained security forces, a civil service, a (theoretically) elected government, etc. De jure recognition is necessary eventually, but only as part of a final status solution.

I mean, if I were an Israeli, I'd want to keep the Palestinians thoroughly oppressed, too. They're all evil bastards that want to kill all Jews. I wouldn't necessarily hate them back, because I'd prefer to spend my energy on travelling, eating good food, hanging out at cafés, enjoying sitcoms, discussing philosophy etc, but I'd be annoyed. But look at it from the other side: what Israeli would be satisfied with Israel not being a sovereign state? It would be intolerable.

That's the status of Israel in much of the world. Recognition of Israel is not high on the Arab agenda; it doesn't exist in schoolbooks, on maps, in diplomacy, or much of anything else. Israel still seems to be doing just fine. Oh, they don't like it - that's why one of the key demands Netanyahu has during negotiations is for said recognition (he adds that it must be recognized not just as 'a' state but as the Jewish state, which I'll admit adds further complexities) - but Israelis more or less get on with their lives instead of bitching about it. When Israel declared a state in 1948, they successfully fought off a massive attack by their neighbors aimed at destroying the nascent state, and then endured decades of hot and cold wars aimed at their extermination - all with a complete lack of 'recognition'. Yet instead of moaning about it, they went about building the machinery of a modern democracy and economy, all while keeping one hand on their swords and another on their plowshares (Biblical references FTW?). De jure sovereignty isn't all it's cracked up to be.

Being a state is a bit like being in love - if you are, you just know it. No one can tell you you aren't a state; they can try to impose their will on you, of course, but you're a state if you think you are and you can convince enough other people to agree with you. Israel's done a better job of doing the convincing than the Palestinians have, but plenty of countries (134 of them, I believe) recognize a Palestinian state, and plenty of countries don't recognize Israel. What will Israel's recognition materially change for the Palestinians, other than reducing the chances of a final status agreement with defined borders? Is Taiwan not a state just because most of the world says they aren't?

[Aimless]

That was very poetic and it almost made me forget that Israel has a couple of hundred settlements with a few hundred thousand residents in the West Bank, covering, what, two fifths of the land, and is preparing to keep building these settlements that are all considered illegal by the international community and whose legality is defended almost exclusively by Israel partly on the basis of not recognizing any Palestinian sovereignty and having a belief that it is appropriate to acquire and retain sovereignty over land through the use of force even in the face of overwhelming international condemnation. Whew. That's certainly an old-fashioned and Biblical approach to love, but it's not one that flies today. Except in Israel

[wiggin]

That was very poetic and it almost made me forget that Israel has a couple of hundred settlements with a few hundred thousand residents in the West Bank, covering, what, two fifths of the land, and is preparing to keep building these settlements that are all considered illegal by the international community and whose legality is defended almost exclusively by Israel partly on the basis of not recognizing any Palestinian sovereignty and having a belief that it is appropriate to acquire and retain sovereignty over land through the use of force even in the face of overwhelming international condemnation. Whew. That's certainly an old-fashioned and Biblical approach to love, but it's not one that flies today. Except in Israel

1. Settlements cover only 1-2% of the West Bank land area, almost all of the major population centers being near the Green Line. Even if you include areas effectively under their control, it's still less than 10%, and could easily be ceded in a final status agreement. The rest of Areas B and C (which have some level of Israeli military and/or civil control) are in Israeli hands because of security issues, not settlers. These could be easily ceded provided security guarantees were made (such as in the cession of the Sinai); Israel has already shown itself willing to remove smaller groups of more far-flung settlers.

2. I don't give two shits about what is 'considered' illegal by the international community, since Israel will always be 'considered' in the wrong by said community.

3. Israel's claim to the legality of the settlements rests on the (correct) assertion that Palestine was not a sovereign state in the past. It does not prejudice a current or future Palestinian state; it just suggests that the borders of said state are not by default the Green Line. This doesn't have any effect on the willingness of Israel to cede land or recognize Palestinian sovereignty in a final status peace agreement.



(Also, your assertion that the Sinai was difficult to defend is laughable. Crossing the Suez was not at all easy for Egypt in 1973, and Israel's use of the Sinai as a massive buffer so they could bring up reinforcements; Israel was happy to fall back from advancing forces in the Sinai because the geography gave them plenty of room to work with. Giving up the Sinai was a huge strategic loss to Israel (also, economic), but they did it for peace.)

[Aimless]

1. Settlements cover only 1-2% of the West Bank land area, almost all of the major population centers being near the Green Line. Even if you include areas effectively under their control, it's still less than 10%, and could easily be ceded in a final status agreement. The rest of Areas B and C (which have some level of Israeli military and/or civil control) are in Israeli hands because of security issues, not settlers. These could be easily ceded provided security guarantees were made (such as in the cession of the Sinai); Israel has already shown itself willing to remove smaller groups of more far-flung settlers.

*shrugs* I have seen different figures for the percentage of land that is effectively under the jurisdiction of the settlers. Of course, the 40%-figure is by a political organisation that exists only to persecute honest Jews etc etc and we should believe the estimates offered by those who have absolutely no reason to be biased.

That said, I like the notion that it's good for peace to steal 10% of someone's property and to continue using that property as if it's your own even though you know such thieving antics are among the things that are, ostensibly, cause for anger.

2. I don't give two shits about what is 'considered' illegal by the international community, since Israel will always be 'considered' in the wrong by said community.

3. Israel's claim to the legality of the settlements rests on the (correct) assertion that Palestine was not a sovereign state in the past. It does not prejudice a current or future Palestinian state; it just suggests that the borders of said state are not by default the Green Line. This doesn't have any effect on the willingness of Israel to cede land or recognize Palestinian sovereignty in a final status peace agreement.

Thank you at least for being honest about your irrationality and dishonesty. Thank you also for reminding me that interpreting international law, such as it may be, is the sole prerogative of the infallible and always-honest Israeli government even though it apparently has difficulties listening even to its own supreme court about domestic laws.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interna...legal_outposts

http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomac...y-idf-1.449909

Perhaps you should consider the possibility that the international community's opinion may to some small extent be a well-considered one that takes into account interpretations of international law that are maybe just a teensy weensy bit rational. Almost every single rational observer seems to have a belief that is for some reason diametrically opposed to that of Israeli politicians about eg. whether or not the 4th geneva convention applies to the settlement business and renders them illegal.

But, you know, sure, in tricky difficult-to-settle matters of law where all but one party agree to one interpretation, it is perfectly clear that we should go with the biased opinion of the lone dissenter because clearly he is being persecuted. It makes sense somehow.

(Also, your assertion that the Sinai was difficult to defend is laughable. Crossing the Suez was not at all easy for Egypt in 1973, and Israel's use of the Sinai as a massive buffer so they could bring up reinforcements; Israel was happy to fall back from advancing forces in the Sinai because the geography gave them plenty of room to work with. Giving up the Sinai was a huge strategic loss to Israel (also, economic), but they did it for peace.)

So what you're telling me is that it would have made more sense, economically and wrt military strategy, to try to hold on to the sinai by force and attempt to exploit its resources rather than giving it back to its actual owners in exchange for not having to hold it by force, in exchange for getting free passage through the Suez Canal, etc? You're saying that it would have made more sense for Israel to keep the sinai if only Israel hadn't been so woefully sentimental?

[Loki]

Did you forget about them giving up the Sinai, which is three times the size of Israel itself?

[Aimless]

Did you forget about them giving up the Sinai, which is three times the size of Israel itself?

Wow you're right I forgot that Israel at the time may have needed and wanted peace with Egypt more than it needed or wanted a giant area of land, three times the size of Israel itself and difficult to defend, that still belonged to Egypt. But Egypt is Egypt and Palestine doesn't even exist

[Loki]

And if Israel gave back the West Bank and Gaza, you'd no doubt make the exact same claim there. How utterly hypocritical.

[Aimless]

And if Israel gave back the West Bank and Gaza, you'd no doubt make the exact same claim there. How utterly hypocritical.

Look I realise that the merest whiff of imagined hypocrisy gets you all gaga but you have to try to keep a level head. You pointed out that Israel gave back the Sinai, and I assumed you were trying to say something about Israel's peace-loving character. My response to that is to observe that there may have been several reasons for that concession that have little to do with peace&love and that are, afaics, also not applicable to the situation with the present illegal settlements in the WB, never mind the Golan Heights. If Israel gave back the West Bank and Gaza, which it never will, I think I'd be more shocked than happy.

[Loki]

Look I realise that the merest whiff of imagined hypocrisy gets you all gaga but you have to try to keep a level head. You pointed out that Israel gave back the Sinai, and I assumed you were trying to say something about Israel's peace-loving character. My response to that is to observe that there may have been several reasons for that concession that have little to do with peace&love and that are, afaics, also not applicable to the situation with the present illegal settlements in the WB, never mind the Golan Heights. If Israel gave back the West Bank and Gaza, which it never will, I think I'd be more shocked than happy.

In your opinion, what's the main reason Israelis refuse to give up the West Bank? Land grab?

[Aimless]

Honestly?

I believe the primary reasons for controlling much of that land have to do with mostly legitimate security concerns. I suppose it could also be a bargaining chip, but I dunno how that'd work if the chip is viewed as being stolen to begin with.

I also believe that the reasons for continually building settlements on that land (an activity that is either wholly illegal according to international law, or just very often illegal according to Israeli law, and that may be an obstacle to peace for anyone who hopes for peace in the region) may be very different and rooted in eg. culture, religion, history, politics, feelings, and, yes, greed. As to the reasons Israelis may have had for depopulating villages etc, well, I won't venture any opinions on that and anyway it's water under the bridge etc. Maybe they were working towards getting separate buses for Palestinians and Israelis

[Loki]

So if the primary reason is security, surely if the security threat went away, so would the primary motivation for wanting to hang on to that land? Sure, there's a certain part of the population that wants the land for religious reasons, but they're a minority.

[Aimless]

Do you believe Israel will ever come to the conclusion that the security risk will be low enough to justify giving up the west bank and acknowledging either the '49-boundaries or those from '67? And what do the security concerns have to do with whether or not it is legitimate or desirable to continue building civilian settlements on that land?

[Dreadnaught]

And what do the security concerns have to do with whether or not it is legitimate or desirable to continue building civilian settlements on that land?

I agree. I would prefer Israel do a Gaza-style withdrawal on many of the West Bank settlements except for the mega-blocs, while obviously still retaining security and border control in the Jordan Valley.

Though I also truly believe many the settlements are, in some fashion, intended to create a security buffer in an area of strategic weakness for Israel. The dense center of Israel also happens to a very narrow strip of land. And it's so narrow because it's the lowlands -- the West Bank occupies a strategic high ground. In a militarized West Bank, this would put an enormous amount of the population within range of the kinds of rockets being used in Gaza.

[Loki]

You realize that Israel offered over 90% of the West Bank and Gaza in previous deals, right?

[Aimless]

I've only seen that figure come up in unofficial reports-of-reports that were not confirmed. If it has been made as an official offer then it'd be interesting to know the details of those negotiations and see some information on just how they broke down.