http://www.theonion.com/article/nucl...cape-nor-54962
So in recent months we have seen a number of worrying signs out of NK - another nuclear test, various bellicose moves and rhetoric, and most recently, a claim at breakthroughs in developing ICBMs. Some US intelligence officials have been quoted as being somewhat concerned there was some truth to this boast - assessments of their improvements in warhead miniaturization and missile technology are obviously partially guesswork, but it seems like they have indeed made some progress. It seems likely NK will have some rudimentary ICBM + nuclear warhead systems functioning in the relatively near term (5 years or less?). The guidance and reentry challenges should not be discounted, but it seems like they are indeed making incremental progress towards this capability.
From the perspective of NK's neighbors, this is not a particularly new development - NK has had some form of credible nuclear deterrent against SK and possibly Japan for a while, though obviously warhead miniaturization would dramatically improve their deterrence. But I'm curious about how this might change the dynamic of US policy towards NK. Until now, it has been largely limited to hand-wringing and wagging our fingers at China's continued inaction in reining in the NK nuclear program. Various rounds of sanctions have been of extremely limited utility and seem unlikely to change anything in the future.
So what should we do? Investments in BMD systems are obviously one approach - it seems unlikely that NK will ever have a robust enough capability to really saturate a BMD system the way Russia would be able to. Yet we are all aware of the checkered record of BMD systems in actually intercepting and effectively killing their targets, and one wouldn't want to gamble the West Coast on such untested technology. Diplomacy seems futile in the absence of a substantial change in how China goes about its business. That leaves deterrence - perhaps forward-stationed nukes in, say, Guam, beefed up conventional defenses in SK and Japan, and a very explicit nuclear security umbrella.
This final option is flawed in that it (a) does little to actually improve security of the US or our allies, and (b) will piss off China to no end, and possibly make matters worse. In the coming confrontations we are likely to have with China over trade and other issues with the new administration (coupled with the administration's obvious reluctance to pursue an aggressive collective security policy with our allies), it seems like a long shot.
So, what should we do? How do we stop continued improvement in NK nuclear capability? How do we ensure that they do not continue to proliferate nuclear technologies? How do we ensure that command and control over NK nukes remains robust, especially in the event of regime collapse at some point in the future?