I think this is going to be the fundamental issue. I heard Ehud Olmert interviewed by the BBC this morning (why they'd interview him was beyond me, but nonetheless). He spent much of the interview trying to moderate expectation while simultaneously agreeing that they needed to try to systematically dismantle Hamas. It's going to be hard to see a victory condition that would meaningfully improve the security situation absent ongoing occupation of Gaza, which Israel has zero interest in.Originally Posted by Steely Glint
There's ample evidence that Hamas is not particularly popular in Gaza (despite their ridiculously heavy-handed suppression of dissent, there are occasional (and shockingly large!) protests against Hamas), but it's not clear that there is a coherent organizational structure to take the place of Hamas - Fatah is seriously discredited and unpopular as well, and there's very little remaining civil society left. The only major institutions that sorta function are Hamas and UNRWA. It's a very tricky problem.
I think the jury's still out on both of these points, but I'm inclined to think the Egypt story has some legs. The most likely explanation is that a warning was given to Israeli intelligence, and it was either discounted or hadn't yet made it up to the top brass. Either way it would be a substantial failure (though even more so if Netanyahu was given a credible warning and he didn't change their force posture around Gaza). Israel is well aware that succumbing to groupthink is dangerous, and that's why Ipcha Mitsabra exists. For them to have received such intelligence and not considered it seriously would be a major failure.
It's also possible that the intelligence was either received to close to the attack to digest, or was too vague to be actionable. But I'm more willing to believe that this was a failure of imagination, not bad luck. It's also likely that given the poor HUMINT Israel has on Hamas, they've been relying far too much on SIGINT, when Hamas knows they have had major OPSEC issues in the past. That's just a recipe for missing something if your enemy adapts.
Re: Iran, I think it's kinda a sideshow. It's largely irrelevant whether Iran was directly involved or not; I think most parties have a vested interest in keeping Iran from being directly embroiled in this war, and even if Iran was directly involved I doubt they'd face any serious consequences.
You know, Hazir, I think that you're wrong on both counts: first, Israel has not thrown out the rule book, and second, it would not be right for them to do so.
Yes, the calculus of the conflict has changed. If your campaign is just about reducing rocket fire (which causes injuries, occasional death, and lots of damage, but is not an existential problem for Israeli life), then the permissible force is lower because the military advantage achieved by a given attack is lower, which means that acceptable collateral damage must also be lower. Given that the threat by Hamas has just been demonstrated to be far more serious, the acceptable collateral damage is also higher. I'm framing this in a very legalistic way (because that's how military lawyers think about it) but it means that even if the principle of distinction is still followed scrupulously, the principle of proportionality provides far more leeway in the way a war is prosecuted. We've seen that in the move away from 'knock on the roof' warning strikes (and calls/texts) and the broader selection criteria for targets.
I do think that Israel has a stupid own goal re: cutting off food and medical supplies to the Strip, but this is kinda par for the course in previous conflicts as well, not a change. I think a decent argument can be made that cutting off food and medical supplies is a violation of the laws of war, and it's also silly - no one will be bringing any food or medical supplies through an Israel-Gaza crossing any time soon, since all of the crossings were badly damaged by the Hamas attack and the border is an active war zone. It's wildly unlikely Hamas can be trusted to respect the inviolability of a humanitarian crossing, given that they've previously attacked crossings while they were being used for such a purpose (cf Kerem Shalom multiple times over the last 17 years). So Israel could have achieved the same result (forcing reliance on the Rafah crossing, which is Egypt's problem) without, you know, committing a possible crime. I should note that I don't think cutting electricity or fuel shipments are the same issue, that has legitimate military purpose.
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