Zionuts

[Loki]

Twitter Link

[Lewkowski]

Anyone else notice how the pro-Israel rally was almost completely devoid of any sort of violence and vandalism? Whereas the pro-Hamas rallies...

https://www.foxnews.com/us/pro-pales...police-injured

"Police in the nation's capital responded to the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee as pro-Palestinian demonstrators grew violent as they called for an immediate cease-fire in the ongoing Israel-Hamas war.

U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) said about 150 people were "illegally and violently protesting" near the DNC headquarters building in the Capitol Hill neighborhood of Washington.

Protesters told Fox News Digital that there were 300 people protesting the war."



While exceptions can certainly exist, since political views aren't hive minds... the propensity to use violence at a protest instead of persuasion is certainly a sign of the appropriateness or lack thereof of your cause. Protests that are violent are saying they can't win an argument through debate or voting, and instead seek to use intimidation and violence. Weather it is rioters in Kenosha, or J6 morons, if you are stooping to using violence, your cause is already a bust.

[Aimless]

Things are bad when even the BBC start accusing you of being dodgy:

Twitter Link

NYT OSINT researcher Aric Toler (formerly with Bellingcat) has a thread with an overview of some early findings:

https://twitter.com/AricToler/status...37501788209251

(NYT article in thread)

The Israeli government sent a weird nerd to yell at Mehdi Hasan, it did not go well:

Twitter Link

Notwithstanding the weirdo behavior, he also said that 200 of the casualties reported by Israeli sources as victims of the Oct 7 terrorist attacks were apparently Hamas terrorists who'd been burned to the point of being unrecognizable?

Twitter Link

Twitter Link

Terrible day for Jon—or possibly a wonderful day, depending on where his passions lie.

[Aimless]

Two schools—in which thousands were sheltering—attacked and destroyed. Many casualties—including children—and many more injured. No clear word on who did it, but the IDF had their coordinates. After weeks of documented IDF attacks in areas claimed to be safe, the world's most moral army has now announced its intent to attack Khan Younis. This is a campaign of ethnic cleansing with clear evidence of genocidal intent. The US is once again facilitating atrocities and war crimes. Weird American nerds with big brains and withered souls are busy running interference for genocidaires in what should've been the easiest moral test of our generation. Hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of people all over the west have voiced their opposition to this unconscionable violence, yet most of our democratically elected leaders have chosen to get down on their knees and kiss the ass of a notorious crook with a lifelong record of violent extremism. The entire Israeli govt. belongs on targeted sanctions lists and international arrest warrants, but they'll get away with it. IDF soldiers who've committed atrocities will be heroes. And, next year, the West Bank will explode.

[Steely Glint]

I noticed the IDF isn't even trying to make claims about number of combatants they've killed. If UN/Palestinian figures and breakdown are correct the percentage of non-combatants in the Palestinian death toll is somewhere between 75% and 90%, one of the highest in recent memory. And the governments of virtually the entire western world is just... waving it through.

[Aimless]

I noticed the IDF isn't even trying to make claims about number of combatants they've killed. If UN/Palestinian figures and breakdown are correct the percentage of non-combatants in the Palestinian death toll is somewhere between 75% and 90%, one of the highest in recent memory. And the governments of virtually the entire western world is just... waving it through.

Afaict casualty demographics closely reflect overall demographics of Gaza's population. The IDF's best bet is to try to persuade weird nerds in the west that every single male casualty over the age of 6 is Hamas, and use that Golda Meir quote to justify the remainder.

[Loki]

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67463162

It's almost as if breeding hatred for Israelis and Jews is one of the main objectives of Netanyahu's (and his settler allies') policy.

[Aimless]

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67463162

It's almost as if breeding hatred for Israelis and Jews is one of the main objectives of Netanyahu's (and his settler allies') policy.

If you haven't read that op-ed by Giora Eiland then, uh, don't

[Aimless]

If you haven't read that op-ed by Giora Eiland then, uh, don't

And now the finance minister of the middle east's only democracy has openly endorsed an explicit call for genocidal violence against civilians from the the world's most moral army. I recall the first time I encountered that thing about the world's most moral army—here, courtesy of our most ardent defender of Israel's "rambunctious" democracy. I guess all those moral fighters were all magically swapped out in the years that have passed.

[Aimless]

The rambunctiously democratic opposition checks in:

Twitter Link

[Aimless]

Jpost: non-zionist jews aren't real jews, they're pigs in yarmulkes

https://m.jpost.com/opinion/article-773548

Very normal behavior, not at all loony

[Loki]

There are no adults in the room.

https://www.ynetnews.com/article/h1nngcpnp

[Loki]

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...gaza-maps.html

I'm curious how Israel believes that destroying the homes of half of all Gazans (so far) is going to make those people support anyone less extreme than Hamas.

[Aimless]

Israeli legislator has come up with a lasting solution to the Palestinian problem:

Twitter Link

[Hazir]

Because Arabs can't learn any lesson you mean?

[Aimless]

Jpost so obv take with a pinch of salt, but, if this is true, tens of thousands of people will have been killed bc of some fucking guy:

https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-774862

[Lewkowski]

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...gaza-maps.html

I'm curious how Israel believes that destroying the homes of half of all Gazans (so far) is going to make those people support anyone less extreme than Hamas.

At this point I can't imagine the dummies in Gaza are going to learn in the short term. They literally cheered and heaped abuse on dead women. At a certain point you can't worry about hearts and minds and search for ways to make sure the dumbshits just don't have the ability to strike at Israel any longer. There is no political solution as long as their children are raised to glorify 'martyrs' and venerate suicide bombers.

[Loki]

At this point I can't imagine the dummies in Gaza are going to learn in the short term. They literally cheered and heaped abuse on dead women. At a certain point you can't worry about hearts and minds and search for ways to make sure the dumbshits just don't have the ability to strike at Israel any longer. There is no political solution as long as their children are raised to glorify 'martyrs' and venerate suicide bombers.

And you actually believe that destroying most buildings in Gaza will remove Hamas's ability to strike Israel?

[Lewkowski]

And you actually believe that destroying most buildings in Gaza will remove Hamas's ability to strike Israel?

No, but that might be a good first step to make sure they can't hide there anymore, the real issue is the tunnels though. Israel also needs to take over running the security and inspect everything coming in. No sense in deleting Hamas, destroying tunnels, and letting another terror group repeat it a few years later.

[Loki]

Israel already does that.

[LittleFuzzy]

At this point I can't imagine the dummies in Gaza are going to learn in the short term. They literally cheered and heaped abuse on dead women.

So. . . exactly what you've been doing?

[Loki]

Reminds me of the "this is what America will look like under Biden" pictures (showing homeless camps) that were taken during the Trump presidency.

[Loki]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...beyond-tuesday

Israel admits it only killed 1-2k Hamas members (out of at least 30k). Who could have seen it coming?

[wiggin]

Seriously Loki that's a shit source and you know it. Anyone who claims to know how many fighters have been killed is lying. There's evidence of about 1000-1500 killed in Israel proper, but it's anyone's guess about inside Gaza. Given the type of fighting most people would estimate 10-30%combatant casualties, which is in line with this (similarly unsourced) estimate of 5k total killed:

https://www.ft.com/content/81717934-...1-30c517399879

[Loki]

Let's take your 5k number (which I don't buy because Hamas is clearly exaggerating the overall casualty numbers and Israel isn't only killing Hamas members). Israel's objective is to wipe out Hamas. That's been used to excuse its high casualty numbers. Do you think Hamas will be gone if 10k members are killed?

[wiggin]

Let's take your 5k number (which I don't buy because Hamas is clearly exaggerating the overall casualty numbers and Israel isn't only killing Hamas members).

While I don't trust the overall casualty numbers in Gaza (and certainly don't assign all of those casualties as noncombatants killed by Israel), I think the order of magnitude is believable. There's a reason why Israel has desperately avoided precisely this fight for 17 years through a series of less-than-ideal choices. Other numbers include ~4k in another piece I saw (but it's an Israeli news source that is not as reputable as FT so I didn't cite it). We're also including the 1000-1500 Hamas soldiers killed in Israel proper, which are not included in the Hamas ministry's numbers.

If you asked me whether it was reasonable to believe that of the ~14500 killed in Gaza proper (very roughly) 2500-3500 were Hamas or PIJ members, I'd find that very believable and in line with expectations for this kind of urban combat, especially when fought on a clock.

Israel's objective is to wipe out Hamas. That's been used to excuse its high casualty numbers. Do you think Hamas will be gone if 10k members are killed?

Israel's objective is a bit more subtle than that - its goal is to remove Hamas' ability to administer the Strip and destroy its major military capability. Obviously you can't destroy Hamas entirely any more than you can destroy Islamic State or Al Qaida, but you can degrade them sufficiently to change the strategic reality on the Gaza border.

Irrespective of that, I think that obviously Israel is nowhere near done with their task. Given the very clear telegraphing of their move into northern Gaza (3+ weeks of warning), it's obvious that much of Hamas' leadership and force structure has moved south. They left behind substantial forces, of course, but not the bulk of their forces. Israel has mostly been involved in destroying infrastructure (tunnels, bunkers, etc.) and collecting intelligence. The killing of a few thousand enemy troops, while certainly a goal, is not indication that they're anywhere near success.

Hamas' strength is somewhere on the order of 25k-40k troops, depending on how you count things (there's also 5-10k PIJ but let's ignore them for now). Most of that higher number are poorly trained/equipped 'reservists' who have roles in e.g. the police force or the like and are no match for Israeli troops. They also might be reasonably expected to not be necessary to kill in order to eliminate Hamas control over Gaza (or the strategic threat to Israel). Of the 15-25k more 'regular' troops, the biggest threat is the Nukhba troops and other various specialized units, likely numbering around 5-10k. It is those who likely died in droves on Oct 7 were elites (though the attack was a strategic 'success' as these things are measured, it was a tactical failure - few of Hamas' elite troops advanced past the first envelope of Gaza settlements, and they had something like a 5:1 combatant casualty ratio, even with a badly undermanned border and the element of surprise; we've seen even more lopsided ratios in northern Gaza, even with the battlefield being heavily prepared by Hamas). It is also likely that many, though not all, of the Hamas troops killed in fighting to date inside Gaza were also relatively higher grade troops.

There are discussions in military theory about how much of a military unit/organization it is necessary to kill or injure in order to make the unit nonviable for more combat. In the case of irregular formations like seen with Hamas, the percentage is higher, but I would expect that killing ~50% of the ~20k 'regular' troops along with most of their military leadership would indeed make them incapable of controlling the Gaza Strip. And frankly I suspect Israel has plans to kill a lot more than 10k Hamas troops... and I wouldn't be surprised if they're planning on assassinating their political leadership overseas as well, over time (they've already been hitting the political leadership in Gaza).

The big flaw here is not the ability to destroy Hamas' ability to administer the Strip, that's a doable task, given enough time and political will. The flaw is that no one - not in Israel, not in the US, not in the Arab world, and certainly not in the 'international community' - has provided a feasible option for who will take over afterwards. Indeed, this is one of the big reasons why Israel has refrained from toppling Hamas in the past. I think this should be something that is occupying minds throughout the region; unfortunately, it is unlikely that the current Israel government (with the possible exception of Gantz and Gallant) have really given it serious thought. There are a series of very bad options; it just appears that the default bad option (leaving Hamas in power indefinitely using a combination of bribery and deterrence) was no longer viable.

[Loki]

Wig, you lived through the same Afghan and Iraq War as the rest of us. You know your claims about Hamas's ability to stay in power are nonsense. For starters, Hamas has access to an endless stream of recruits (and the resources to hire them). Killing 5k won't do anything. Neither will killing 10k. Or even 15k. It doesn't need high-quality troops to stay in power. Second, the recruits can get training from Hezbollah operatives. Any damage Israel does to Hamas leadership will be undone within a year (for operational purposes), if not less. Third, even if Hamas was somehow eliminated, it would simply be replaced by another group. Which would happen after a period of internecine warfare, where all factions would have an incentive to attack Israel to gain street cred. And whoever whins is likely to be more extreme than Hamas. I.e., this war was hopeless from the start. Israel should have done enough damage to show it's not a pushover, but otherwise focus on preventing another attack. Its current actions make a future conflict more likely, not less likely. Instead, Netanyahu created unrealistic expectations for the Israeli public and needs some way to save face to avoid getting embarrassed more than he already has been.

And you even understand the heart of the problem. Israel can't fully occupy Gaza. Which means it doesn't get to choose who rules Gaza. Israel has less ability to steer Gaza's fate than America had Afghanistan's. Anything it does will quickly be undone. Short of mass population transfers or genocidal levels of violence, Israel can't do anything to prevent Hamas or someone like it from ruling Gaza.

[wiggin]

Wig, you lived through the same Afghan and Iraq War as the rest of us. You know your claims about Hamas's ability to stay in power are nonsense. For starters, Hamas has access to an endless stream of recruits (and the resources to hire them). Killing 5k won't do anything. Neither will killing 10k. Or even 15k. It doesn't need high-quality troops to stay in power. Second, the recruits can get training from Hezbollah operatives. Any damage Israel does to Hamas leadership will be undone within a year (for operational purposes), if not less. Third, even if Hamas was somehow eliminated, it would simply be replaced by another group. Which would happen after a period of internecine warfare, where all factions would have an incentive to attack Israel to gain street cred. And whoever whins is likely to be more extreme than Hamas. I.e., this war was hopeless from the start. Israel should have done enough damage to show it's not a pushover, but otherwise focus on preventing another attack. Its current actions make a future conflict more likely, not less likely. Instead, Netanyahu created unrealistic expectations for the Israeli public and needs some way to save face to avoid getting embarrassed more than he already has been.

Loki, I don't deny that this will be very challenging. But I think the cases of IS and AQ are actually quite instructive, because neither of them is a perfect match for the situation here, but both have salience.

In the case of AQ, they never aspired to control territory and were focused primarily on attacking Westerners in Western countries. This is quite different from Hamas, which exerts at least the facsimile of state power in Gaza and appears to have every intention of keeping it. (It also distinguishes it from other Palestinian terrorist groups like PIJ which don't attempt to exert much political power - only Fatah reasonably challenges Hamas politically.) Yet Hamas is also not a carbon copy of Islamic State, which definitely controlled territory but had pan-Islamic ambitions and was very dogmatic in their religious orthodoxy - Hamas is more of a national movement, despite their connection to the Muslim Brotherhood, and is far more tolerant of variants of Islam (so much so that an avowedly Sunni group takes money/weapons/training from the major power in Shia Islam).

But comparisons are still worth considering. Because while the broader US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were largely failures (more so in Afghanistan than in Iraq, but that's damning by faint praise), the specific goals that were aimed at the groups of AQ and IS were reasonably successful - the caliphate is no more, and AQ is only a rump of what it used to be. Knocking out AQ was an exercise in counterterrorism - detailed intelligence work, heavy use of special forces and drones, and disruption of their sources of funding. By killing most of the AQ leadership and driving the rest into hiding, they were able to make the organization also-rans in the global terrorism industry. That isn't to say that Islamist terrorism was solved (far from it!) but the specific threat of AQ, which was very focused on US and Western targets, was blunted. The various AQ spinoffs have much more regional focus and can similarly be fought using a counterterrorism strategy.

IS was a different story - a campaign of assassination and spec ops strikes wouldn't have dramatically changed the fact that they controlled large swathes of Syria and Iraq and were terrorizing the populace there. Even a massive airstrike campaign wouldn't have done the job. No, instead the US (and partners) had to go in and pry them out of the territory they had captured, and continue to have forces on the ground to maintain the gains. Large numbers of IS rank and file were killed or captured, and their military units were rendered ineffective.

These are - local - success stories. And I think that Israel's strategy is a rough amalgamation of the two - go after the leadership with a CT strategy but pry Hamas out of Gaza with a ground op and continued 'security control' after completion of the ground op. I don't view that as a re-occupation in the sense of Area C in the WB, with daily friction at checkpoints and the like, but I imagine it would be closer to Area A after the 2nd intifada - nightly arrest raids, continual disruption of terrorist networks, but leaving civil administration and day-to-day policing in the hands of whoever succeeds Hamas.

The US' mistake in Iraq and Afghanistan was a combination of not adequately preparing for the 'day after' in either country, and in trying to mold both countries in the image of the US rather than accepting a 'good enough' solution that met American security/strategic needs without necessarily achieving a fully democratic, free, unitary state. Israel is definitely guilty of the first mistake but is unlikely to fall for the second trap. Israel knows there's no fairy tale solution to Gaza that will create a Singapore or Silicon Valley of the Middle East. But they're probably willing to work with a largely demilitarized Strip run by people who hate Israel but aren't trying to murder every Jew. It's a low bar, but it's at least potentially achievable.


I don't want to dissect your post line by line, but two general points I'd like to talk about:

First, what should Israel have done? To be honest, I have no clue, I think there were only awful options. I do think that option you suggest is unworkable and unwise. Israeli military doctrine has generally focused on rapid offensive operations rather than defensive postures. The reason for this is that Israel has no strategic depth and has extremely limited ability to wage lengthy attritional battles or maintain high force levels in a defensive posture indefinitely - they rely too heavily on reserves to make this economically or politically feasible. There are two major periods when Israel fell into a defensive posture: in the 1967-1973 attritional battles with Egypt, and in the 2007-2023 Gaza/Israel border. Both of these decisions failed spectacularly - Israel tried to rely on technological solutions in both cases to deal with the manpower issues (see: Bar Lev line, Iron Dome, Gaza border fence), but technological fixes can be surmounted. And the only reason why the debacle in 1973 wasn't even worse was that (a) Egyptian troops had greater discipline than Hamas terrorists and (b) Israel had defensive depth in the Sinai. No amount of 'securing the border', even with heavily boosted force posture (which would detract from other priorities like the northern border - with a far more dangerous foe - or ongoing low level insurgency in the WB), would be effective in the long run.

It is this strategic calculus that is why I think people who view this as 'Netanyahu's war' are really missing the point. All of the major political parties, along with pretty much all of the security services and military leadership, think that Hamas' continued control of Gaza is intolerable. There was debate long before October 7 about the wisdom of leaving Hamas in charge (mostly shut down because everyone knew the cost in uprooting Hamas would be horrendous), but the consensus (supported by Western intelligence agencies and governments, along with Qatar et al) was that Hamas could be handled by bribery and deterrence, and that they valued controlling Gaza more than they valued killing Israelis. This is why everyone ignored various warning signs from e.g. the tatzpitaniyot because there was a fundamental logic of deterrence that appeared to pervade everyone's calculations. This logic has been shown to be fundamentally incorrect, and everyone in Israel (including a shocking proportion of non-Jewish citizens of Israel) think Hamas needs to go. If anything, Netanyahu's fundamental risk aversion has been why he spent the last dozen years trying to avoid something precisely like this. He's always had a wing of his party (and fellow-travelers on the right) who have advocated for the reoccupation of Gaza in order to remove Hamas, but he's studiously ignored them during each flare-up of violence. He has never wanted to be a war PM. He's doing this because the entire Israeli political and security establishment don't see an alternative. Oh, I'm sure he has some vague hope that a success will keep him from getting blamed for all of this mess, but it's obvious to everyone that he's going to lose, very badly, after this is all over. Golda Meir didn't have a chance after 1973 either.

The second point is the alternative to Hamas. It is not obvious to me that there is another political entity that could take charge of Gaza other than Fatah. Destroying Hamas as a terrorist organization will of course be short-lived - CT campaigns are continual efforts for this reason, and that's why the IDF has had nearly nightly raids in the WB since the height of the 2nd intifada. Whether under the guise of Hamas or a successor organization, until a political solution is reached (and Palestinians start policing themselves), it's wildly unlikely that the fundamental threat of Palestinian terrorism can be eliminated with any degree of permanence; it can only be disrupted temporarily. But there's two points that you miss: first, if the political/civil administration of Gaza is in the hands of someone like Fatah (or someone like Dahlan who may or may not still be Fatah), the chances of the kind of state-level attack seen on Oct 7 will be dramatically lessened. It wouldn't eliminate the occasional infiltration/bombing/rocket attack, but it would be damned hard to pull of something like Oct 7 without control of the Strip. Second, if Israel maintains the ability to operate semi-freely in Gaza afterwards (with or without security coordination with a Fatah or Fatah-adjacent government), they'd have a much easier time in their parallel CT efforts, much as has happened in the WB (where terrorism is a concern, but nowhere near where it was in the 2nd intifada when Israel hadn't touched Area A in a decade).

Obviously all of this would require a rapprochement with the PA/Fatah that will not happen with the current Israeli government. But I think Smotrich, Ben Gvir, and Netanyahu are doing a splendid job demonstrating to the Israeli people why they are not fit to run the country. A center (possibly even center left?!?! though I'm skeptical) government seems all but inevitable after the immediate crisis is over. And with appropriate pressure from the US and Israel's Arab partners, I think something might be possible to provide some sort of politically acceptable reset of relations and the restart of some sort of political process. Hamas has always had a veto over such political processes - might it be nice if that were no longer the case?

And you even understand the heart of the problem. Israel can't fully occupy Gaza. Which means it doesn't get to choose who rules Gaza. Israel has less ability to steer Gaza's fate than America had Afghanistan's. Anything it does will quickly be undone. Short of mass population transfers or genocidal levels of violence, Israel can't do anything to prevent Hamas or someone like it from ruling Gaza.

I think that Israel can weaken Hamas to the extent that a non-terrorist force (likely Fatah) can take control, and they can potentially keep them weak enough to let Fatah get a stronger foothold. There is a great deal of dissatisfaction with Hamas inside Gaza. While we all know that the current conflict (and the many previous less-intense rounds) have not made Israel any friends in Gaza, but neither have they made Hamas' brutal regime popular. I don't think it will be easy, but I do think it's at least possible. Israel and anyone who cares about the future of the Palestinian people should be thinking as hard as possible about how to make this a reality.

[Loki]

I'm not talking about displacing al-Qaeda, which never had power in Afghanistan. I'm talking about the Taliban, which is the closest comparison to Hamas (in that it wields power, does so at all levels, and enjoys the support of at least some factions of society). You talk about Hamas not being popular, but A) there's no way to know that (no, anecdotes don't count), and B) authoritarian groups don't need the support of the majority to stay in power when there are no real military challengers to their power. I also fully expect a rally-around-the-flag effect that only benefits Hamas. Every hostage release is a victory. And while people might grumble about Hamas provoking Israel, they'll still place a vast majority of the blame on Israel.

You talk about Fatah as a replacement and that's plain laughable. Fatah enjoys no public support, including in areas under its ostensive control (also note how it manages to stay in power in the West Bank despite minimal public support because there is no military alternative). There's no way in hell it can rule Gaza. Its operatives would get massacred by the public long before Hamas fighters join the fight. Fatah is seen as an Israeli stooge and its actions during the current conflict only buttress that argument. If there's going to be a revolt anywhere in the next few months, it will be in the West Bank, not Gaza.

Until you provide a serious alternative as to who could rule Gaza, your arguments are meaningless. The reality is that the population of Gaza detests Israel and anyone unwilling to stand up to it. There's no way in hell that a non-nationalist faction takes power in Gaza without a massive and long-term occupation. There is minimal civil society in Gaza. The other armed factions are at least as extreme as Hamas and are also less popular. It's plausible that some combination of them can overthrow Hamas (though at the expense of an insurgency) if Israel does enough damage to it, but there's absolutely no reason to think they'll be any friendlier toward Israel.

The reality is that Israel's actions are creating an entire generation of Hamas (or similar groups) supporters. Whoever rules Gaza going forward will find it increasingly difficult to stick to even basic agreements with Israel because of public pressure to "hurt the Zionists." Iran is going to double down on its support for Hamas (including in terms of resources). Israel's only realistic short-term move is to turn Gaza into a fortress surrounded by countless Israeli troops. Meanwhile, Israel has to hope that its disgraceful actions in the West Bank don't lead to an uprising there (against both itself and Fatah). In the medium term, nothing short of concrete steps toward Palestinian statehood are going to lessen popular Palestinian demands to inflict suffering on Israelis.

[Loki]

Meanwhile, in Oakland:

Twitter Link