While I don't trust the overall casualty numbers in Gaza (and certainly don't assign all of those casualties as noncombatants killed by Israel), I think the order of magnitude is believable. There's a reason why Israel has desperately avoided precisely this fight for 17 years through a series of less-than-ideal choices. Other numbers include ~4k in another piece I saw (but it's an Israeli news source that is not as reputable as FT so I didn't cite it). We're also including the 1000-1500 Hamas soldiers killed in Israel proper, which are not included in the Hamas ministry's numbers.Originally Posted by Loki
If you asked me whether it was reasonable to believe that of the ~14500 killed in Gaza proper (very roughly) 2500-3500 were Hamas or PIJ members, I'd find that very believable and in line with expectations for this kind of urban combat, especially when fought on a clock.
Israel's objective is a bit more subtle than that - its goal is to remove Hamas' ability to administer the Strip and destroy its major military capability. Obviously you can't destroy Hamas entirely any more than you can destroy Islamic State or Al Qaida, but you can degrade them sufficiently to change the strategic reality on the Gaza border.Israel's objective is to wipe out Hamas. That's been used to excuse its high casualty numbers. Do you think Hamas will be gone if 10k members are killed?
Irrespective of that, I think that obviously Israel is nowhere near done with their task. Given the very clear telegraphing of their move into northern Gaza (3+ weeks of warning), it's obvious that much of Hamas' leadership and force structure has moved south. They left behind substantial forces, of course, but not the bulk of their forces. Israel has mostly been involved in destroying infrastructure (tunnels, bunkers, etc.) and collecting intelligence. The killing of a few thousand enemy troops, while certainly a goal, is not indication that they're anywhere near success.
Hamas' strength is somewhere on the order of 25k-40k troops, depending on how you count things (there's also 5-10k PIJ but let's ignore them for now). Most of that higher number are poorly trained/equipped 'reservists' who have roles in e.g. the police force or the like and are no match for Israeli troops. They also might be reasonably expected to not be necessary to kill in order to eliminate Hamas control over Gaza (or the strategic threat to Israel). Of the 15-25k more 'regular' troops, the biggest threat is the Nukhba troops and other various specialized units, likely numbering around 5-10k. It is those who likely died in droves on Oct 7 were elites (though the attack was a strategic 'success' as these things are measured, it was a tactical failure - few of Hamas' elite troops advanced past the first envelope of Gaza settlements, and they had something like a 5:1 combatant casualty ratio, even with a badly undermanned border and the element of surprise; we've seen even more lopsided ratios in northern Gaza, even with the battlefield being heavily prepared by Hamas). It is also likely that many, though not all, of the Hamas troops killed in fighting to date inside Gaza were also relatively higher grade troops.
There are discussions in military theory about how much of a military unit/organization it is necessary to kill or injure in order to make the unit nonviable for more combat. In the case of irregular formations like seen with Hamas, the percentage is higher, but I would expect that killing ~50% of the ~20k 'regular' troops along with most of their military leadership would indeed make them incapable of controlling the Gaza Strip. And frankly I suspect Israel has plans to kill a lot more than 10k Hamas troops... and I wouldn't be surprised if they're planning on assassinating their political leadership overseas as well, over time (they've already been hitting the political leadership in Gaza).
The big flaw here is not the ability to destroy Hamas' ability to administer the Strip, that's a doable task, given enough time and political will. The flaw is that no one - not in Israel, not in the US, not in the Arab world, and certainly not in the 'international community' - has provided a feasible option for who will take over afterwards. Indeed, this is one of the big reasons why Israel has refrained from toppling Hamas in the past. I think this should be something that is occupying minds throughout the region; unfortunately, it is unlikely that the current Israel government (with the possible exception of Gantz and Gallant) have really given it serious thought. There are a series of very bad options; it just appears that the default bad option (leaving Hamas in power indefinitely using a combination of bribery and deterrence) was no longer viable.
Reply With Quote