Things seem to be getting worse fast in the retaliatory conflicts in the Middle East right now. Is it going to simmer off, or end up at an almost war footing like the intifada?
Israel/Gaza conflict
Things seem to be getting worse fast in the retaliatory conflicts in the Middle East right now. Is it going to simmer off, or end up at an almost war footing like the intifada?
Originally Posted by Ominous Gamer
At this point I'm willing to gauge the chances of another intefada as relatively low as a direct result of this. That said, it's clear Hamas was testing the waters with Israel. And there has been no freaking progress on this issue for some time now, so it's possible. Then again, there have been some pretty substantial economic gains in the West Bank over the past few years which could sap support for more violence.
Gaza is a whole other basket. When it comes to Gaza, the best comparison I've heard is an Israeli metaphor saying that it's now time to mow the lawn/cut the grass in Gaza. Hamas has had four years to develop their missile infrastructure. You wouldn't be able to tell from the British media, but in the past few weeks they've been escalating their rocket launches and firing anti-tank missiles at Israeli border positions. Now the Israelis feel the need to cut-down that rocket and anti-tank inventory a bit.
It's like a cleaning cycle, except horrible.
Could it be that the Israeli government is expecting the endplay in Syria soon and doesn't want to have to worry about Hamas in its back at the same time?
Congratulations America
Curious what Wiggin thinks, but I doubt it. The concern in Syria is for the conflict spilling-over at any moment. The other concern is Assad uses something involving Israel as a pretext to avoid pressure to go away/die.
I think the Israelis are taking something of a chance by engaging on their southern front while so much could go wrong on the northern front.
I don't think there's reason to assume grander motives here. There have been a record amount of rockets shot from Gaza this year. Israel is unwilling to tolerate that many rockets being fired and decided to do something about it (the amount of rockets fired decreased sharply after the previous operation).
Hope is the denial of reality
Source.
Because I read the British media daily and its been reporting on it the whole time
My criticism is mainly that the reporting has made it seem like Israel assassinated this Hamas dude out of nowhere, as if this was a semi-random escalation.
Dreadnaught has a point with this one. That was the impression I was left with.
When the sky above us fell
We descended into hell
Into kingdom come
inWell, it was a bit out of nowhere; this dude was only hours before the missile hit him the recipient of a proposal on how a cease fire could work. It strikes me as a bit odd that you would then turn around and kill your potential partner in negotiations. (source; Gershon Baskin in an opinion piece in the NYT)
Congratulations America
Pretty sure Israel considers all Hamas leaders to be interchangeable (not an unreasonable position).
Hope is the denial of reality
Even if that were so it's not really smart to kill the guy you're about to strike a deal with. One who's somewhat good for his word even, which is more than you can say from most Hamas' leaders.
Congratulations America
Yes, that was the claim made by the NY Times. It's not really consistent with 700 rockets being fired from Gaza this year, the highest since the last war.
Hope is the denial of reality
I was wondering when someone would start a thread on this. To be honest, I don't know if there's much new to say on this issue since the basic calculus hasn't really changed since Cast Lead four years ago. I have some specific comments in response to others below, but my basic understanding of the current escalation follows:
I think that this escalation is due to a number of factors. The proximate cause was the firing of an anti-tank missile at an IDF patrol on the Israeli side of the Gaza border fence. It injured four soldiers, and provoked some relatively small airstrikes in response. This escalated into a tit-for-tat between limited IAF sorties and gradually escalating rocket fire. As rocket fire had become a bigger and bigger issue in recent months, Netanyahu was viewing it as a more significant security threat rather than the occasional manageable flare-up. I suspect he also was in possession of intelligence about the location and extent of Hamas' longer range Fajr-5 missile stockpiles, which can threaten three major cities (Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Beer Sheva) and roughly half of Israel.
I suspect that cease fire negotiations had been largely stalemated, and Israel lost its faith in Hamas' ability or willingness to rein in rocket fire by other groups (Islamic Jihad, PRC, etc.) that had formed the basis of the tacit truce since Operation Cast Lead. Given the growing rocket threat (and the employment of said threat) combined with their conclusion that Jabari could no longer be reasoned with, they chose to assassinate him. I'm not particularly upset about that from a moral perspective, given his rather unsavory list of crimes, but it may or may not have been a good idea from a strategic perspective.
At the same time as the assassination, they did their best to eliminate much of the long-range missile threat, and it does seem like most of the Fajr-5 stockpiles were destroyed (though obviously not all, given the occasional rocket lobbed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem). This provoked the expected retaliation, and the fighting started in earnest. The big differences in the strategic calculus are twofold: first, Hamas has far more long-range rockets than in the past (a few years ago, they could barely reach Beer Sheva with a handful of projectiles; now they routinely attack major towns most of the way to Tel Aviv). Second, Israel's Iron Dome system gives its citizens a modicum of protection - something like 80-90% of rockets aimed at populated areas have been intercepted, resulting in remarkably few casualties (3 civilian deaths, a few dozen wounded, some property damage).
In theory, the existence of the Iron Dome (expensive as it is; some $10 million in interceptors have been destroyed in the last week) should allow the Israeli government time to allow the situation to stabilize after an initial attack. In earlier episodes, mounting civilian casualties caused a public outcry that necessitated further escalations. Unfortunately, this logic hasn't worked as Hamas' longer range rockets have hardened Israeli attitudes - attacks on Israel's economic and political capitals have changed a local security problem into a national one, and Israel cannot allow the status quo to continue.
As such, Netanyahu and Barak have rapidly escalated matters, striking several hundred targets in Gaza and using some pretty aggressive rhetoric. Most startling to me is the scale of the approved reserve call-up: in Cast Lead, Israel called up 2 or 3 divisions, and only used about 1-2 divisions in actual ground operations in Gaza. In Pillar of Defense (terrible translation, that), the cabinet has approved a request for 75,000 troops. That's 5 times the size of the call-up in the 2nd Lebanon War; over seven divisions of troops. For comparison, that's 1% of the Israeli population and over 40% of the active duty military personnel. That number of troops couldn't just invade Gaza; they could flatten it. Operation Defensive Shield, where Israeli troops surrounded and systematically cleared each city in the West Bank, took only about 20,000 troops. We're talking about serious firepower.
It seems on the face of it like Netanyahu is committed to a massive ground invasion into Gaza to do far more than the limited goals of Cast Lead four years ago. I'm skeptical for two reasons. First, there's an Israeli election in January, and while bombing the hell out of Gaza is popular with voters, troops dying by the dozens in a quagmire is not. Second, the sheer size of the request suggest to me it's more a massive threat to Hamas rather than an actual intention. There's precious little information about how many troops have actually been mobilized - certainly the request for 75k was approved, but I doubt more than a few thousand have actually been brought to the border so far (likely a hefty helping of special forces, engineers, maybe some armor). The question is whether Netanyahu is bluffing in the hopes of making Hamas stand down. Their infrastructure was seriously damaged in Cast Lead (and their fighting force roundly defeated in any engagements with overwhelmingly superior IDF forces), and I don't think there's interested in round 2 except for propaganda purposes. Netanyahu is probably betting on this, and hopes that a very aggressive show of force will make them back down.
I think that time will tell whether this analysis is correct. I don't think a major ground incursion into Gaza is in the cards given the political realities, but if it is indeed going to happen then I think going in with massive force to do a systematic clearing of the northern half of the Strip (and maybe by the Philadelphi route) is probably the way to do it.
A few other notes: I don't doubt that the specific timing of this operation was to some extent driven by political considerations. Netanyahu is keenly aware of American politics, and would not have launched an operation before the US elections. He is also aware of his own electoral timetable - though he is indeed currently enjoying a significant lead in the polls, being seen as the killer of an arch-terrorist and hawkish on security is never a really bad platform for an Israeli election. A ground invasion, though, seems to militate against this logic.
Another concern is the position of Egypt. Although they had made some not-too-friendly noises about jihadists in Gaza and the Sinai after multiple attacks against Egyptian police/military posts in the last few months, Morsi has used some pretty harsh rhetoric about Israel (and visited Gaza). This is not good news if the cold peace with Israel turns into enmity. I am less than encouraged.
Unlikely; the West Bank and Gaza are two different animals right now. Gaza is bottled up and not a major threat outside of rocket fire - suicide bombings would be difficult (even through the Sinai route), as would cross-border attacks. The Palestinians in Gaza simply don't have the capacity to inflict the kind of mass horror of the second intifada, and the lack of IDF occupation of Gaza makes regular clashes between civilians and IDF troops challenging to orchestrate. The rocket issue will continue indefinitely, of course, but rockets do not an intifada make.
In the West Bank, the security situation is miles better. Israel works relatively closely with the PA and routinely locks up the nasty guys. Between aggressive intelligence/policework, coordination with the PA, economic growth in the WB, and the separation fence, Israel has made it very difficult for terrorists in the West Bank to launch a reign of terror like in the early years of this century. I suspect that the conflict in the WB is well 'managed' though obviously not anything like an actual solution.
I find this highly unlikely. Israel is concerned about Syria (including the occasional stray bullet or mortar round that crosses the border), but I don't think they find it likely the violence will spill over into Israel. The broader concern is on longer term geopolitics, going from a nasty but pragmatic regime living in an uneasy 'peace' and plunging Syria into anarchy where Islamist groups could seize control near Israel's borders and make trouble, much as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon. This is not an immediate term security concern, and current IDF forces on the Golan are more than enough to handle whatever comes up from Syria as well as flattening any problems in Gaza at the same time.
I don't really agree; see above. During the second Lebanon war, there was a second front opened up in Gaza, and the IDF was able to bottle that up pretty easily without significant issues. The fact of the matter is that in terms of conventional military power, the IDF outclasses all of their immediate adversaries, and can easily fight a multi-front war. They fought such wars against FAR more sophisticated and well-equipped adversaries in the past with less equipment and personnel, and they were victorious. In contrast, these threats are not particularly existential concerns, just strategic issues wrt the security of the home front.
See my comments above re: Netanyahu's timing. I agree with you that the operation was likely to occur soon at any rate, especially now that Shalit was returned, Hamas had an upgraded arsenal, and Israel had the relative security of 5 Iron Dome batteries. I just think the specific timing was driven by political and not military considerations.
Gershon Baskin is not a representative of the Israeli government; he is a freelance peace activist who has attempted to mediate between Jabari and Israel. I doubt that Netanyahu's calculations (or that of the IDF/Shin Bet) had much to do with Baskin's efforts one way or another. Clearly Netanyahu and Barak felt he was not capable of negotiating in good faith, and that deterrence re: rocket firings had eroded.
Last edited by wiggin; 11-18-2012 at 05:01 AM.
One could always make the argument that any action was driven by politics. And there's probably some element of truth to these claims. But one could easily make the claim that doing the exact opposite or doing something at a different time would also be driven by politics (Haaretz had a piece suggesting that Netanyahu preferred to mount this operation before November, because Obama wouldn't want to take a controversial stance in the lead-up to an election). In essence, it's an unfalsifiable claim that is generally made on the basis of how much one dislikes the person/people making the decisions.
What we do know is that this conflict would have happened regardless. Had it happened later, it would be even closer to the Israeli election. There were some pretty clear provocations right before this conflict started that were sufficient to put into effect plans that were likely made earlier. To the extent that I might believe that there are wider motives, it might be that Israel is testing how far Egypt (and to a lesser extent Jordan) are willing to go to placate their publics in the wake of the Arab Spring; this wouldn't be the main motivation for this operation, however.
Hope is the denial of reality
Loki, largely agreed. I'm skeptical about your take re: Egypt and Jorden, though.
*shrug* Israel seems to be going out of its way to placate Egypt (without actually stopping the operation) and has been doing so from the very start of the operation. Not sure I'd trust Netanyahu to only start thinking of this after the conflict began.
Hope is the denial of reality
This kinda sums up how I see the reserves call-up: http://www.timesofisrael.com/calling...style-foul-up/
Sounds like the "mowing the lawn" idea, but with more context.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/wo...eakens.html?hp
This is why there won't be peace for the foreseeable future.
Hope is the denial of reality
http://www.thedailymash.co.uk/news/i...-2012111949611
http://www.thedailymash.co.uk/news/i...s-200812291481
Two shorts from the Daily Mash, sort of Britain's version of the Onion.
I lol'd
Rocket attacks mean you can go balls-out crazy apeshit.
I could have had class. I could have been a contender.
I could have been somebody. Instead of a bum
Which is what I am
I aim at the stars
But sometimes I hit London
I think Palestine should be recognized as a sovereign nation, with clear political boundaries, and their own democratically-elected government. Then they'd be required to act as a legitimate governing body, with 'tests' from other nations. That would go a long way toward weeding out their fringe 'terrorist' elements.
At the same time, it would limit Israel building beyond their designated borders, or creating barriers that keep essential goods (water, food, medicine) from entering Palestine.
Question still remains --- who decides those borders and boundaries?
Remind me how Palestine would get this democratically elected government and how Israel is preventing it from doing this right now.
Hope is the denial of reality
For some reason, the BBC has had a real obsession with sound in this war. Reporters in Gaza in particular are always talking about the sounds of the Israeli bombardment, how it affects day to day life, stops people being able to sleep and so on.
It seems to have culmilated in this article about the Sound of War, with several clips for various conflicts: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20400030 it's kinda interesting.
When the sky above us fell
We descended into hell
Into kingdom come
Perhaps because this is the only issue the British left cares about? Meanwhile, a nasty rebel group just took over a city of 400,000 in the DRC (the brave Congolese army didn't even bother to put up a fight, despite having an advantage in manpower and military hardware), and I'm willing to bet that more than 100 people will be killed. Yet no one cares...
Hope is the denial of reality
Well, that's the kick in the balls, innit? Currently, Israel has more influential "allies", the US in particular. The US has great influence in the UN and NATO, but those entities don't really have as much power as they assume, do they? The Arab Nations and border states have more real "power", but they keep punting to the US, UN or NATO....in a relentless pass-the-buck cycle.Remind me how Palestine would get this democratically elected government and how Israel is preventing it from doing this right now.
Israel has automatic political buffers, but they've (unfortunately) used those buffers to expand building beyond their borders. And pissed off a bunch of Palestinians in the process. Is that True or False?
That's not my point. My point is that there are currently two separate Palestinian governments, neither being democratic (Hamas was democratically elected, but stopped playing that game soon after). Israel allowing the creation of a Palestinian state wouldn't resolve either part of that problem, and could quite possibly make it worse.
Hope is the denial of reality
Not sure how you can say Hamas was 'democratically elected'....when Palestine isn't even considered a sovereign nation.
Since when do you need to be a sovereign nation to be elected. Is Texas a sovereign nation? Or New York or any of the States? Does that mean the State governments aren't democratically elected? What about Scotland and its national government?
Cricket clubs can have democratic elections let alone non-sovereign nations.
Seriously? You're comparing Palestinians to Texans or New Yorkians....and then Scots....or Cricket Clubs?
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