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Thread: [Article] Missile Defense

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    Default [Article] Missile Defense

    With the dust settling in Gaza and Israel, one of the big take-aways in the Western media seems to be that the Iron Dome CRAM (counter rocket, artillery, mortar) system was a smashing success, and has revived interest in missile defense as a viable strategic goal. I'm a bit more skeptical, but I'm curious what some of you folks out there think about the cost/benefit analysis of the US (or Western allies in general) aggressively pursuing a comprehensive missile defense strategy. In this article, I will examine missile defense systems currently in operation and development in order to assess their efficacy and viability. Given the economic and technical realities, I will argue that certain forms of missile defense are more worth pursuing and developing than others. In particular, I believe that CRAM systems like the Iron Dome and tactical ballistic missile defense like Aegis and Arrow are relatively proven and reliable technologies with reasonable costs for the political and military benefits. They benefit from flexibility, modularity, and a clearly articulated need. However, I will show that other missile defense systems in development - notably those aimed at medium to long range rockets and cruise missiles such as Magic Wand, as well as strategic ballistic missile defense against ICBMs - are largely overpriced and irrelevant for most governments. In particular, I single out the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system as a fundamentally flawed technology with little strategic or tactical value which is being implemented at enormous cost.


    Beats CRAMming into bomb shelters

    There is no question that the Iron Dome system is pretty fancy technology. In the latest round of fighting, it appears that the system had an 84% successful intercept rate (with the radar and C&C system determining about 2/3 of incoming rockets were not significant threats and choosing not to attempt an intercept) - some 400 intercepts have been recorded to date. There were some snafus, mostly with the control systems, but overall it appears that the system will approach 90% interception success for rockets with ranges up to about 70 or 75 km. Further upgrades might push this interception rate a bit higher, but likely not too much further - the short intercept time complicates matters. This is by far the most successful missile defense system to date. It is true that the mortars and rockets being intercepted by the system aren't particularly large, heavy, or fast (making the job of the interception a bit easier), but the time to intercept is also incredibly small, generally ranging from about 15 seconds to a minute. That's part of why Israel has to deploy so many batteries to protect its cities - more centrally located batteries wouldn't be able to launch an interceptor in time to meet the incoming threat.

    I would say that this is indeed a more capable system than the earlier proposed alternative, a land version of the Phalanx CIWS for point defense of ships (it also is far more practical than an earlier idea using chemical lasers called Skyguard/THEL). It has greater flexibility and range, and has the ability to attempt multiple intercepts. The unit cost per intercept is certainly higher, but a single Iron Dome system can cover much more ground against more varied threats. An issue with both systems is the danger to surrounding areas from the system itself - the Phalanx system is supposed to have self-destructing rounds, and the Iron Dome is supposed to direct unexploded missiles to uninhabited 'graveyards', but there's still a lot of danger there. The Phalanx/Centurion ammunition is likely to have some duds that don't self-destruct, and shrapnel from successful Iron Dome intercepts has cause damage and some minor injuries in Israel. I would imagine that protecting a single small region (such as a military outpost) is still probably a job for the cheaper-per-intercept Phalanx system, but any more comprehensive solution would need something akin to the Iron Dome (or, potentially, a heavily re-engineered land-based version of the SeaRAM).

    The reason this kind of technology hasn't been implemented until now has largely to do with speed. Until recently, we didn't have the computer power or sophisticated enough control systems to do the necessary calculations for intercept in the allotted time. It also helps that missile technology has gotten pretty fancy, and it's possible to build relatively cheap interceptors that are still quite maneuverable and sophisticated. $40k a pop might not sound cheap, but it's a drop in the bucket compared to other modern missiles - a modern air-to-air missile will run about 10 times as much, and a cruise missile will cost maybe 50 times more. Obviously it's more expensive than an asymmetric threat (a rocket that costs at most a few hundred dollars), but given target discrimination abilities and the savings in lost property/lives, it probably approaches being cost effective.

    So much for the CRAM threat; I think given this new reality it makes sense for Western militaries to invest in these systems for specific needs - generally, point defense of military ships and bases as well as area defense against asymmetric threats in relevant environments. These systems are clearly effective and change the strategic calculus when face with short-range asymmetric threats, giving governments a much greater degree of political freedom in responding to such threats. Cost is a significant concern, but marginal costs are low enough compared to alternatives (such as much more costly ground invasions or extensive fortification) that it is probably worth it for most scenarios. Since the technology is now proven, development costs and risk are fairly minimal. The biggest buyer I'd see (now that the US is winding down Afghanistan) would be South Korea, though some other countries might find it a useful investment as well for point defense of military bases and sensitive installations.


    Wanna see my Magic Wand? That will be $1 million

    The real question, though, is whether longer-range systems should also be pursued. There's several steps between a CRAM system and a full ICBM shield, so I'll address each one:

    In the sub-ballistic missile range there are long range artillery rockets (up to a few hundred km) and cruise missiles. These are a more challenging target in that they tend to be faster, larger, and potentially can be steered, but you also can get away with fewer batteries and more time-to-intercept (allowing for multiple shootdown attempts). The cost disparity between interceptor and target may decrease, depending on the particular threat, which makes the economics more favorable for an interception system. So far there is precious little data out there on functioning systems. Israel has been aggressively pursuing this with its Magic Wand system, which just achieved a notable milestone with its first test interception, and it seems likely they will be able to successfully replicate their success with the Iron Dome - much of the basic technology is the same, given that the target is not all that different. I am more skeptical of their claims that this will form the basis of a comprehensive air defense system, which Magic Wand interceptors being able to engage cruise missiles, aircraft, etc. - those are much more maneuverable, and it may drive costs up to have to engineer for those threats as well. Missiles that are too broad in design will often fail to be very effective at any one task.

    The only other vaguely similar system is the bottom end of the Patriot engagement envelope. Though envisioned mostly as an anti-ballistic missile system (for the PAC-3; earlier versions are better optimized for engaging aircraft as well), it does have some capability of medium to long range rockets as well as cruise missiles. I am still quite skeptical of the efficacy of the Patriot after its relatively lackluster combat performance in the past, but I do indeed recognize that the system has been dramatically upgraded in the last twenty years, and it may indeed be capable. The real challenge is the economics - Patriot missiles are too expensive to waste on intercepting a Zelzal rocket, so they're not really suited for this kind of engagement. It's a bit better of a cost differential with cruise missiles, but the PAC-3 is not really suited for that role.

    I'd say the jury is still out on whether it's worth it to invest in medium-to-long range rocket defense systems like Magic Wand. I understand Israel's interest (and South Korea's), but it seems to fit in the uneasy space between point defense (very useful for the military) and theater defense (very useful against unconventional warheads). It's good for protecting large civilian populations against long range asymmetric threats, but probably isn't very good at much else. The US and most of its allies should probably not pursue this very aggressively.


    Sheltering under the Aegis of America's warm (and expensive) embrace

    Now we get to the meat of the debate: ballistic missile defense. This is by far the most expensive part of the whole story, and the most prone to failure. The strategic stakes are also far higher. I would distinguish between two categories here: theater ballistic missile defense and strategic ballistic missile defense.

    Theater defense has a pretty long and varied history - many of the early systems, like the Patriot and various Soviet systems, evolved out of sophisticated surface to air missile systems which were given dual status in the vain hopes of some level of ballistic missile defense for a given theater of war (say, covering a small country with a single system against most ranges of ballistic missiles). Most of these early systems were pretty bad at their job, mostly because it's easier to make a plane not airworthy than it is to keep a relatively hefty missile from screaming out of the sky and exploding. Given the relatively small amount of accuracy these ballistic missiles need if equipped with unconventional warheads (the only kind of warhead that makes sense for a medium to long range ballistic missile), you need to have a pretty lethal and accurate kill vehicle. Your defense system also needs to have a very low leakage rate against fairly large salvos (say, at most letting 1 in 1000 through in a salvo of dozens or even hundreds). A single miss will likely make your system a moot point, so it has to be very good.

    This makes these systems very challenging (and expensive!) to develop. It also means that outside of a pretty big shooting war between fairly sophisticated enemies, there's no way to test the system in a realistic setting. The big advances since the early operating theater ABM systems in the 80s are threefold: better tracking, better maneuverability, and better lethality. Radars have gotten a lot better, as have computers - this helps a lot. Also, as they have expanded the interception envelope higher into the atmosphere (or even into space), it gives systems the possibility to do things like shoot-look-shoot to have multiple interceptors tracking a single target (90% interception rate jumps to 99.9% if you shoot three interceptors). Radar systems are also much better at tracking multiple targets in real time. Missiles are now much better at moving, using clever (but fancy) technologies like thrust vectoring, fancier terminal seeking, and better on board computers. This also is somewhat useful in better target discrimination from decoys or MIRV designs, though not as much protection as one would like. Lastly, the missiles are more lethal to targets - they have learned from the near-misses of the Patriot during the Gulf War which tracked Scuds decently but were unable to take them down. There are a variety of kill vehicle approaches - fancy proximity fuses, hit-to-kill, etc. - but they all take into account the early design flaws. It's hard to know if hardened terminal stages of medium and long range ballistic missiles will be able to withstand new kill vehicles, but at least it's an area of significant concern to current designers.

    So - the technology is better, but is it better enough? Early ABM tests in the 90s using new theater ABM systems were notoriously iffy, but results in tests and simulations have gotten a lot better - and not just from the designers making easier tests. Of particular interest are the US' two major theater systems and Israel's Arrow system. The US' best tested system is the Aegis BMD, which was originally developed for naval defense on cruisers and destroyers using the SM-2 and SM-3 missiles. The missiles are pretty sophisticated, albeit expensive, and can go exoatmospherically for midcourse as well as terminal phase intercepts. A single battery has coverage for a decent area, and this is the basis for the 'interim' phase of European missile defenses (several Aegis-equipped US Navy ships hanging out in the Mediterranean etc.). It has the advantage of being more flexibly deployed than ground-based systems, and it is based on relatively proven technology. The big challenge is that tests so far haven't been that realistic against emerging threats (more sophisticated re-entry vehicles coming from Iran, NK, China), and the missiles are quite pricey (over $10 million a pop in most cases). The US also has the THAAD system, which is solely a terminal interception system from ground units. It has a very troubled development history in the 90s, though more recent tests have been more promising. It remains to be seen whether it will gain the desired capability, but bits of it have been deployed already - the US Army has a small initial operating capability, multiple X-band radars have been installed (including one in Israel), and the US is selling the system to some Gulf region countries (notably the UAE). I'd say the jury is still out on THAAD compared to the more mature Aegis system. The Israeli system, Arrow, is more rigorously tested than either and the missiles may be a bit cheaper. It also is the first theater ABM system in operation. It has similar caveats to the Aegis system wrt realism of the tests, but the new interceptors in the later blocks of the Arrow 2 and the new Arrow 3 all appear to be quite capable.

    What's the verdict? I'd say that the technology remains to be tested and proven in battle, but that it fills a glaring need for defense against unconventional threats from sophisticated but not near-peer competitors (e.g. NK, Iran), and against conventional threats from belligerent ones (China). The problems of intermediate range ballistic missile defense are a bit easier to solve than a strategic shield, and the systems tend to be a bit more modular, cheaper, and flexible. Tests in the last decade or so have been increasingly showing successful intercepts against more and more sophisticated engagement scenarios. I'd say it's worth it. Lots of countries agree with me - bits of the Arrow system have been sold to India and South Korea, and the US has sold Aegis to a boatload (heh) of various Navies - Japan, NATO, Australia, possibly SK in time. THAAD has also been sold to UAE and is evincing interest elsewhere. I don't think these systems satisfy leakage requirements for unconventional warheads yet, but they are getting there. The obvious regions of concern are Asia (NK and China) and the Middle East (Iran) right now, and a policy of containment is probably better than outright confrontation. These systems give us a bit of flexibility in discussing other actions, whether military or diplomatic, which is not a bad thing.


    Good Morning Deficit

    The last type of missile defense is by far the most expensive - strategic ABM shields for global coverage against ICBMs. Currently, this is only a threat from near-peer competitors - Russia, China, and technically some Western nations we wouldn't consider threats (Israel, Britain, France). India will get there eventually, but Pakistan, Iran, and NK will still need quite some time before they have a real threat there. These threats also tend to have the most sophisticated re-entry vehicles, are extremely fast, and almost all carry unconventional warheads. To date there is no functioning system that can convincingly intercept these threats. The closest we have is the US' Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, which uses a series of very powerful radars to detect and track missiles, and a handful of ground-based silos to launch interceptors for a 'midcourse' intercept in space. This has the advantage of being able to provide much larger coverage (you'd only need 2 or 3 silos to convincingly cover the US), but is an incredibly hard problem and requires very large, fast, and sophisticated interceptors and kill vehicles. To date, the US has sunk tens of billions of dollars into this program with extremely mixed results in tests. Identification and tracking (with X-band radars and the like) seems to be pretty decent, but actual interception has been plagued with failures and troubles with the interceptor. It also leads to all sort of political issues, especially with Russia.

    A lot of other (largely loony) ideas have been tried over the years as well. The looniest one lately was the Airborne Laser system, where Boeing stuck a gigantic chemical laser into a 747 for shooting down missiles in their vulnerable boost phase. It never made any sense (how do you get a 747 close enough to an enemy launch to be effective?) and was incredibly expensive. Ditto with plans for orbiting X-ray laser satellites from back during SDI. Strategic ABM systems have come a long way from that, and in principle it seems likely that the latest attempts will be relatively successful given enough money and time. I question, though, whether this is all an exercise in futility. It's a lot easier to make re-entry vehicles on ICBMs more difficult to kill than it is to make interceptors even better than they are. The costs start to get prohibitive as well - ICBMs are expensive, but you need quite a lot more (also expensive) interceptors to convincingly defend against a large salvo of ICBMs. The economics doesn't really work, and once a country achieves a relatively large arsenal of unconventional-tipped ICBMs, it's probably a waste of time to try for interceptions. Something like GMD might be useful if a country like Iran or NK ever gets hold of true ICBMs and gets smaller nuclear warhead designs - it's unlikely either country will have the resources to develop a large enough arsenal to overwhelm GMD. But the development costs are so prohibitive that's it's probably wiser just to make sure they never get such capabilities in the first place. As for near-peer competitors, though, strategic ABM is probably an expensive boondoggle that won't even work effectively.

    To conclude, it's true that missile defense has become much more of a reality than the days of SDI. Technology has evolved to the point that the real limiting factor is one of economics rather than feasibility. Given these threats, though, it's not always clear that the cost/benefit analysis supports aggressive investment into various forms of missile defense. Point defense using cheap and flexible systems like Iron Dome (and to a lesser extent, Phalanx/Centurion) is appropriate for some applications, notably for protecting civilian areas and sensitive installations from nearby asymmetric threats. It's a useful technology that was rapidly brought from initial conception to operation, and marginal costs are low enough to make it viable for a number of different scenarios. Longer range rocket/cruise missile defense can be part of a multifunction air defense system for an entire country, but is still relatively untested and should only be pursued by countries with immediate needs in this area (SK, Israel) - this is such a niche need that it's probably a waste to spend much money on development outside of these particular countries. Theater ballistic missile defense is convincingly reaching feasibility now and seems like an eminently wise investment against a number of emerging threats - it may be expensive, but it gives policymakers a great deal of flexibility in dealing with unconventional threats from non-peer competitors. It also is not too expensive, and has given us convincingly working technology. I would caution, though, against funding theater ABM systems in perpetuity if a better and cheaper alternative exists. These programs have inertia, and I fail to see why THAAD wasn't cancelled a decade ago given the relative success of Aegis BMD and Arrow. Conversely, strategic ballistic missile defense is almost certainly too expensive and complex to work against any real threats for the foreseeable future. In times of budgetary austerity, it's a disgrace that we have spent over $30 billion on a technology that is so incredibly complex... and yet still not have anything approaching a working system. It's expensive, politically a mess, and probably useless against most real strategic threats. It's not being 'soft on defense' to suggest this is a waste of our resources, and I would urge policymakers to cut or curtail this program for the foreseeable future.

    I'm sure that plenty of people will take the wrong lessons from the dramatic success of Iron Dome. It is not a panacea and should not be treated like that; it is a useful technological tool that gives policymakers more flexibility in their responses to a given situation. The lessons we should take are that missile defense technology is rapidly improving and is indeed capable of remarkable feats - yet it is still fundamentally limited by the calculations of economics and the extremely high intercept rates needed for unconventional threats. That being said, many missile defense systems indeed appear to be worth the investment. Others, though, are either lower priority (e.g. long range rocket interception) or not worth it (strategic ballistic missile defense).
    "When I meet God, I am going to ask him two questions: Why relativity? And why turbulence? I really believe he will have an answer for the first." - Werner Heisenberg (maybe)

  2. #2
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    Quote Originally Posted by wiggin View Post
    .....
    TLDR of course, but what I picked up from the little I read about Iron Dome that it's a useful real life test with some actual rockets being fired at it. On the other hand I didn't really get the idea that if this was supposed to be a fully operational system if the price/effective ratio was quite right (it seems a bit expensive to fend off a rocket and these are still rather low-tech aren't they) and if it was quite successfull enough at all with quite a few projectiles still coming through.

    It hardly gave me the feeling that SDI is worth the money.
    Congratulations America

  3. #3
    Quote Originally Posted by Hazir View Post
    TLDR of course, but what I picked up from the little I read about Iron Dome that it's a useful real life test with some actual rockets being fired at it. On the other hand I didn't really get the idea that if this was supposed to be a fully operational system if the price/effective ratio was quite right (it seems a bit expensive to fend off a rocket and these are still rather low-tech aren't they) and if it was quite successfull enough at all with quite a few projectiles still coming through.

    It hardly gave me the feeling that SDI is worth the money.
    Indeed on a per-intercept basis the interceptor is worth more than the target for Iron Dome. It gets a bit cheaper when you figure that they only attempt to intercept about 1/3 of incoming rockets based on its predicted destination, but it's still quite a bit more pricey. It gets even cheaper if you factor in saved property and lives... but a hard-headed look at the economics would still find the system to be moderately overpriced. The real savings, though, are when you look at the counterfactual - if this latest Gaza escalation had happened without Iron Dome, Israel would have started a ground operation in Gaza, no question. That would cost on a per day basis roughly the same as the entire week's worth of Iron Dome intercepts. So, the added policy flexibility is not to be ignored in terms of cost savings.

    For a system so capable, the per-intercept cost is remarkably low: the Magic Wand is currently running about $1 million per interceptor; Arrow runs about $4-5 million, Aegis runs over $10 million for most cases, GMD is roughly a bajillion dollars. Obviously these are handling different threats, but $40k for a sophisticated missile is cheap. With volume and added engineering, they can probably drop marginal costs even further.

  4. #4
    Quote Originally Posted by wiggin View Post
    Hmm, yeah, I thought about getting into stuff like this. I think I'll leave it for you to comment on, though - there are a lot of factors in play here and I think it's sometimes easy to overestimate the strategic benefits. A rational response from Hamas might indeed be to give up on rockets as more than a method of shutting down the southern Israeli economy for a few days... yet it also might be to develop tactics and weapons that exploit weaknesses in Iron Dome - e.g. firing in large salvos, improving targeting accuracy to use up interceptors, etc.
    Like with the case of the Brits though, this effectively reduces the number of targets they can attack at one time if they have to staturate a particular target with missiles to stand a chance of getting a hit. I assume the point of the rocket strategy is to make life unpleasent enough for ordinary Israeli's living in the target area that it will cause Israel to stop doing whatever it is Hamas doesn't want them doing - basic terrorism. Iron Dome effectively negates this tactic. They might still be able pull of a successful attack if Iron Dome doesn't work, or they come up with tactics that can work around it, but that's hardly going to have Israeli's living in terror of being rocketed.

    Other factors come into play. In order to pull off a saturation attack, they have to have two things: accuracy and coordination. i.e. they're going to have to be accurate enough to put all the missiles into one area in order to overwhelm particular iron dome battery, and they have to be coordinated enough to do it all at the same time. Given that a) 2/3s of the missiles manage to come down in the middle of nowhere in a country as small as Israel and B) half those things are fired off by small groups that Hamas can't even control for political reasons I am not confident this is something Hamas will be able to achieve.

    They could fire better missiles, but that then means increasing expense of the missiles in question and a corresponding drop in the number of missiles they can fire, never mind the difficulty of obtaining them. And of course the Israeli's can simply upgrade their own system. If it comes down to a technical arms race between Hamas an Israel there really is only one winner.

    Some warhead designs are more delicate than others, true. However, with a NCB warhead, even a warhead failing to appropriately detonante, the dispersal of the dangerous material in the air over a populated area can still be quite destructive. You might not flatten a city, but you can definitely kill a bunch of people and render parts of it uninhabitable. When Iraq was lobbing Scuds at Israel in 1991, the Patriot interceptors did indeed engage nearly every target, but they were unable to damage them sufficiently to keep them from hitting Tel Aviv. Now, the warheads were conventional and thus largely ineffective, but if one of those had been filled with a neurotoxin, it wouldn't really matter if the warhead was that damaged. The dispersal mechanism would have been suboptimal, of course, but it still could have done a lot of damage. The Patriot needed to fully destroy the incoming threat high enough in the atmosphere to limit the amount of dangerous materials that made it to the target.

    I don't really get into the details because that would probably be a bit overtechnical for me (some warhead designs are more 'survivable', but it's complex), but definitely worth some discussion in the thread.
    Fun fact: The Russian system uses or used (not sure which) 10kt nuclear warheads... it didn't need to be that accurate.
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  5. #5
    I figure if missile defense systems don't work than Russia wouldn't have a cow about us putting them in places in Europe.

  6. #6
    Senior Member Flixy's Avatar
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    Nice article

    (with the radar and C&C system determining about 2/3 of incoming rockets were not significant threats and choosing not to attempt an intercept)
    Was that (usually) correctly determined?

    I think that CIWS like Phalanx, Goalkeeper etc. are indeed more for point defense due to short range, but also more suitable for very different kinds of missiles. At least, when I visited Thales Netherlands which manufactures the Goalkeeper, they mentioned that CIWS is really the last line of defense, after interceptor missiles, and is basically meant for things like sea-skimming supersonic missiles, which may even have evasive maneuvers, which is quite different from the missiles flying over Israel. I would think land based versions are suitable for high value targets to protect against most attacks (including more advanced missiles), and when protecting a high value target the risk of stray munition causing damage or casualties is, well, collateral damage.
    Keep on keepin' the beat alive!

  7. #7
    Quote Originally Posted by Steely Glint View Post
    Like with the case of the Brits though, this effectively reduces the number of targets they can attack at one time if they have to staturate a particular target with missiles to stand a chance of getting a hit. I assume the point of the rocket strategy is to make life unpleasent enough for ordinary Israeli's living in the target area that it will cause Israel to stop doing whatever it is Hamas doesn't want them doing - basic terrorism. Iron Dome effectively negates this tactic. They might still be able pull of a successful attack if Iron Dome doesn't work, or they come up with tactics that can work around it, but that's hardly going to have Israeli's living in terror of being rocketed.

    Other factors come into play. In order to pull off a saturation attack, they have to have two things: accuracy and coordination. i.e. they're going to have to be accurate enough to put all the missiles into one area in order to overwhelm particular iron dome battery, and they have to be coordinated enough to do it all at the same time. Given that a) 2/3s of the missiles manage to come down in the middle of nowhere in a country as small as Israel and B) half those things are fired off by small groups that Hamas can't even control for political reasons I am not confident this is something Hamas will be able to achieve.

    They could fire better missiles, but that then means increasing expense of the missiles in question and a corresponding drop in the number of missiles they can fire, never mind the difficulty of obtaining them. And of course the Israeli's can simply upgrade their own system. If it comes down to a technical arms race between Hamas an Israel there really is only one winner.
    Note: Steely quoted a response I gave to him in the draft thread; he suggested that the mere existence of a missile defense system often alters the strategic picture in one's favor, even if it isn't particularly effective.

    I agree in principle with your analysis, Steely, but I think Hamas might indeed choose to focus on using large salvos of more accurate rockets. It will cost them more, but not as much more as you might think. Given that about 2/3 of their (mostly homemade) rockets fall harmlessly in the countryside, improving rocket design for better targeting would mean they'd need much fewer rockets to use up the same number of interceptors. I don't know exactly what the optimum spend per rocket is (it's a tradeoff between using up interceptors with accuracy and the cost to build), but I'm sure they're not at it yet.

    Furthermore, the strategic picture isn't as clearly in Israel's favor. While certainly they can keep most civilian deaths in cities from happening, they are still going to need warning sirens, passive defenses (i.e. bomb shelters), etc. This disrupts the life for hundreds of thousands of Israelis; shutting down schools and factories, etc. The rocket threat was never really about inflicting massive casualties (though certainly the rockets have gotten deadlier in recent years), and the development of Iron Dome just means that the public pressure is a bit less intense to invade.

    I do agree, though, that it's somewhat unwise to doubt the technological sophistication of the Israelis and their ability to innovate their way out of this conundrum.


    On an anecdotal note, I think your implication is right about the psychological effects of Iron Dome. My wife's young cousins who live in Sderot have lived their entire lives in terror of rocket fire - they have children's songs about 'Tzeva Adom' ('Red Alert', roughly, the name for the rocket warning that is broadcast when a launch is detected) and all have experienced some level of PTSD/night terrors/etc. During the latest round, though, I was forwarded a video of them doing an impromptu performance at a family gathering. They acted out rockets being launched from Gaza, did a passable impression of the Tzeva Adom warning, then 'saved the day' by calling out 'Amud Anan' (the IDF operation name) and simulating Iron Dome intercepts in the skies above them. Depressing, perhaps, but they were far less traumatized than in past, and treated it as more of a game. Perhaps you are indeed correct that the 'terrorizing' part of the rocket fire is over. Even if it still disrupts daily routines, it doesn't have the same psychological impact.

    Fun fact: The Russian system uses or used (not sure which) 10kt nuclear warheads... it didn't need to be that accurate.
    Yeah, and some of the SDI plans called for detonating nukes in orbit to make x-ray lasers. I tend to frown on the wisdom of ballistic missile defenses that use nuclear warheads; you might keep the city from vaporizing, but the fallout is a bitch, not to mention the absurd cost. I prefer kill vehicles that are a tad less... indiscriminate. Can't fault the Russians for not being badass enough, though.

    Quote Originally Posted by Lewkowski View Post
    I figure if missile defense systems don't work than Russia wouldn't have a cow about us putting them in places in Europe.
    I think Russia was more concerned that we were encroaching on their traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe than any real concern about their strategic position. The GMD program, even if it worked, would not have been much protection from an all-out strike by Russia.

    Quote Originally Posted by Flixy View Post
    Was that (usually) correctly determined?
    It appears so, though operational data is clearly sketchy. Over 1000 rockets launched landed either in rural areas or (heh) Gaza itself. A bit less than 500 were headed towards cities, of those some 84-88% were intercepted, depending on whose numbers you use. In fact, the three urban deaths (in Kiryat Malachi) happened during a malfunction in one of the system components (which has, supposedly, been since fixed). The other three deaths - two soldiers and one Arab civilian - happened in more rural areas near Gaza and were probably not considered 'protected' by the Iron Dome system. Soldiers massing near the border actually were quite vulnerable (this was also an issue in 2006 on the northern border); the lack of even passive defenses has been one bone of contention in the wake of the operation.

    I think that CIWS like Phalanx, Goalkeeper etc. are indeed more for point defense due to short range, but also more suitable for very different kinds of missiles. At least, when I visited Thales Netherlands which manufactures the Goalkeeper, they mentioned that CIWS is really the last line of defense, after interceptor missiles, and is basically meant for things like sea-skimming supersonic missiles, which may even have evasive maneuvers, which is quite different from the missiles flying over Israel. I would think land based versions are suitable for high value targets to protect against most attacks (including more advanced missiles), and when protecting a high value target the risk of stray munition causing damage or casualties is, well, collateral damage.
    I brought up CIWS (and, briefly, THEL) because they were both touted as cheaper alternatives to Iron Dome during the development of the system. I thought that CIWS was never appropriate for protecting large civilian areas - IIRC you would have needed 4 CIWS systems to protect even the relatively small border town of Sderot, not to mention cities like Ashkelon, Ashdod, or Beersheva. It's also really only useful as a last-ditch attempt to head off a hit rather than a comprehensive shield. I doubt it's very effective against multiple targets simultaneously, either, while the Iron Dome system routinely tracks many targets and assigns interceptors (often two interceptors) for each target.

    The US has indeed deployed a land-based version of naval CIWS near military bases in Afghanistan (and Iraq??) to deal with rocket and mortar threats similar to those coming out of Gaza - apparently they have performed competently but not amazingly well. One significant advantage to CIWS that you allude to is that since it only deals with the last bit of the trajectory, you can use it against even fairly maneuverable guided weapons - Iron Dome, on the other hand, assumes that all trajectories are ballistic and computes intercepts accordingly. A maneuverable threat would require a much more sophisticated terminal seeker (and maybe kill vehicle?), drastically driving up costs for interceptors. I suspect that the Magic Wand system under development is more suited for those kinds of engagement scenarios - I can't imagine there's much point for Hamas to develop short range rockets or mortars with that kind of guidance/maneuverability.

  8. #8
    Senior Member Flixy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by wiggin View Post
    It appears so, though operational data is clearly sketchy. Over 1000 rockets launched landed either in rural areas or (heh) Gaza itself. A bit less than 500 were headed towards cities, of those some 84-88% were intercepted, depending on whose numbers you use. In fact, the three urban deaths (in Kiryat Malachi) happened during a malfunction in one of the system components (which has, supposedly, been since fixed). The other three deaths - two soldiers and one Arab civilian - happened in more rural areas near Gaza and were probably not considered 'protected' by the Iron Dome system. Soldiers massing near the border actually were quite vulnerable (this was also an issue in 2006 on the northern border); the lack of even passive defenses has been one bone of contention in the wake of the operation.
    Thanks. Out of curiosity, since I assume pretty much the entire thing is completely automated, has it misidentified rockets? Though I suppose simple rockets like these with ballistic trajectories aren't so hard to identify.
    I brought up CIWS (and, briefly, THEL) because they were both touted as cheaper alternatives to Iron Dome during the development of the system. I thought that CIWS was never appropriate for protecting large civilian areas - IIRC you would have needed 4 CIWS systems to protect even the relatively small border town of Sderot, not to mention cities like Ashkelon, Ashdod, or Beersheva. It's also really only useful as a last-ditch attempt to head off a hit rather than a comprehensive shield. I doubt it's very effective against multiple targets simultaneously, either, while the Iron Dome system routinely tracks many targets and assigns interceptors (often two interceptors) for each target.

    The US has indeed deployed a land-based version of naval CIWS near military bases in Afghanistan (and Iraq??) to deal with rocket and mortar threats similar to those coming out of Gaza - apparently they have performed competently but not amazingly well. One significant advantage to CIWS that you allude to is that since it only deals with the last bit of the trajectory, you can use it against even fairly maneuverable guided weapons - Iron Dome, on the other hand, assumes that all trajectories are ballistic and computes intercepts accordingly. A maneuverable threat would require a much more sophisticated terminal seeker (and maybe kill vehicle?), drastically driving up costs for interceptors. I suspect that the Magic Wand system under development is more suited for those kinds of engagement scenarios - I can't imagine there's much point for Hamas to develop short range rockets or mortars with that kind of guidance/maneuverability.
    I agree with you that CIWS systems are not an alternative to a system like Iron Dome. It has a completely different purpose, protecting one small area (e.g. a ship) against advanced missiles, vs protecting a larger area against simple ones. I think with regards to multiple targets ammunition would be the biggest problem, radar systems can track multiple targets and aiming and firing is very quick. I imagine for a land based system giving the system a bigger ammunition supply isn't a problem that can't be solved.

    I don't see Hamas using weapons with guidance/maneuverability, since that would increase the costs for their weapons quite astronomically, no? I suppose creating a rocket with an erratic flight path isn't too hard, but if you want it to actually hit something in the direction you send it.. I think weapons like that will, at least for the time being, be almost exclusively used by the military, not terrorist acts, and most likely directed against high value targets, which makes a more expensive interceptor worth it.
    Keep on keepin' the beat alive!

  9. #9
    Quote Originally Posted by Flixy View Post
    Thanks. Out of curiosity, since I assume pretty much the entire thing is completely automated, has it misidentified rockets? Though I suppose simple rockets like these with ballistic trajectories aren't so hard to identify.
    I assume you mean has it classified any aircraft/helicopters as rockets and attempted to engage them? Certainly the Patriot missile has been involved in several such friendly fire incidents.

    To my knowledge, this has not occurred, but they are taking measures to prevent such misidentifications. As I understand it, they changed the flight pattern of civilian airlines coming into Ben Gurion outside of Tel Aviv the avoid the likely path of rockets and Iron Dome interceptors. I understand that they also have some level of protocols wrt the busy airspace over the Gaza Strip - they have drones, helicopters, and manned aircraft all in operation. I know that the IAF has changed their flight profiles given the increased use of MANPAD and RPG weapons by Hamas, and I would imagine they also have changed approach vectors and the like to avoid Iron Dome engagement zones. Furthermore, I assume that the fighters are flying way too high to be mistaken by the system, and helicopters and drones don't have anything like the right trajectories. Given the cramped airspace in the region, though, I would imagine it is a real concern.

    I believe that the system also normally has a man in the loop - the choice to launch interceptors is normally made by a human (albeit at the computer's recommendation and with at most a few seconds to make a decision), and they can also abort interceptors in flight, giving them more time (up to tens of seconds) in the event a mistake has been made. It's not a huge margin for error, of course, but given the other precautions already taken it's probably good enough.


    I agree with you that CIWS systems are not an alternative to a system like Iron Dome. It has a completely different purpose, protecting one small area (e.g. a ship) against advanced missiles, vs protecting a larger area against simple ones. I think with regards to multiple targets ammunition would be the biggest problem, radar systems can track multiple targets and aiming and firing is very quick. I imagine for a land based system giving the system a bigger ammunition supply isn't a problem that can't be solved.
    Possible, I don't know the specific reaction time and abilities of CIWS systems to any degree of exactitude. I was thinking about large salvos where a dozen rockets are launched simultaneously - I don't know if CIWS systems have the time necessary to switch targets since the engagement time is so short (right at the end of flight, rather than mid-flight like a missile interceptor). Obviously fixable with multiple batteries at the same site.

    I don't see Hamas using weapons with guidance/maneuverability, since that would increase the costs for their weapons quite astronomically, no? I suppose creating a rocket with an erratic flight path isn't too hard, but if you want it to actually hit something in the direction you send it.. I think weapons like that will, at least for the time being, be almost exclusively used by the military, not terrorist acts, and most likely directed against high value targets, which makes a more expensive interceptor worth it.
    Hmm. I might agree with you, but I remember what everyone was saying about Qassams a few years back. The common logic was that the crude short range Qassams were likely to be the real threat for the foreseeable future, with a few smuggled Grads being able to maybe hit Beersheva. Now, Grads are commonplace, and they're starting to use the much more advanced Fajr-5 rocket - not guided yet, but with more stable flight and much more range. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has been using Fajr-5s for years and has been busy stockpiling Zelzal-1 and -2 systems. I think that it's easy to assume they won't upgrade their arsenal, but in reality they somehow seem to find the funds to do so. Obviously it's a bit easier to increase your range/payload/flight stability than it is to make a guided, maneuverable missile. But I'm not really imagining Hamas will suddenly start deploying cruise missiles, but a crude form of MLRS with a rudimentary guidance package slapped on? I could see that in the next 5-10 years. Guidance packages are pretty cheap now (you don't exactly need a CEP of better than a few hundred meters to hit a civilian area), and you don't need it to be very maneuverable to throw off a basic ballistics tracking system. All you need is to throw a few kinks into your flight path, and Iron Dome interceptors will need much better terminal seekers - currently they use electro-optics.

    I'm probably exaggerating the ease with which Hamas can adapt here, and as Steely mentioned above it's never a good idea to underestimate the technical competence of the Israelis. Yet costs for weapons with crude guidance and maneuverability aren't as high as you might think.

  10. #10
    I tend to frown on the wisdom of ballistic missile defenses that use nuclear warheads; you might keep the city from vaporizing, but the fallout is a bitch, not to mention the absurd cost.
    Those systems aren't there to be actually used any more than the weapons they're supposed to stop are. They're there to make you think twice.

    Suppose NATO was considering a first strike. Suppose at this point in the cold war NATO has the advantage in terms of weapons to make this a feasible prospect. How badly would that system blunt that first strike? Suppose the system can only be relied upon to stop half of the incoming devices. What's the worse case scenario for the attacker? They have to take out the majority of the oppositions arsenal in one go. Can they still do that, and with what probability of success? If the system can change any of those variables enough to change the answer from "worth it" to "not worth it" then it has done it's job.
    When the sky above us fell
    We descended into hell
    Into kingdom come

  11. #11
    Maybe, Steely, but the Moscow system protected just a single city with, I believe, a terminal phase intercept. You'd need an uneconomical number of 10 kt devices to defend all of your important military and industrial sites, not to mention against counterforce attacks. Sure, you can reduce the number of interceptors by using a system with midcourse intercepts, but that runs into feasibility issues (as the GMD program indicates). I think it's much easier to defend against a counterforce strike by siting most of your nukes on subs or mobile launchers than making a pricey and largely ineffective system.

    I don't disagree that missile defense does change the underlying strategic calculus. I just think it's not a very cost-effective way to do so.

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