BUSINESS Updated January 23, 2013, 8:38 p.m. ET
Innovation Is Messy Business
Boeing's Dreamliner Shows How Problems Often Mar Technological Advances
By DANIEL MICHAELS
Nine years ago, Boeing Co. executives decided to take the biggest leap in airliner technology in a generation and develop the 787 Dreamliner. They promised it would burn less fuel while flying farther and offering more passenger comfort than existing models.
The plane would be "a true game-changer for the industry and traveling public," said Boeing's then-chief executive, Harry Stonecipher. The 787 also showed Boeing's "commitment to innovation."
Airlines, eager to save money and woo fliers, ordered a record numbers of Dreamliners, now totaling 848 planes. Rival Airbus remade its product line in response.
Today, Boeing is struggling to master its innovations. The Dreamliner's body and wings, made of plastic reinforced with carbon fiber, have proven unexpectedly hard to produce and attach. Power-distribution panels running the plane's advanced electrical systems have overheated and ignited in flight. Most recently, lithium-ion batteries that provide auxiliary power—and were themselves a first in commercial aviation—have caught fire, prompting regulators world-wide to ground all 50 Dreamliners in service.
Companies, governments and academics have made "innovation" a buzzword for competing in the global economy. Boeing's experience offers a reminder that innovation—for all its value—doesn't come as easily as a catchphrase. It can get messy.
Boeing, an icon of American ingenuity, has reshaped travel over the past half-century with bold technological leaps such as the 747. The original jumbo jet in 1970 opened air travel to the masses and connected cities as distant as Seattle and Tokyo.
The plane cemented Boeing's position as the world's premier jetliner producer for three decades. But it first nearly bankrupted the company due to technical problems and slow orders.
Boeing's backers say the Dreamliner will prove just as revolutionary. But its problems again show the traumas that innovation can bring. The Airbus unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. and smaller plane makers have also recently faced similar, if less dramatic, crises with some of their most promising advances.
"As a CEO of a high-tech company, you have mixed feelings about innovation," said EADS Chief Executive Tom Enders last spring, as the company grappled with cracks inside the wings of its newest plane in the skies, the A380 superjumbo.
Mr. Enders, who then ran Airbus, noted that every innovation carries risk. "But if you're too risk-averse, the competition will kill you," he added. "Either way, you're walking a tightrope."
Boeing declined to comment for this article.
The history of innovation, of course, is littered with failures. Even Thomas Edison bet badly, as in his development of direct-current electricity that proved inferior to alternating current.
Aviation innovation is especially risky because the stakes are so high. A crashed laptop might lose data, but a crashed plane kills people.
Entirely new jetliners get developed only about once a decade, costing billions of dollars. Jetliners sell on average for about $100 million apiece, roughly the price of an office building—or approximately 200,000 iPads. Airliner systems are so integrated that changes to one element can ripple through the entire design.
Boeing for years stressed innovation and technology. "For a young aeronautical engineer, Boeing was definitely the most exciting place to be," 747 chief engineer Joe Sutter recalled, in his autobiography, of joining the company in 1946.
Over the following half-century, Boeing dominated jetliners thanks to its "willingness to invest whatever it took to be the technological leader," Mr. Sutter recalled.
Profits would come from superior products, top executives reckoned correctly.
Rivals' innovations didn't fare as well. The British-made Comet, the world's first passenger jet, flew in 1952, before designers at de Havilland Aircraft Ltd. fully understood metal fatigue. Two midair Comet disintegrations killed almost 100 people. By the time de Havilland redesigned the plane, Boeing and Douglas Aircraft had overtaken it.
The British government forced de Havilland to merge with competitors during the 1960s as the nation's aircraft industry declined.
Boeing in the late 1990s throttled back on innovation amid internal upheaval. The Dreamliner program, approved in 2004, marked a resurgence. Boeing said the plane, built largely of composite materials, would leapfrog advanced technologies at Airbus. It would rely more on electricity to run its systems than existing planes, which used hydraulic and pneumatic power. The advances meant it would burn 20% less fuel and cost 30% less to maintain than current models, Boeing promised.
To convince wary airline executives that carbon-fiber body material was strong, Boeing sales teams carried samples and hammers, letting airline executives whack the composite with all their might.
Airlines signed on, knowing the risk. "You can't introduce an airplane so radically different without there being issues," says Robert Milton, who in 2005 ordered as many as 60 Dreamliners as chief executive of Air Canada parent Ace Aviation Holdings Inc. "We ordered big, early, but were never in the first year of deliveries."
As orders rolled in, Chicago-based Boeing grappled with the challenges of its new technologies, such as protecting 787s from lightning. Traditional aluminum planes conduct the frequent electric jolts and dissipate the charge, but the Dreamliner's lightweight composite skin wouldn't, exposing it to potential damage. As a defense against lightning, Boeing engineers had to add shielding and metal structures, putting back more than 2,000 pounds—roughly the weight of 10 passengers.
As the first planes came together, other problems emerged. In early 2007, Boeing abandoned plans for wireless entertainment systems onboard. The technology wasn't mature enough yet, Boeing executives said.
That year, as Boeing assembled the first prototype 787, it became clear suppliers were struggling to make their components. Specialized metal fasteners couldn't be produced quickly enough. Composite fuselage sections had imperfections that required extensive repairs.
Armies of Boeing engineers fought mounting delays, but new problems emerged. Excessive moisture trapped by the composite skin, for example, created condensation dubbed "rain on the plane" that Boeing countered with wicking material.
In 2009 Boeing Chief Executive Jim McNerney, who had assumed the post in 2005, conceded that "the initial plan outran our ability to execute it." In retrospect, Mr. McNerney said during an earnings call, "there is no doubt that the baseline was too ambitious."
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