Quote Originally Posted by Steely Glint View Post
I mean, that's what we were supposed to be doing. That was the justification for our being there, originally. That we did not in fact do that was the implied critique I was going for.
I can't speak for the objectives in the UK, but it's far from clear that the US ever had a clear objective of nation building in Afghanistan. There were - and still are - a multiplicity of viewpoints in the US about the justification and objectives of the war in Afghanistan. The common denominator was to degrade the terrorist networks that existed in Afghanistan and deny them the safe haven that had been provided by the Taliban. But beyond that, there were substantial divisions about the rest of the scope. Some, especially the neoconservative wing of the Republican party, felt that this was an opportunity to build a strong, centralized, American-friendly democracy in a crucial region of the world. Others focused more on the humanitarian angle (e.g. allowing freedoms for women, improving education, etc.) without explicitly expecting a full-on nation building exercise. Still others focused on the strategic value of a strong American military presence adjacent to Iran, central Asia, and the AfPak region (without specific expectations of an emergent democracy).

The point is that with such a diversity of views and little coherent policy (let alone little willingness to commit the resources needed to achieve any of these aims), I think it's rather much to suggest that the US was 'supposed' to be doing anything, other than disrupting Al Qaeda safe havens and hunting down their leadership.

This lack of strategic focus is a hallmark of most postwar American interventions; certainly the US has a lot of resources and a lot of firepower (not to mention the projection capability to bring these to bear), but rarely is there a unified strategy consensus that is implemented in a sustained and thoughtful manner. This outcome is not the exception, but the rule.