Iranian nuclear agreement

[wiggin]

What do you guys all think? I haven't had a chance to read the whole deal, yet, but my general impression so far is 'not very good, but could be worse.' Obvious points of concern revolve around the weakened inspections regime, unclear restrictions on nuclear R&D, and the usual concerns about what happens in 10-15 years once their breakout down reduces down to nearly zero.

One thing that I think is particularly interesting/troubling is the eventual elimination of sanctions on the sale of conventional weapons and ballistic missile technology in 5 and 8 years, respectively. I have no understanding why the Western world would agree to this (Russia and China already routinely ignore such sanctions). Iran, with or without nukes, is a rogue state that is financing, training, arming, and directly assisting in massive instability in at least five countries in the Middle East. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed by groups or regimes supported by Iran. I fail to see how a nuclear agreement in any way means we should allow exports of weapons to Iran; these are two different issues. This may be a bit of a moot point - since Iran's main weapons suppliers don't follow the sanctions regime, it's not likely that the suspension of sanctions will really change all that much. But there's a certain element of 'naming and shaming' here - and Russia has been somewhat hesitant to send truly sophisticated weapons to Iran in the face of international opprobrium (or, at least, to use it as a negotiating tool). I see no reason for the West to rescind Iran's status as a pariah state, even if they loosen economic restrictions.

The reporting from the negotiations has suggested that the P5+1 framework was fatally flawed - bringing China and Russia into the negotiations, ostensibly negotiating opposite Iran, sharply weakened the US negotiating position. Since Russia and China have never really enforced or implemented the sanctions regime (China has continually bought Iranian oil, and Russia funnels weapons systems to them), it seems rather foolish to include them as part of a monolithic P5+1 negotiation team. The need for some level of consensus in the UNSC matters, of course, but I question just how important that is given that it's EU and US sanctions that have really hit the Iranian economy hard.

I'm going to wait and see how the inspection regime plays out. If it looks genuinely robust, I'll be cautiously optimistic that a military strike can be safely ruled out for about a decade. After that, all bets are off. Expect to see rapid increases in conventional armament by Israel, the GCC countries, and possibly Egypt; I would imagine part of the bribe the US is paying all of them to acquiesce to the deal will be substantial access to sophisticated weapons systems.

[GGT]

It was a complex negotiation....and I'm glad it's finally a "done deal" with many specifics outlined by other nations, and not just the US.

[wiggin]

Now that I've had more opportunity to dig into the deal in more depth, I must say I'm a bit concerned about verification measures. Obama is right that a deal that increases breakout time to one year for at least a decade is definitely preferable to the status quo and an unraveling sanctions regime (though there are reasonable arguments about whether other alternatives exist to this false dichotomy). I further think Netanyahu is being a bit disingenuous to argue that only a deal that completely eliminated uranium enrichment capacity in Iran would be acceptable, since we all know that was a non-starter. Yet everyone agrees that allowing this sort of agreement requires an extremely robust verification regime: Iran has repeatedly cheated and lied in the past (see: existence of the Fordow plant, detonator work at Parchin, etc.) and they have every incentive to do so in the future, especially as it gets more and more difficult to reimpose sanctions.

The problem, however, is that the 'anytime, anywhere' inspections that would be necessary to create a believable verification regime simply don't exist in this deal. There's a drawn-out process to deal with unscheduled inspections of alternative facilities (not the main ones at Arak, Natanz, Fordow, etc.) that could easily take up to ~3 weeks. That's plenty of time for Iran to hide evidence of further enrichment or weaponization work from inspectors. Some reports suggest that Israel routinely did this to US inspectors of Dimona in the 60s, and were able to build a plutonium reprocessing plant under the noses of inspectors... and I believe they had far less than 3 weeks of warning. Realistically, the weakened inspection regime is probably the single most concerning part of this deal.

Thoughts? Mitigations to my concerns?

[Flixy]

I haven't read the deal so I can't really comment in depth. If your concerns about the inspections are correct that is worrying - on the other hand it's better than no inspections now I suppose. I think it's clear that the previous plan of sanctions slowed them down but never stopped them. I don't really know what the alternatives are?

What bugs me is Israel + GOP hating on any deal even if it were better. I thought the point of sanctions was to push them to the negotiating table (since it's never going to actually stop them), so shouldn't they be happy the sanctions did that?

[Loki]

Agreed with Flixy. The main criticism of the deal seems to be that it leads to sanctions being removed. Getting Iran to the negotiating table was the very point of sanctions. There's no way in hell we'd be able to maintain multilateral sanctions on Iran the second it agreed to any kind of a nuclear deal. The EU would certainly not be on board with such a move.

Now the deal might make a bit too many concessions to the Iranians (they seem too happy with the deal). But is that really a deal breaker? If Iran wants to cheat, it will find a way to cheat. And if Iran cheats, we'll find out. We're not in the '60s anymore.

As for alternative ways of dealing with Iran: the only real alternative was a constant bombing campaign, like what we did to Iraq throughout the '90s. Does anyone really think that would be a good idea?

[Steely Glint]

As for alternative ways of dealing with Iran: the only real alternative was a constant bombing campaign, like what we did to Iraq throughout the '90s. Does anyone really think that would be a good idea?

It seems the Israeli establishment and figures in the GOP are very keen on the idea.

[wiggin]

I haven't read the deal so I can't really comment in depth. If your concerns about the inspections are correct that is worrying - on the other hand it's better than no inspections now I suppose. I think it's clear that the previous plan of sanctions slowed them down but never stopped them. I don't really know what the alternatives are?

I briefly touched on this earlier, but I think it's quite disingenuous when the administration creates this false dichotomy between no deal with a march to war and this deal. This is not an exhaustive list of options. I think there are few people who think this deal is inferior to the status quo without sanctions (i.e. if the sanctions regime fell apart after negotiations failed, but Iran continued to decrease breakout time). And there are similarly few people who genuinely are interested in seeing the US attack Iran. Yet that doesn't mean that this deal is the only one achievable. I think a lot of the criticism revolves around the fact that the US was ostensibly negotiating from a position of strength, but were required to give up some critical needs for relatively modest Iranian concessions. I obviously was not present for the negotiations, but it seems like a US determination to cement a deal - nearly any deal - strengthened the Iranian position and allowed them to extract very favorable terms.

If you were to ask me what we should do now, instead of two weeks ago, I'm not sure. Rejecting the deal now would almost certainly result in no further negotiations and the international sanctions regime falling apart (though Western sanctions would likely continue). But I think it's reasonable to argue that better alternatives were available in the very recent past. To an extent, that's why Netanyahu was so vociferous (and the Saudis were also quietly concerned) about the framework agreement half a year back - this was their main opportunity to influence the shape of the final deal, because everyone knows that once a detailed deal is in place, there are precious few options for improving it. What's disappointing is that despite the best efforts of Iran's legitimately concerned neighbors - and longtime US allies - the deal still included a number of very troubling elements.

There are also hidden risks associated with this choice compared to alternatives. Now that the US appears to have delineated its maximal ambition in containing Iran (feeble as it might be), that means Iran's neighbors are likely to conclude they are on their own in dealing with an aspirational regional hegemon with near-nuclear capabilities. That means rapid armament and the potential for additional nuclear programs. Prior to the agreement, there was a certain element of 'wait and see' in the attitudes of esp. the Gulf countries. Not so today. It is highly likely that this will add fuel to regional instability that has already killed a few hundred thousand people in the last few years. Would continued US pressure on Iran and engagement with this issue - even if it did not substantially limit their nuclear program - have forestalled this result? Maybe; hard to know the counterfactual.

What bugs me is Israel + GOP hating on any deal even if it were better. I thought the point of sanctions was to push them to the negotiating table (since it's never going to actually stop them), so shouldn't they be happy the sanctions did that?

I want to stress that there is a distinction between political opposition to Obama inside the US and concern about elements of the deal among regional allies in the Middle East. You're right that the GOP would have likely opposed any deal because, well, that's what the GOP does with a Democratic president coming up on an election year. But in Israel and Gulf countries this is largely not a political issue - across a pretty broad consensus Iran is seen as a dangerous, expansionist regime that is sponsoring all sorts of nasty types fueling instability around the region, and only a very strong nuclear agreement is likely to satisfy them. That makes perfect sense - to the US, Iran is not an existential threat, nor are they likely to be a substantial threat any time in the future. The US is involved because their interests in the region are at stake, but these other countries are involved because they are legitimately afraid that a nuclear armed Iran would intimidate the entire region into submission. This is not an idle concern, and their bar for an acceptable agreement is understandably higher.

Netanyahu's approach to this has indeed been dickish, but across the political spectrum in Israel (the only regional country involved that really has open discourse and a genuine political spectrum) there is concern about the deal. Obviously Israel and others in the region would prefer if the Iranian program had been entirely shut down - no enrichment, no centrifuges, etc. - but I think they would have accepted a token enrichment program under appropriate safeguards if the following elements of the deal as-is were changed:
1. A much more robust inspection regime, truly allowing for 'anytime, anywhere' inspections (which was a public US demand until a few weeks ago). A 24 day wait to get access to facilities is ridiculous, despite State Department assurances that it's in fact very short.
2. A complete halt to further R&D work on enrichment: as is, Iran can do all of the research they want on their IR-8 centrifuges, which are far faster and more sophisticated than current centrifuge technologies in their possession. This means that when the agreement does start to taper off after 10 years, their breakout time can rapidly decrease to zero.
3. An indefinite continuation of arms sanctions, given that Iran's non-nuclear behavior in the region easily justifies it.
4. An ironclad (possibly private) commitment to regional allies that after the 10-15 year window, additional US action will be taken as necessary to keep breakout time at an acceptably long period.

None of these conditions have been met, so it's easy to see why regional US allies are concerned. They could probably live with a deal as I outlined it, despite the fact that their maximal ideal would be more ambitious.

Agreed with Flixy. The main criticism of the deal seems to be that it leads to sanctions being removed. Getting Iran to the negotiating table was the very point of sanctions. There's no way in hell we'd be able to maintain multilateral sanctions on Iran the second it agreed to any kind of a nuclear deal. The EU would certainly not be on board with such a move.

I'm sure that regional rivals of Iran would appreciate indefinite economic sanctions on the regime. However, I think if they felt that a deal would have appreciably curtailed Iran's ambitions they would be more comfortable stomaching the increased funding the IRGC and its proxies will be getting as the price of existential security. However, I don't think any of Iran's neighbors feel particularly comforted by the deficiencies in the deal - as they see it, they're getting precious little improvements in nuclear security in exchange for a dramatically reinvigorated foe. Further, I think they find the future discontinuation of arms sanctions (esp. on missile technology) to be a deal breaker.

Now the deal might make a bit too many concessions to the Iranians (they seem too happy with the deal). But is that really a deal breaker? If Iran wants to cheat, it will find a way to cheat. And if Iran cheats, we'll find out. We're not in the '60s anymore.

I don't doubt this. I just doubt that given the short breakout times and the sophistication and historical duplicity of the regime, any detected cheating won't give enough time to coordinate an international response. We all know that even 'snap back' of sanctions is going to be a tough slog, let alone developing the support for an additional agreement or military action. It took an extraordinary amount of time from the first sanctions (2003?) to even starting negotiations, let alone coming to an agreement. I have little confidence that the mere likelihood of cheating being detected will seriously deter Iran from trying to cheat. Inspections that caught cheating before it even got far along, though, might help more.

As for alternative ways of dealing with Iran: the only real alternative was a constant bombing campaign, like what we did to Iraq throughout the '90s. Does anyone really think that would be a good idea?

See above what I wrote in response to Flixy.

It seems the Israeli establishment and figures in the GOP are very keen on the idea.

I seriously doubt anyone in Israel is interested in starting a war with Iran. Oh, Israel will almost certainly do so if they think an Iranian bomb is imminent, despite all of the substantial challenges to such an attack. The Begin doctrine is alive and well in Israel. But the Israeli public has no interest in sitting in bomb shelters for months while Hamas and Hezbollah shell the entire country and Iranian ballistic missiles hit Tel Aviv, and Israeli political and military leaders have little appetite for a war that is likely to end - at best - in a draw, with only partial damage to the Iranian nuclear program.

What they want is a verifiable way to control Iran's nuclear ambitions without handing them the keys to the entire region.

[Steely Glint]

I get the impression from the Israeli government that any outcome short of the violent destruction of the Iranian nuclear program would be unacceptable to them.

[wiggin]

I get the impression from the Israeli government that any outcome short of the violent destruction of the Iranian nuclear program would be unacceptable to them.

Source?

That is certainly the position being peddled by most media sources, but frankly there is little to support it. The Israeli government has clearly delineated their ideal deal, which would involve Iran voluntarily dismantling its entire nuclear program in exchange for relief from sanctions, coupled with an admission of prior military work on the program and agreement for comprehensive inspections to ensure they don't start again. Now we all know that Israel's maximal position is likely to be a fantasy (though there's little doubt that Israel's Sunni neighbors share this fantasy). Israel, thus, would probably be willing to accept a deal that allowed Iran some minor peaceful nuclear program under strict safeguards. They'd prefer if enrichment occurred outside of Iran, but they'd probably countenance some power reactors and small research facilities.

Now this watered-down version of Israel's best option isn't likely to work with the multilateral P5+1 framework, mostly because of problems with Russia and China. So let's imagine that you achieved a deal similar to the one I outlined above - allowing enrichments but under tight safeguards and with limited technology. Israel would hate this deal - in particular because it enshrines the 'right to enrichment' that Iran so clearly desires - but if the safeguards were adequate, I suspect they'd grudgingly accept (even if they protested publicly).

Are these highly restrictive deals? Absolutely. Would they be hard to negotiate? Sure. But Israel would likely find any of these preferable to a war. And remember that the US isn't negotiating with Belgium here - they're negotiating with a state sponsor of terror with a history of using proxies to attack Western targets AND a history of routinely lying about its nuclear program... and probably the single greatest source of instability in the Middle East. They're a huge proliferation risk, and the bombastic statements made by their theocratic government don't help matters. Allowing them an enrichment program under relatively loose safeguards with ongoing R&D and restrictions phasing out over time... that seems foolish. If your counterfactual is doing nothing, then certainly it's better than the alternative. But that's hardly an exhaustive list of the possible outcomes, now, is it?

It's disingenuous to present an agreement and rally support for it by saying, "This is the best agreement we could get, and the alternative is doing nothing!" Criticism of the agreement isn't saying that an agreement is out of the question, but rather that it's far from the best achievable, and even further from an ideal agreement.

[Being]

Source?

That is certainly the position being peddled by most media sources, but frankly there is little to support it. The Israeli government has clearly delineated their ideal deal, which would involve Iran voluntarily dismantling its entire nuclear program in exchange for relief from sanctions, coupled with an admission of prior military work on the program and agreement for comprehensive inspections to ensure they don't start again. Now we all know that Israel's maximal position is likely to be a fantasy (though there's little doubt that Israel's Sunni neighbors share this fantasy). Israel, thus, would probably be willing to accept a deal that allowed Iran some minor peaceful nuclear program under strict safeguards. They'd prefer if enrichment occurred outside of Iran, but they'd probably countenance some power reactors and small research facilities.

Now this watered-down version of Israel's best option isn't likely to work with the multilateral P5+1 framework, mostly because of problems with Russia and China. So let's imagine that you achieved a deal similar to the one I outlined above - allowing enrichments but under tight safeguards and with limited technology. Israel would hate this deal - in particular because it enshrines the 'right to enrichment' that Iran so clearly desires - but if the safeguards were adequate, I suspect they'd grudgingly accept (even if they protested publicly).

Are these highly restrictive deals? Absolutely. Would they be hard to negotiate? Sure. But Israel would likely find any of these preferable to a war. And remember that the US isn't negotiating with Belgium here - they're negotiating with a state sponsor of terror with a history of using proxies to attack Western targets AND a history of routinely lying about its nuclear program... and probably the single greatest source of instability in the Middle East. They're a huge proliferation risk, and the bombastic statements made by their theocratic government don't help matters. Allowing them an enrichment program under relatively loose safeguards with ongoing R&D and restrictions phasing out over time... that seems foolish. If your counterfactual is doing nothing, then certainly it's better than the alternative. But that's hardly an exhaustive list of the possible outcomes, now, is it?

It's disingenuous to present an agreement and rally support for it by saying, "This is the best agreement we could get, and the alternative is doing nothing!" Criticism of the agreement isn't saying that an agreement is out of the question, but rather that it's far from the best achievable, and even further from an ideal agreement.

Here's an out of the box idea; Israel offers to dismantle its nuclear programs in direct proportion to Iran. Reality is Israel brings nothing to the table.

[Loki]

Wiggin, what it comes down to is that Israel's position is irreconcilable with Iran's. It's dishonest to claim that Israel wanted the negotiations to succeed, while claiming that they have red lines that everyone knows Iran would never accept. In the end, it's obvious that Israel wanted the negotiations to fail because it was always preferable to any deal that could have realistically been reached. Furthermore, Israel, like the Saudis, never wanted the sanctions to be lifted from Iran, whether Iran gave in to Western demands over its nuclear programs or not. In effect, Israel wanted Iran to make all the concessions, while it would get absolutely nothing in return. That's not a serious negotiating position. Israel is either deluded or dishonest when it comes to these negotiations. Pick your poison.

I'm sure that regional rivals of Iran would appreciate indefinite economic sanctions on the regime. However, I think if they felt that a deal would have appreciably curtailed Iran's ambitions they would be more comfortable stomaching the increased funding the IRGC and its proxies will be getting as the price of existential security. However, I don't think any of Iran's neighbors feel particularly comforted by the deficiencies in the deal - as they see it, they're getting precious little improvements in nuclear security in exchange for a dramatically reinvigorated foe. Further, I think they find the future discontinuation of arms sanctions (esp. on missile technology) to be a deal breaker.

The regional rivals aren't what's keeping the Iranian economy down. It's the EU (and US, but only as long as the EU was on board). The EU would never consent to maintaining the sanctions once a nuclear deal was reached. You seem to be conflating what is desirable with what was possible. Even if you could come up with the technological barriers to keep Iran from getting nukes before anyone noticed what was going on, Iran would never consent to those barriers. Additionally, if Iran simply ignored those barriers and everyone knew it was trying to get nukes, it's far from certain that a coalition could be formed to attack Iran before the nukes were ready.

I don't doubt this. I just doubt that given the short breakout times and the sophistication and historical duplicity of the regime, any detected cheating won't give enough time to coordinate an international response. We all know that even 'snap back' of sanctions is going to be a tough slog, let alone developing the support for an additional agreement or military action. It took an extraordinary amount of time from the first sanctions (2003?) to even starting negotiations, let alone coming to an agreement. I have little confidence that the mere likelihood of cheating being detected will seriously deter Iran from trying to cheat. Inspections that caught cheating before it even got far along, though, might help more.

I don't disagree, but I don't think there's a way around this.

See above what I wrote in response to Flixy.

Iran would never consent to that and everyone knew that.

[Steely Glint]

Source?

Israel has been hostile to the very notion of negotiations with Iran, constantly describes any form of compromise as capitulation, etc. It's not hard to see what their preferred outcome is.

So let's imagine that you achieved a deal similar to the one I outlined above - allowing enrichments but under tight safeguards and with limited technology. Israel would hate this deal - in particular because it enshrines the 'right to enrichment' that Iran so clearly desires

So, in order to accept this deal, harsher on Iran than the one we have now, what does the US et al give to Iran in exchange in order to accept this rather than the one they did accept? War is obviously off the table, much to McCain et als chagrin I'm sure, because of everything else happening in the middle east and a general lack of appetite for Yet More Middle Eastern Interventions in the US and west generally and I'm sure Iran knows this, so we can't threaten them into accepting it. What's Obama suppose to do, use a stern expression?

I suspect they'd grudgingly accept (even if they protested publicly).

Well, that's exactly what they're going to do about this agreement, isn't it? I don't think the Israeli airforce is able to do much more than put a big dent in the Iranian nuclear program and it will then occur all the negative consequences you detailed, re: the bombardment of major population centers you mentioned, so they've basically no choice but to make cross noises and accept it.

[wiggin]

Here's an out of the box idea; Israel offers to dismantle its nuclear programs in direct proportion to Iran. Reality is Israel brings nothing to the table.

Other than the fact that Israel isn't bound by the NPT (and had nukes before the NPT anyways), the fact of the matter is that Israel isn't at the table. Iran is negotiating with the US, and to a lesser extent the rest of the P5+1 (to be fair, France has been very heavily involved in particular). And from a geopolitics standpoint, the existence of an Israeli nuclear weapon has not ignited a regional arms race, while Iranian possession of one almost certainly would. Israel also isn't a substantial proliferation threat. So even if the US could negotiate on Israel's behalf, it's not really analogous.

Wiggin, what it comes down to is that Israel's position is irreconcilable with Iran's. It's dishonest to claim that Israel wanted the negotiations to succeed, while claiming that they have red lines that everyone knows Iran would never accept. In the end, it's obvious that Israel wanted the negotiations to fail because it was always preferable to any deal that could have realistically been reached. Furthermore, Israel, like the Saudis, never wanted the sanctions to be lifted from Iran, whether Iran gave in to Western demands over its nuclear programs or not. In effect, Israel wanted Iran to make all the concessions, while it would get absolutely nothing in return. That's not a serious negotiating position. Israel is either deluded or dishonest when it comes to these negotiations. Pick your poison.

I think Israel's maximalist position is obviously at odds with Iran's maximalist position. And certainly they have consistently touted a position that all Iranian enrichment activity must stop and all of their infrastructure must be removed or destroyed, along with an acknowledgement of the scope of their military program and continuing inspections. I agree that these conditions are extremely problematic for any Iranian government to accept, most notably removing the 'right to enrichment'. What is notable is that contrary to the media narrative, this has also been the public US position until very recently. It makes sense for Israel and the US to make maximalist demands (it's called negotiating), and it makes a lot of sense for Israel and Iran's other neighbors to want to thoroughly remove Iranian breakout capability. Yet once the framework deal was announced, despite Israel's bitching about breaking their 'red lines', they went about highlighting those aspects of its implementation they wanted fixed in the final agreement. For example, here:

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/wo...deal.html?_r=0

That's from three months ago, and it looks like Israel has reluctantly accepted the basic structure of the deal, but wants fixes in some of the same areas that I'm highlighting in the final deal today. This hardly seems like they're not serious... and what's more, most of their demands are eminently achievable, largely revolving around technical aspects that don't force Iran to back down on their 'right to enrichment'. It's not dishonest or unrealistic; once the framework was announced, they went about trying to fix the biggest flaws in it instead of rejecting it outright.

In terms of sanctions, it's obviously true that Iran's neighbors would like to see the regime further weakened given its penchant for starting proxy conflicts around the region that is entirely divorced from the nuclear issue. I would be lying if I said that any of them are excited to the int'l economic sanctions removed, but I think they'd all grudgingly accept it in return for a verifiable end to Iran's nuclear program. Israel in particular sees it as an existential threat, and they have ample experience dealing with conventional proxy threats like Hezbollah and Hamas. Ami Ayalon and others have specifically made this argument, that they're willing to see some pressure on Iran eased if it ends their nuclear ambitions.

The point is that Israel has been noisy about the deal, and I think that Netanyahu's rhetoric in particular has made a lot of blunders, but if you look carefully at what they actually say (rather than what CNN reports), you'll see they have very hard-headed and reasonable concerns with the deal that aren't tied to fantastical dreams of a humbled Iran.

The regional rivals aren't what's keeping the Iranian economy down. It's the EU (and US, but only as long as the EU was on board). The EU would never consent to maintaining the sanctions once a nuclear deal was reached. You seem to be conflating what is desirable with what was possible. Even if you could come up with the technological barriers to keep Iran from getting nukes before anyone noticed what was going on, Iran would never consent to those barriers. Additionally, if Iran simply ignored those barriers and everyone knew it was trying to get nukes, it's far from certain that a coalition could be formed to attack Iran before the nukes were ready.

I think there's an important distinction between economic sanctions, that have really crippled Iran and hurt their people, and much more limited sanctions against sales of conventional weapons and missile technology. I find it the height of hypocrisy when State Department officials argue that Iran's neighbors shouldn't couple non-nuclear issues to a purely nuclear agreement when the agreement unfreezes sales of conventional weapons that have little to do with their nuclear program. The arms sanctions should stay in place just because they're a rogue state, completely divorced from the nuclear agreement. And while Russia and China will ignore it anyways, I don't think the EU would have real issues with these sanctions - it's the oil and commerce they're mostly concerned with.

However, that being said, I don't think it's a deal-breaker. The verification regime and the R&D issues most certainly are IMO.

Israel has been hostile to the very notion of negotiations with Iran, constantly describes any form of compromise as capitulation, etc. It's not hard to see what their preferred outcome is.

You're right it's not hard to see their preferred outcome - they've been very public for years that they want a negotiated solution that completely eliminates Iran's pathway to a bomb by removing their enrichment capability.

While Israel has always kept the military 'option' explicitly on the table, we all know why they didn't employ it years ago (as opposed to Iraq and Syria, where they attacked nuclear facilities much earlier in their nuclear programs and effectively stopped them from continuing). It's incredibly hard for Israel to hit the Iranian nuclear program given the distance, AA defenses, and hardened targets involved. Israel has never relished trying it, and they certainly don't want to deal with the fallout in terms of attacks against their home front. That's why they countenanced a sanctions regime and negotiations in the first place. And, if you see above what I wrote to Loki, you'll see that they've been quietly realistic about their maximalist position for negotiations, and just want a deal that verifiably ends Iranian nuclear ambitions. In the current deal, they're worried about both the verification and the ending part of that agreement, and I don't think they're wrong.

You're accepting a media narrative that doesn't do a whole lot to add nuance to Israeli positions.

So, in order to accept this deal, harsher on Iran than the one we have now, what does the US et al give to Iran in exchange in order to accept this rather than the one they did accept? War is obviously off the table, much to McCain et als chagrin I'm sure, because of everything else happening in the middle east and a general lack of appetite for Yet More Middle Eastern Interventions in the US and west generally and I'm sure Iran knows this, so we can't threaten them into accepting it. What's Obama suppose to do, use a stern expression?

The argument isn't that Iran gets new concessions, but that the US gave away too much (or perhaps just enough) in return for too little. Now that the deal is finalized, I don't think there's a whole lot they can do other than use intelligence agencies to improve verification and quietly strongarm Iran into discontinuing R&D. I've said it before - I don't know if it makes sense to oppose the deal now that it's a fait accompli, but the negotiations appear to have been carried out with too much emphasis placed on getting a deal at all costs.

History will judge whether this deal stops Iranian nuclear ambitions. Maybe it will - I'd be delighted! But if it doesn't, we'll be able to point at these negotiations as the critical blunder. I think this is the real problem with Netanyahu's rhetoric... he's acting as if he can change things now. What's notable is that his basic opinion is widely shared across the political spectrum in Israel. Two main opposition leaders have very publicly said they don't like the deal (mostly because of issues I've outlined above) but they excoriate Netanyahu for his handling of the issue. Bibi has made the argument to his domestic audience that he alone is capable of ending Iranian nuclear ambitions, and he has made it a centerpiece of his foreign policy. Yet he clearly has nothing to show for it - the sanctions regime nonwithstanding, his alienating the US with divisive rhetoric has not only damaged Israel's ability to influence the negotiations, but has also driven a wedge between Israel and its most important ally on a range of other issues. Compare his position to that of Gulf states - they hate the deal as well, for similar reasons (though I suspect they would be happier with a US strike on Iran, mostly because the costs to them are minimal), but have pressured the US more quietly on the issue. Of course, for them it isn't an existential threat, and they don't have domestic audiences they really need to worry about in the same way, so it makes sense that Israel would be more publicly involved. But Netanyahu has gone about this in a damaging manner. Much better had he just left his criticism to the final agreement to a simple, "It isn't the strong deal we would have liked, but we will work with our allies to make sure the verification is robust as possible, and continue to be vigilant in countering Iran's increasingly violent influence on the region." That gets across the point without needlessly pissing people off.

Well, that's exactly what they're going to do about this agreement, isn't it? I don't think the Israeli airforce is able to do much more than put a big dent in the Iranian nuclear program and it will then occur all the negative consequences you detailed, re: the bombardment of major population centers you mentioned, so they've basically no choice but to make cross noises and accept it.

Yes, but there's a difference between accepting a deal that more or less works but isn't your ideal result, and accepting a deal just because you don't have a choice and are stuck with it. I think Israel may continue their campaign of sabotage and assassination against the Iranian nuclear program. That's going to cause all sorts of trouble.

[Steely Glint]

You're accepting a media narrative that doesn't do a whole lot to add nuance to Israeli positions.

It seems to me the best characterization of the Israel position on the Iranian nuclear program is to stand around dropping heavy hints that America should destroy it. "You know, someone should do something about this Iranian nuclear program. Someone with a large, powerful airforce, power projection capabilities and the technology to destroy hardened targets. Someone who's always been Israel's alley and doesn't get on with the Iranian government. Does anyone know any countries like that?" *coughs heavily and glares at Obama*

That's why they countenanced a sanctions regime and negotiations in the first place

Interesting use of the word 'countenanced' there. What would they do if they didn't countenance it, exactly? Build more settlements on Palestinian land? Bomb a research ship? Kidnap a Nazi from Argentina?

The argument isn't that Iran gets new concessions, but that the US gave away too much (or perhaps just enough) in return for too little.

Without having been party to the negotiations or knowing what Iran was ultimately willing to accept, this argument is speculation at best. And much it tells you about those who make it.

History will judge whether this deal stops Iranian nuclear ambitions. Maybe it will - I'd be delighted! But if it doesn't, we'll be able to point at these negotiations as the critical blunder. I think this is the real problem with Netanyahu's rhetoric... he's acting as if he can change things now. What's notable is that his basic opinion is widely shared across the political spectrum in Israel. Two main opposition leaders have very publicly said they don't like the deal (mostly because of issues I've outlined above) but they excoriate Netanyahu for his handling of the issue. Bibi has made the argument to his domestic audience that he alone is capable of ending Iranian nuclear ambitions, and he has made it a centerpiece of his foreign policy. Yet he clearly has nothing to show for it - the sanctions regime nonwithstanding, his alienating the US with divisive rhetoric has not only damaged Israel's ability to influence the negotiations, but has also driven a wedge between Israel and its most important ally on a range of other issues. Compare his position to that of Gulf states - they hate the deal as well, for similar reasons (though I suspect they would be happier with a US strike on Iran, mostly because the costs to them are minimal), but have pressured the US more quietly on the issue. Of course, for them it isn't an existential threat, and they don't have domestic audiences they really need to worry about in the same way, so it makes sense that Israel would be more publicly involved. But Netanyahu has gone about this in a damaging manner. Much better had he just left his criticism to the final agreement to a simple, "It isn't the strong deal we would have liked, but we will work with our allies to make sure the verification is robust as possible, and continue to be vigilant in countering Iran's increasingly violent influence on the region." That gets across the point without needlessly pissing people off.

He's acting like Israel always does with it's most powerful and, arguably only, ally - demanding much, vocally, while offering little in return and generally acting as though Israel has the right to simply expect the United States to act on behalf of Israeli interests.

Yes, but there's a difference between accepting a deal that more or less works but isn't your ideal result, and accepting a deal just because you don't have a choice and are stuck with it. I think Israel may continue their campaign of sabotage and assassination against the Iranian nuclear program. That's going to cause all sorts of trouble.

But this time it will presumably do so without the co-operation of the US. Wasn't it pretty much agreed that stuxnet was a joint US-Israel project?

[wiggin]

It seems to me the best characterization of the Israel position on the Iranian nuclear program is to stand around dropping heavy hints that America should destroy it. "You know, someone should do something about this Iranian nuclear program. Someone with a large, powerful airforce, power projection capabilities and the technology to destroy hardened targets. Someone who's always been Israel's alley and doesn't get on with the Iranian government. Does anyone know any countries like that?" *coughs heavily and glares at Obama*

I think you're thinking of the Gulf countries - Wikileaks has shown quite clearly that they were begging the US behind closed doors to strike at Iran. The Israelis have more to lose and are a bit more realistic of America's abilities to affect lasting change in the Middle East after the Iraq debacle.

I think plenty of Israelis would find the strategic calculus of a US attack acceptable, but I don't think it's a first choice.

edit:
I think the best argument in favor of this thinking is that Israel has been noisy about Iran. Before the Osiraq attack, no one even considered that the IAF could attack the reactor, let alone that they would. In Operation Orchard, no one outside of a few intelligence agencies was even aware that a Syrian nuclear program existed. Israeli strikes happened quickly and quietly with no fanfare. In this instance, Israel has been making noise for literally decades about Iran. They conduct high profile military exercises and deployments that are a clear attempt at deterrence and intimidation, and keep up a bellicose rhetoric. Yet to me that indicates they they're less interested in an attack than when they went after Iraq and Syria's programs. Even with a US attack, the chances of success are only so-so, and Iran's capacity for retaliation is much greater. The rhetoric, paradoxically, is intended to force a negotiation.

Interesting use of the word 'countenanced' there. What would they do if they didn't countenance it, exactly? Build more settlements on Palestinian land? Bomb a research ship? Kidnap a Nazi from Argentina?

Around the time the sanctions regime started really ramping up, Israel had a relatively narrow window of opportunity to strike at the Iranian nuclear program. Fordow was revealed in 2009, but beforehand the major sites for attack only included one relatively hardened site, Natanz. New Israeli capabilities theoretically brought about the chance of a moderately successful attack against the Iranian nuclear facilities. The IAF had enough F-16Is with CFTs, some new (and large) guided munitions, new MALE UAVs with better capabilities, and some new space assets (notably a satellite with a SAR that was launched in 2008). I suspect that Israel was restrained from attacking because of a commitment by the US to ratchet up sanctions and force the Iranians to the table. They acquiesced, and here we are. Obviously once Fordow was revealed, it became a moot point - absent new penetrators or a ground assault, there's no way the IAF would take out the facility. Even the US would likely find it challenging without tactical nukes.

I am curious what 'research ship' Israel has bombed, though...?

Without having been party to the negotiations or knowing what Iran was ultimately willing to accept, this argument is speculation at best. And much it tells you about those who make it.

Fair enough. But it's equally speculative to say that there wasn't a better deal that could have been achieved. Obviously those involved with the negotiations will say that, but that doesn't mean it's true. I think that a few relatively small changes to the agreement would have resulted in a much better outcome, though the broad shape would have remained unchanged. Maybe there really wasn't any more give on the Iranian side, but in my eyes the US was holding most of the cards.

He's acting like Israel always does with it's most powerful and, arguably only, ally - demanding much, vocally, while offering little in return and generally acting as though Israel has the right to simply expect the United States to act on behalf of Israeli interests.

I would strongly encourage you to read up on the history of the US-Israeli alliance. Israel has generally been a supplicant to the US, subordinating their interests to US interests because they're not idiots and know who is running the show. Even on matters of significant strategic interest to Israel, they generally bow to US pressure - that is often why Israeli military campaigns are so short in duration, and why they have not further developed their nascent relationship with China. Furthermore, ensuring that Israel-US relations are nonpartisan has been a central plank of Israeli thinking for decades. Netanyahu screwed up on this one a whole number of levels.

But this time it will presumably do so without the co-operation of the US. Wasn't it pretty much agreed that stuxnet was a joint US-Israel project?

There are elements of the assassination and sabotage campaign that were probably coordinated, and other elements that were likely carried out by each agency independently. I have no doubt that Israel has assets in Iran working very hard to find ways to further disrupt the program without an overt attack.

[GGT]

.....Israel is either deluded or dishonest when it comes to these negotiations. Pick your poison.

Bingo. While Israel wasn't technically part of the negotiations, everyone knows the US is its proxy power.

Maybe that gives Netanyahu some political space to maneuver in a complicated middle east....but when push comes to shove, everyone knows the US will go to great lengths to protect and defend Israel.

[Steely Glint]

I think you're thinking of the Gulf countries - Wikileaks has shown quite clearly that they were begging the US behind closed doors to strike at Iran. The Israelis have more to lose and are a bit more realistic of America's abilities to affect lasting change in the Middle East after the Iraq debacle.

KEYWORDS: 'behind closed doors', and 'begging', not 'in public' and 'demanding'

I think plenty of Israelis would find the strategic calculus of a US attack acceptable, but I don't think it's a first choice.

No, not their first choice, but I think we've agreed that Israel's first choice was never going to happen, so a US attack would be Israel's first choice that was actually within the range of plausible outcomes.

Around the time the sanctions regime started really ramping up, Israel had a relatively narrow window of opportunity to strike at the Iranian nuclear program. Fordow was revealed in 2009, but beforehand the major sites for attack only included one relatively hardened site, Natanz. New Israeli capabilities theoretically brought about the chance of a moderately successful attack against the Iranian nuclear facilities. The IAF had enough F-16Is with CFTs, some new (and large) guided munitions, new MALE UAVs with better capabilities, and some new space assets (notably a satellite with a SAR that was launched in 2008). I suspect that Israel was restrained from attacking because of a commitment by the US to ratchet up sanctions and force the Iranians to the table. They acquiesced, and here we are. Obviously once Fordow was revealed, it became a moot point - absent new penetrators or a ground assault, there's no way the IAF would take out the facility. Even the US would likely find it challenging without tactical nukes.

KEYWORD: revealed. My reading indicates some western intelligence agencies knew about the place before hand, which might have been what caused Iran to publicly acknowledge its existence. Of course we don't know the whys and wherefores of when it came online, when Israel knew about it and when, exactly, it became futile for Israel to attempt to use force to destroy the play.

I am curious what 'research ship' Israel has bombed, though...?

I believe the USS Liberty answered to that description?

Fair enough. But it's equally speculative to say that there wasn't a better deal that could have been achieved. Obviously those involved with the negotiations will say that, but that doesn't mean it's true. I think that a few relatively small changes to the agreement would have resulted in a much better outcome, though the broad shape would have remained unchanged. Maybe there really wasn't any more give on the Iranian side, but in my eyes the US was holding most of the cards.

I don't really see how the US holds most of the cards - just how desperate was Iran to get rid of those sanctions? If they were forced to choose between their nuclear program and the end of sanctions, what would they pick?

There are elements of the assassination and sabotage campaign that were probably coordinated, and other elements that were likely carried out by each agency independently. I have no doubt that Israel has assets in Iran working very hard to find ways to further disrupt the program without an overt attack.

No, I have no doubt of that either. But they've been unable to comprehensively stop it with US assistance, so I see no reason why we should expect them to be able succeed without it. Assuming the US participation actually stops after this agreement

[wiggin]

KEYWORDS: 'behind closed doors', and 'begging', not 'in public' and 'demanding'

That has more to do with domestic issues than anything of substance... and Israel has never publicly demanded or begged for US military action on Iran, merely for said action to still be 'on the table'. They have only been loud about their concern about the program and their feeling that the world has not been adequately responding to the threat. Netanyahu has been a dick about it, but he hasn't been pushing for war in public. I'm sure it has come up in private, but Wikileaks didn't (to my knowledge) have any information about it.

No, not their first choice, but I think we've agreed that Israel's first choice was never going to happen, so a US attack would be Israel's first choice that was actually within the range of plausible outcomes.

Their maximal negotiated position wasn't super likely to happen (a complete halt to enrichment capability), though it was also the US maximal position. I think we disagree, however, about their backup position - a strong and verifiable deal would still be preferable to war for them. Would today's deal be preferable to a war? Probably if they had to do it alone, but I think if the US was involved, they'd probably take war over this deal. I think that says more about the deal that it does about Israel's alleged warmongering.

KEYWORD: revealed. My reading indicates some western intelligence agencies knew about the place before hand, which might have been what caused Iran to publicly acknowledge its existence. Of course we don't know the whys and wherefores of when it came online, when Israel knew about it and when, exactly, it became futile for Israel to attempt to use force to destroy the play.

Indeed it's very hard to know exactly when it became clear that Israel couldn't strike against the program on their own. I haven't a clue, and so it's hard to know if their newer projection assets would have been useful or not. The first squadron of extended range F-16Is came online in the mid-2000s, though their SAR satellite and other assets were in the late 2000s. Hard to know.

I believe the USS Liberty answered to that description?

The USS Liberty was an NSA-tasked reconnaissance vessel, not a research ship. It had as much to do with research as Japanese whalers are 'research ships'. Also has a rather different level of intentionality than your other two cases.

I don't really see how the US holds most of the cards - just how desperate was Iran to get rid of those sanctions? If they were forced to choose between their nuclear program and the end of sanctions, what would they pick?

I think if the sanctions were going to genuinely continue indefinitely, they'd lose the nukes. The economic sanctions really trashed the Iranian economy - inflation has been well into the double digits (rising as high as 40+%) and they've been in a recession for two years running. I think that this has a lot to do with Rouhani getting power and them coming to the table. Iran has previously discussed ending their enrichment program (granted, over a decade ago) and if an appropriate face-saving measure could be found, I think they would have done it under adequate pressure. As many people are fond of telling me, Iranians are generally rational actors.

No, I have no doubt of that either. But they've been unable to comprehensively stop it with US assistance, so I see no reason why we should expect them to be able succeed without it. Assuming the US participation actually stops after this agreement

Israel won't be able to 'comprehensively stop it' with or without US assistance, it's more a matter of slowing it down and hitting key bits of infrastructure or personnel. It's still very unclear (and may always be unclear) to what extent each country's intelligence apparatus has acted against the program, and how much cooperation they have enjoyed - even with Stuxnet, it's mostly speculation. I'm sure they have the capability to carry out effective missions without direct US support; however the definition of 'effective' must obviously be narrow, since no amount of clandestine work is likely to end the program.

[Steely Glint]

That has more to do with domestic issues than anything of substance... and Israel has never publicly demanded or begged for US military action on Iran, merely for said action to still be 'on the table'. They have only been loud about their concern about the program and their feeling that the world has not been adequately responding to the threat. Netanyahu has been a dick about it, but he hasn't been pushing for war in public. I'm sure it has come up in private, but Wikileaks didn't (to my knowledge) have any information about it.

When the only realistic way to achieve your desired outcome is war, and the only country capable of fighting and winning that war is the US, and what you're doing in public is demanding that your desired outcome be... somehow... made to happen then that is tantamount to demanding the US fight a war for Israel.

Their maximal negotiated position wasn't super likely to happen (a complete halt to enrichment capability), though it was also the US maximal position. I think we disagree, however, about their backup position - a strong and verifiable deal would still be preferable to war for them. Would today's deal be preferable to a war? Probably if they had to do it alone, but I think if the US was involved, they'd probably take war over this deal. I think that says more about the deal that it does about Israel's alleged warmongering.

How 'strong and verifiable' does it need to be for Israel to accept, and how 'strong and verifiable' does the deal have to be before Iran decides continuation of sanctions is preferable?

The USS Liberty was an NSA-tasked reconnaissance vessel, not a research ship. It had as much to do with research as Japanese whalers are 'research ships'. Also has a rather different level of intentionality than your other two cases.

Research vessel is the official designation, which was why I used it.

And I think reconnaissance is a kind of research

I think if the sanctions were going to genuinely continue indefinitely, they'd lose the nukes. The economic sanctions really trashed the Iranian economy - inflation has been well into the double digits (rising as high as 40+%) and they've been in a recession for two years running. I think that this has a lot to do with Rouhani getting power and them coming to the table. Iran has previously discussed ending their enrichment program (granted, over a decade ago) and if an appropriate face-saving measure could be found, I think they would have done it under adequate pressure. As many people are fond of telling me, Iranians are generally rational actors.

Do the sanctions continue after the point where Iran actually has nukes?

Israel won't be able to 'comprehensively stop it' with or without US assistance, it's more a matter of slowing it down and hitting key bits of infrastructure or personnel. It's still very unclear (and may always be unclear) to what extent each country's intelligence apparatus has acted against the program, and how much cooperation they have enjoyed - even with Stuxnet, it's mostly speculation. I'm sure they have the capability to carry out effective missions without direct US support; however the definition of 'effective' must obviously be narrow, since no amount of clandestine work is likely to end the program.

Presumably, then, the intelligence activities were simply intended to slow up the Iranian program and buy time for negotiations to product Israel's preferred outcome for them to fail completely and the US decides to act militarily. Given that neither of those things now appear likely, what is the point in continuing with them?

[wiggin]

When the only realistic way to achieve your desired outcome is war, and the only country capable of fighting and winning that war is the US, and what you're doing in public is demanding that your desired outcome be... somehow... made to happen then that is tantamount to demanding the US fight a war for Israel.

I think I've been pretty clear that I think (and I think Israel also thinks) that their acceptable outcome is also achievable, even if their ideal outcome might not be. So your entire logic falls apart if there's a realistic alternative to war.

How 'strong and verifiable' does it need to be for Israel to accept, and how 'strong and verifiable' does the deal have to be before Iran decides continuation of sanctions is preferable?

At a bare minimum, I think they'd want better verification procedures, instead of this absurd 3.5 week wait for inspections, along with a halt to research into advanced centrifuge technologies. That's it, despite the vast gap between that and the US and Israel's desired outcome. They'd probably even be willing to stomach and end to arms sanctions if it meant that the existential threat of nukes was off the table.

This is not really that far off the actual outcome, and I think Iran would have accepted it as preferable to ongoing crippling sanctions.

Do the sanctions continue after the point where Iran actually has nukes?

I would think that if anything a sanctions regime would intensify if Iran actually dropped out of the NPT (or clandestinely developed nuclear weapons). NK certainly isn't a favored member of the int'l community, and Iran wouldn't be either. If Iran genuinely tried for breakout, though, I think there's a nonzero chance the US would actually strike. Obviously there are a lot of variables involved, and getting good intelligence on something like this is likely to be quite challenging, but I think the White House would seriously consider it.

Presumably, then, the intelligence activities were simply intended to slow up the Iranian program and buy time for negotiations to product Israel's preferred outcome for them to fail completely and the US decides to act militarily. Given that neither of those things now appear likely, what is the point in continuing with them?

I'm not sure the sabotage was in any way tied to negotiations. I think Israel and the US were hoping that a sufficiently concerted clandestine effort might permanently dissuade Iran from continuing. At the very least, they could keep breakout time to a maximum for as long as possible to allow for all options - negotiation, military options, etc. - to be explored in depth. Regardless, I think ongoing sabotage would have two goals: 1. To continue to hamper ongoing R&D efforts in advanced centrifuge technologies and potential weaponization research - this keeps breakout time to a maximum when the strictures of the deal start to ease off. 2. To attack their know-how, through assassinations of key players - if they lose important expertise, that's very hard to replace in a future breakout push.

I'm not saying it's wise or likely to be particularly effective, but I wouldn't be surprised if they at least try it. Israelis see this as a critical issue of national security, and they will go to great lengths for even small chances of success.

[Steely Glint]

I think I've been pretty clear that I think (and I think Israel also thinks) that their acceptable outcome is also achievable, even if their ideal outcome might not be. So your entire logic falls apart if there's a realistic alternative to war.

At a bare minimum, I think they'd want better verification procedures, instead of this absurd 3.5 week wait for inspections, along with a halt to research into advanced centrifuge technologies. That's it, despite the vast gap between that and the US and Israel's desired outcome. They'd probably even be willing to stomach and end to arms sanctions if it meant that the existential threat of nukes was off the table.

I think the issue you're having is that this is pure speculation - we don't actually know what any of the parties were ultimately going to be willing to accept. The Israeli government, which shares your view, is probably better informed, but we don't know if they're acting how they're acting for purposes of political posturing, genuine belief of sheer petulance.

I would think that if anything a sanctions regime would intensify if Iran actually dropped out of the NPT (or clandestinely developed nuclear weapons). NK certainly isn't a favored member of the int'l community, and Iran wouldn't be either. If Iran genuinely tried for breakout, though, I think there's a nonzero chance the US would actually strike. Obviously there are a lot of variables involved, and getting good intelligence on something like this is likely to be quite challenging, but I think the White House would seriously consider it.

I agree with you on that. However, throws into question your earlier assertion that Iran would be prepared to give up much in return for an end to these crippling sanctions - they're currently undertaking a course of action which, should they successfully complete it, will lead to even more crippling sanctions, which would last indefinitely at least until they disarm. And they would have to know this. So either they don't give as much of a shit about sanctions as you think, or they have no interest in developing a bomb and are just doing so for... what? leverage? attention? some domestic blahblah? the uncontrollable urge to be pricks?

I'm not saying it's wise or likely to be particularly effective, but I wouldn't be surprised if they at least try it. Israelis see this as a critical issue of national security, and they will go to great lengths for even small chances of success.

Agreed.

[wiggin]

I think the issue you're having is that this is pure speculation - we don't actually know what any of the parties were ultimately going to be willing to accept. The Israeli government, which shares your view, is probably better informed, but we don't know if they're acting how they're acting for purposes of political posturing, genuine belief of sheer petulance.

Fair enough - and also, even if one were better informed, we're arguing about a 'could have been', so we're inherently limited in our ability to determine right vs. wrong.

I agree with you on that. However, throws into question your earlier assertion that Iran would be prepared to give up much in return for an end to these crippling sanctions - they're currently undertaking a course of action which, should they successfully complete it, will lead to even more crippling sanctions, which would last indefinitely at least until they disarm. And they would have to know this. So either they don't give as much of a shit about sanctions as you think, or they have no interest in developing a bomb and are just doing so for... what? leverage? attention? some domestic blahblah? the uncontrollable urge to be pricks?

I think that there's multiple viewpoints going on here that we need to think about. There's what Iran plans, what the US plans, and what Israel plans (along with various other powers and the Gulf states). Then there's what Iran thinks the US and Israel are thinking and vice versa. And what they think the other party thinks they are planning. Etc. It's complicated. So to understand Iran's actions, we need to think about how they assess the risk of further sanctions or military action.

My evaluation of Iran is that they are not currently interested in actually possessing nuclear weapons, but become a nuclear weapons 'threshold' state, with the technology to develop a small arsenal quickly and delivery systems for warheads. This makes them much more dangerous to their neighbors and provides some level of insurance against conventional attack. It also frees their hand to continue to meddle in the region. Best of all, it makes their enemies, both near and far, appear unnecessarily alarmist since they can still be cloaked in the legitimacy of the NPT.

If Iran actually moved towards breakout, they lose a lot of these advantages - the US and EU could probably pressure China and Russia into punishing sanctions, their neighbors begin an arms race, and they have a serious risk of military action. So it makes sense for them to develop threshold state capabilities without actually going for a bomb.

However, you'd argue that then Iran isn't really a threat without actual nukes, right? There's at least three reasons why that's wrong. First, consider the effects on their neighbors - there's no guarantee that their neighbors won't start weapons programs in anticipation of a nuclear armed Iran, or that they won't launch a conventional attack even without actual weaponization. Second, Iran can still be a substantial proliferation threat, of both nuclear technology as well as radioactive material for asymmetric attacks. Finally, events might precipitate an Iranian rush for breakout, and keeping such a rogue state at that threshold level is not only criminally stupid, but it also violates the spirit (and possibly letter) of the NPT.

In my analysis, this means that Iran is susceptible to pressure on sanctions, since the advantages accrued by threshold status (prestige, geopolitical power, etc.) can be offset by the economic harm that comes from sanctions. Appropriate sanctions and negotiation can push them a bit back from threshold status, and that is indeed what this deal has done. I just think that the Iranians have more elasticity in their demand for threshold status given the pressure that can be brought to bear, so can be pushed back farther. It doesn't mean, though, that Iran is always going to be willing to forego weaponization due to outside pressure - the aforementioned event that precipitates a rush to breakout can't be predicted or controlled. So it makes sense to make a safeguards agreement that pushes them back as far as possible from threshold status, and importantly, keeps them there. This agreement is problematic in that it allows Iran to keep on developing and acquiring technologies that would enhance their breakout push at some time in the future, and it does not adequately verify that they have been pushed back sufficiently from threshold status - not to mention that it legitimizes their threshold status in about 15 years. It's better than nothing, but that is not necessarily the counterfactual.

[GGT]

When the only realistic way to achieve your desired outcome is war, and the only country capable of fighting and winning that war is the US, and what you're doing in public is demanding that your desired outcome be... somehow... made to happen then that is tantamount to demanding the US fight a war for Israel.

Bingo. And since the US is war-weary, it makes sense to find diplomatic stop-gaps. Even with nations like Iran who are considered 'enemies'. Trust but verify has been a principle with political backing for decades now. Without the deal, there's no verification ability at all.

[Steely Glint]

Fair enough - and also, even if one were better informed, we're arguing about a 'could have been', so we're inherently limited in our ability to determine right vs. wrong.

Of course we do have the fact that the people in the room and negotiating on behalf the west &c did, apparently, think that this was the best deal that could be achieved, or that the chance of a better deal was low enough that it was not worth the risk in pushing for more and risking the entire thing, so in the absence of other evidence 'this was probably the best deal possible' really has to be the default position.

However, you'd argue that then Iran isn't really a threat without actual nukes, right?

Nope, I think as long as the nature of the regime in Iran is as it is, it will always be a threat to it's neighbours. Being a threat is a continuum not a binary thing though, and then there's the question of what we should do to mitigate the threat until at some point in the coming century presumably Iran will realize how absolutely ridiculous their bullshit is and get their act together. Because we can't just march in and impose our own order, I think recent history has proven that that's really not a very good plan.

There's at least three reasons why that's wrong. First, consider the effects on their neighbors - there's no guarantee that their neighbors won't start weapons programs in anticipation of a nuclear armed Iran, or that they won't launch a conventional attack even without actual weaponization. Second, Iran can still be a substantial proliferation threat, of both nuclear technology as well as radioactive material for asymmetric attacks. Finally, events might precipitate an Iranian rush for breakout, and keeping such a rogue state at that threshold level is not only criminally stupid, but it also violates the spirit (and possibly letter) of the NPT.

Their neighbours are U.S. allies and can presumably be dissuaded from developing their own programs by U.S. pressure combined with assurances of protection, the way other states were during the cold war. The proliferation issue is serious, but it doesn't go away because the program's been "destroyed" - arguably, a program destroyed by forced or unwillingly shutdown by Iran because the pressure of sanctions has gotten to them could potentially be an even greater risk of proliferation.

Unless you physically go in there with troops, seize the entire thing and make sure each and every last piece of it is accounted for there's no telling where the leftovers of the program will end up, and if Iran has been attacked I'd say they were highly likely to make sure whatever was left over went to, e.g. Hezbollah out of sheer spite.

At least with them nominally brought in from the cold, there's some scope to work with them to make sure proliferation doesn't happen.

I just think that the Iranians have more elasticity in their demand for threshold status given the pressure that can be brought to bear, so can be pushed back farther.

For which I have seen no evidence at all. Barely even some reason to justify that conclusion.