International lawlessness--is it a problem? Are there any answers?

[Aimless]

It's been a while since Osama's death, and now that we've entered the mockery phase with the porn stories etc I hope that we can use his death as an intro to a question:

are these sorts of actions okay? Hunting down terrorist leaders in other countries, suspected terrorist leaders in other countries, killing people (good or bad) without fair trials, declaring wars, committing acts of torture, committing genocide, and so on and so forth.

In which ways is it okay? In which ways is it good? In which ways is it wrong and/or problematic? Does it matter if a misdeed is done by the good guys rather than by the bad guys?





People here are either biased in favour of the US or at least biased against terrorism, so this may prove to be a difficult topic to explore without tempers flaring. If it's a problem for you, then I ask that you simply pretend the US doesn't exist, or that you're a scholar from Venus.

These are also fairly open-ended and somewhat undefined questions. I hope that you can nevertheless find some target and some avenue of attack that works for you.

[LittleFuzzy]

It's been a while since Osama's death, and now that we've entered the mockery phase with the porn stories etc I hope that we can use his death as an intro to a question:

are these sorts of actions okay? Hunting down terrorist leaders in other countries, suspected terrorist leaders in other countries, killing people (good or bad) without fair trials, declaring wars, committing acts of torture, committing genocide, and so on and so forth.

In which ways is it okay? In which ways is it good? In which ways is it wrong and/or problematic? Does it matter if a misdeed is done by the good guys rather than by the bad guys?




People here are either biased in favour of the US or at least biased against terrorism, so this may prove to be a difficult topic to explore without tempers flaring. If it's a problem for you, then I ask that you simply pretend the US doesn't exist, or that you're a scholar from Venus.

These are also fairly open-ended and somewhat undefined questions. I hope that you can nevertheless find some target and some avenue of attack that works for you.

So when you say international lawlessness, you really mean state acts, yes? Rather than the actions by non-state actors in the international sphere *classic example being global sex slavery* which was my first thought based on your terms.

[Aimless]

Hmm, yes, I was thinking of state acts. I'm not sure, but I think it's easier to agree when it comes to vile actions committed by individuals or non-state entities (eg. crime syndicates). When it comes to states you have the added spice of loyalties, an increased tendency to look at whether or not ends justify means, etc. For example, we can have long and multifaceted discussions about killing in wars or in the justice system, but usually have few disagreements about individuals killing each other for reasons other than defense of life.

[GGT]

Are you asking is it acceptable for a state-sponsored special-op force (Navy SEALs) to "take out" a guy like bin Laden....but maybe not for killing an elected a state leader? Or if it's done in another country there should be sharing of info and bilateral planning? (It gets cloudier for the latter )

Are you asking is it acceptable for a state to use private mercenaries to work the "hit list" of state-sponsored military actions? (Isn't that what got Ollie North in trouble?)

[Dreadnaught]

It's a legitimate question, but with an answer I don't find too hard to arrive-at when it comes to non-state actors. If states give up the right to assassinate non-state combatants, they are simply allowing non-state actors to vandalize the international order. They also allow states to fund non-state actors for proxy battles. I don't think genocide and torture really factor into it, those seem like totally unrelated issues to be.

But are you saying whether states can assassinate the leaders of other states?

[Loki]

The current international order was never meant to address non-state actors that operate across state lines. International law has yet to catch up to this changing dynamic. I would imagine that if state A kills an enemy combatant inside state B, state B has the right to try the individuals who conducted and ordered the killing in their own courts and can treat the entire attack as an act of war, but they wouldn't be able to do anything across their own borders. Of course the countries doing the killing tend to be far stronger than the countries in which the killings took place, so treating the attack as an act of war isn't really going to help anyone.

[Lewkowski]

International law for the most part isn't something to hold to. International law is only as strong as each individual country wants it to be. If the US says, "You know what, screw X treaty or Y 'international' law" then as a sovereign nation they can do this. Any country can. No international body can compel another country without the use of force, military, economical or political.

[wiggin]

Minx - a worthwhile question, though I think your phrasing is muddled (for example, lumping genocide, torture, and targeted killings together is a bit much). I think there are two points worth considering, much of which has already been brought up before.

First, in the specific case of OBL, I think a reasonable case can be made for its legality (in an international setting, though it's an interesting question whether it's legal by US law). One can either consider the killing part of an open war (in which case operational commanders are fair game), or one could consider him as a non-state actor and fit the operation into the rubric of targeted killings (essentially, a fairly involved argument discussing the immanence of the threat, the chances of cooperation/capture/extradition from the host state, proportionality, etc.). If the former, you get into a mess that we're not actually at war with Pakistan, so it's a little dicey how it works. If the latter, it hasn't really made its way into established international law yet, mostly since non-state actors weren't really considered when these rules were first made up. Nevertheless, either of these approaches can be bent enough to justify this particular operation, though obviously there will be dissenters.

I think there is also a broader question, though. For better or worse, the US can more or less do as it pleases right now wrt international law. The question is whether it should. As WWII came to a close, the US became the reigning superpower since it was effectively the only industrial power that had emerged from the war mostly unscathed, as well as having a number of other advantages. Interestingly, the US chose to foster an international order based on rules and international institutions - the Geneva and Genocide conventions, the UDHR, the UN, the ICJ, the IMF, the WTO, etc. They strove to rule the 'free world' (and much of the third world) by consensus and a set of agreed-upon rules rather than a Pax Americana. These institutions and rules have been surprisingly successful at keeping the world away from conflicts between most major powers, and has kept the global economy (e.g. trade, monetary policy, etc.) managed better than at any time in the past. Obviously, the rules have been set up to some extent to reflect Western values and Western power, but the institutions themselves have a much broader purpose and mandate, and have evolved over time to be more inclusive of rising powers.

The real question, though, is not whether the US can set up these institutions, but whether they will respect them when push comes to shove - in a time of crisis, or when US power with respect to other nations is not quite as overwhelming. The US' record when it comes to this is mixed - sometimes adhering to the rules with an admirable degree of seriousness, sometimes playing fast and loose with the established order. I think there are valid reasons to sometimes ignore the rules, but I also believe the US has a responsibility as a superpower to more or less follow them and work within the system, if only to provide an example for future superpowers.

So: The rules of international law were perhaps somewhat subverted (or at least bent) in this particular operation, which the US should take care to only do as absolutely necessary. Yet in this case, I think the fact that the rules needed bending implies not that the violator was in the wrong, but rather that the rules need to be revisited in our changing world. International law is a dynamic animal, and the US should be at the forefront of updating it for today's world - and providing a system in which to consider new challenges to the functioning of the world.

[Loki]

International law for the most part isn't something to hold to. International law is only as strong as each individual country wants it to be. If the US says, "You know what, screw X treaty or Y 'international' law" then as a sovereign nation they can do this. Any country can. No international body can compel another country without the use of force, military, economical or political.

Breaking promises has its costs, even in the international arena.

[Asmodian]

Surprisingly I find myself reluctantly in agreement with lewk not in the sense that international law shouldn’t be respected but rather it is not and never will be.
It is like Geneva conventions, I mean seriously rules that govern war? Really? Everybody knows that these go out the window as soon as you need them to go out the window to win, they are only really there so that nation can deploy a vastly superior force and attack an objectively inferior opponent and look all fluffy because they are following the convention. And even then more often than not these rules go out the window… Or maybe it works when a conflict is between satellite states controlled by greater powers that are not too committed to the outcome.
There is only really one international law that works, might makes right, and until you annoy someone who can oppose you whether militarily or economically you can do what you want.
There are consequences for pulling out of agreements unilaterally, in that agreements are usually signed for mutual benefit, and even if the benefit your nation derived from a particular agreement is no longer needed/valid, you may well jeopardize other agreements. But I think that supports might makes right approach rather than invalidates it.
You must of course keep up some degree of appearance for the public’s sake. I have not read much about the termination of Osama, so don’t know the details as to exactly why he got shot rather then arrested for trial, which would have been a better script. But if he was killed while resisting with fire arm in hand then there is no problem (at least they should have said he was resisting with fire arm in hand). Just shooting some 80 year old guy in the head without convicting him of anything is bit crude for PR shooting while attempting to apprehend him there is no problem. The fact that it was on foreign soil, didn't US have some sort of go ahead for such operations from Pakistan?

[Nessus]

I think there is also a broader question, though. For better or worse, the US can more or less do as it pleases right now wrt international law. The question is whether it should. As WWII came to a close, the US became the reigning superpower since it was effectively the only industrial power that had emerged from the war mostly unscathed, as well as having a number of other advantages. Interestingly, the US chose to foster an international order based on rules and international institutions - the Geneva and Genocide conventions, the UDHR, the UN, the ICJ, the IMF, the WTO, etc. They strove to rule the 'free world' (and much of the third world) by consensus and a set of agreed-upon rules rather than a Pax Americana. These institutions and rules have been surprisingly successful at keeping the world away from conflicts between most major powers, and has kept the global economy (e.g. trade, monetary policy, etc.) managed better than at any time in the past. Obviously, the rules have been set up to some extent to reflect Western values and Western power, but the institutions themselves have a much broader purpose and mandate, and have evolved over time to be more inclusive of rising powers.

Uh

What?

Let's ignore the fact that mass production of atomic weapons was years away, do you really think the US-UK coalition had a chance of going at it with uncle Joe? There would not have been a Soviet invasion of the US, certainly, but how would have subsequent events turned out if the Iron Curtain reached the Portuguese coast?

[Loki]

Um, the Soviet army was in tatters. There's no way Stalin would continue the war. There's a reason he was willing to give the US almost everything it asked for in 1945. At no point did Stalin cross any red lines.

[Nessus]

So why didn't they finish up?

[Loki]

Who? There's a vast difference between a defensive and offensive war, you know. The US and UK might have been able to defeat the Soviet army in central Europe, but they wouldn't be able to manage an occupation.

[Nessus]

I know nothing, you know that. Might've been, that's a nice sentiment, do we have numbers? Did they have numbers? Do you know where the eye of hind sight resides? Would an attempted occupation slash forced division of Europe beyond the Iron Curtain have been better or worse in the long run? Is hubris marketed by Hugo Boss this season?

[Loki]

A) We know the Soviets suffered far higher casualties.
B) We know that Stalin was afraid the US would invade the Soviet Union and was thus willing to make numerous concessions to it.
C) We know that an occupation of the USSR would be extremely costly.
D) We know that there was absolutely no popular support in either the UK or the US for a continued war unless strongly provoked.
E) Politicians don't think about what might occur decades into the future.

[Nessus]

Can I get some cites for B? I think I'm not remembering crucial things here.

[Loki]

I read this far too long ago to remember the exact sources. I think one was "Soviet Foreign Policy: year x to y" (the one that covers the 40s). I could give you specific examples: Soviet withdrawal from Austria and Iran, willingness to leave Finland alone, withdrawal from most of Germany, tolerance of limited democracy in Eastern Europe.

[Nessus]

I read this far too long ago to remember the exact sources. I think one was "Soviet Foreign Policy: year x to y" (the one that covers the 40s). I could give you specific examples: Soviet withdrawal from Austria and Iran, willingness to leave Finland alone, withdrawal from most of Germany, tolerance of limited democracy in Eastern Europe.

Our historians are probably biased, but the theory here is that Stalin gave up on occupying us because he wanted to reach Berlin first, for bargaining with the western Allies. Austria was...Interesting after the Reich, given how they executed people willy-nilly among starvation.

Either way, it assumes undue altruism on the part of the West for "choosing" not to drive the Bolshevik back to the Urals when they "had the chance"; as if there would have been a missile crisis or a stand-off over Berlin if the US had just walked all over an impotent CCCP. Again, hind sight resides in the

[wiggin]

Uh

What?

Let's ignore the fact that mass production of atomic weapons was years away, do you really think the US-UK coalition had a chance of going at it with uncle Joe? There would not have been a Soviet invasion of the US, certainly, but how would have subsequent events turned out if the Iron Curtain reached the Portuguese coast?

I don't deny the USSR was an important power, but as an industrial power they were woefully inadequate, and their military was in shambles. The only reason they were a threat to the US was their ideology and sheer size, but they were never able to convincingly compete on an industrial or economic scale.

This question is largely irrelevant to my point, though: all of the international organizations that established the new world order post-WWII were founded and run by the US. The USSR was an important party to all of these (often the only important party other than the US, at least at first), but it's the US that set up the system when they had no particular need to.

[Loki]

Our historians are probably biased, but the theory here is that Stalin gave up on occupying us because he wanted to reach Berlin first, for bargaining with the western Allies. Austria was...Interesting after the Reich, given how they executed people willy-nilly among starvation.

Either way, it assumes undue altruism on the part of the West for "choosing" not to drive the Bolshevik back to the Urals when they "had the chance"; as if there would have been a missile crisis or a stand-off over Berlin if the US had just walked all over an impotent CCCP. Again, hind sight resides in the

What would prevent him from resuming the occupation afterward? I doubt the Finns were disposed toward going to war against all of the Allies.

I'm assuming no altruism. I'm saying that if the Soviets decided to continue the war, they would lose. If the West invaded Soviet territory, they'd end up losing as well.

This question is largely irrelevant to my point, though: all of the international organizations that established the new world order post-WWII were founded and run by the US. The USSR was an important party to all of these (often the only important party other than the US, at least at first), but it's the US that set up the system when they had no particular need to.

The Soviets weren't party to most of them. The UN was the big exception, and it was set up during the War. The Soviets didn't join the IMF, World Bank, GATT, the revised gold standard, etc.

[wiggin]

The Soviets weren't party to most of them. The UN was the big exception, and it was set up during the War. The Soviets didn't join the IMF, World Bank, GATT, the revised gold standard, etc.

You're right; I misspoke (it's obvious that the USSR wouldn't be involved in our establishment of monetary, economic, and trade rules that emerged wholly from capitalism). I guess I just feel that the 'rule-based' part of the international order matters more on the UN and its associated organizations (notably the ICJ) and various international treaties. It took until the fall of the USSR for most of the world to agree on managing the global economy along Western-suggested lines.

[LittleFuzzy]

Uh

What?

Let's ignore the fact that mass production of atomic weapons was years away, do you really think the US-UK coalition had a chance of going at it with uncle Joe? There would not have been a Soviet invasion of the US, certainly, but how would have subsequent events turned out if the Iron Curtain reached the Portuguese coast?

Loki's put forth one position, I'm rather more skeptical than he is *but then also remember we're BOTH engaging in hindsight and what matters are what both Western and Soviets thought THEN. If Stalin was hesitant than he was hesitant, whether we think he ultimately had sufficient reason to be or not* but the whole thing is irrelevant. Whether or not you think the US was "the reigning superpower" right at the end of WWII, it did deliberately and successfully set out to create the outlined international order, and that international order is more or less what we live under today.

[Nessus]

I'm sorry, I'm going to write a small lump post at all three of you:

I have a hard time seeing how the events of the Cold War could've transpired had the current consensus (or situation, but since there's a lack of information on both sides, etc.) been that the USSR wasn't really relevant as a super-power. Of course their internal absurdity meant that they had to import grain (try wrapping your brain around that one), but if the US could have pushed the Iron Curtain back to the current Russian border using conventional forces in '45, why didn't they? It would have saved everyone a whole bunch of trouble down the line, no Cuban crisis, no Berlin air lift, the works.

One the face of it this seems like a whole bunch of revisionist history. The world was bi-polar for several decades, and for that matter you can't have it both ways; either god-emperor Reagan solidified the US as the sole super-power, or the USSR was never that important. Maybe we're talking past one another, I don't really know.

[wiggin]

As Fuzzy and I have said before, this is a largely irrelevant argument to my initial point, but here goes:

Just because the US is the most powerful country in the world for the last 60-odd years doesn't mean it didn't have constraints on its actions. The reason we didn't enter into a ruinous and costly war in 1945 is the same reason we haven't forcibly stopped Iran's nuclear program - even if we can carry it out (certainly likely given the asymmetry of forces), it's costly and the same ends might be achieved with different means. The US had no interest in running a trans-Atlantic war against a large, though undisciplined and poorly=equiped, force, especially when most of their allies had little to offer in terms of help. So, politically their actions were constrained, but the sheer industrial output of the US makes it likely it could eventually have prevailed in such a war, albeit at significant cost. (Obviosly when nukes entered the equation things changed, but it didn't affect the underlying asymmetry in economic and military power.)

I'm not trying to belittle the power of the USSR; I'm just suggesting that in a hard-headed look at force levels and industrial output in 1945, the US was the undisputed leader. They weren't the undisputed political leader just because the USSR established a large bloc of nations ideologically opposed to US policy, and it constrained their actions.

[LittleFuzzy]

I'm sorry, I'm going to write a small lump post at all three of you:

I have a hard time seeing how the events of the Cold War could've transpired had the current consensus (or situation, but since there's a lack of information on both sides, etc.) been that the USSR wasn't really relevant as a super-power. Of course their internal absurdity meant that they had to import grain (try wrapping your brain around that one), but if the US could have pushed the Iron Curtain back to the current Russian border using conventional forces in '45, why didn't they? It would have saved everyone a whole bunch of trouble down the line, no Cuban crisis, no Berlin air lift, the works.

One the face of it this seems like a whole bunch of revisionist history. The world was bi-polar for several decades, and for that matter you can't have it both ways; either god-emperor Reagan solidified the US as the sole super-power, or the USSR was never that important. Maybe we're talking past one another, I don't really know.

As I said, I'm rather more skeptical of the claim that the US was the sole super-power at the time, *IMO, neither the Soviets nor the West really had the strength to push the other back to their original borders* and if it was, it was only for a very short time, two years at the outside, while the Soviets were recovering. Wars cause damage, that one caused a lot of damage, and it did way more damage to the Soviet Union than the US. I will say this. During and immediately after the war, the US was acting like a sole superpower *successfully* and the Soviet Union was not. The US was creating a new international order to suit it, and the Soviet Union took longer to do that.

[Nessus]

Alright, I won't bog this down any further, we agree on the broad aspects (and I think you're both better versed on internal USSR history than I am anyway).

[Asmodian]

Which fantasy books are you people reading, USSR army was not in shambles at the end of world war 2 it was at the peak of its power. The standing army was estimated at 10-13 million (reduced to 5 million following demobilization after German surrender) most of these veteran soldiers that just won the war. it was one of the most well equipped armies, disposing of more tanks and artillery then all other nations combined. Not only that but those tanks and artillery were technologically superior to anything at disposal at disposal of the allies. The industry was already in the mode of churning out ridiculous amounts of equipment, and conventional ground war against USSR would be suicide.
The allies may have however had some edge with the navy which would pose a significant issue for any ground invasion of the American continent.